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ABSTRACT
Decentralization policy in India has coalesced in recent years around interrelated concerns over the
transparency of local government financial management and reporting systems and the capacity of urban
local bodies to implement modern performance budgeting and accrual accounting structures. This
dissertation examines the relationship between these policy concerns in the case of Bangalore and looks
deeply into the role of information technology providers in advocating for greater local government
financial transparency and accountability through financial management information system projects.
Utilizing the concept of legitimacy games I find that mechanisms to support coordination in project
implementation are subject to partially predictable but ultimately uncontrollable contingent interactions of
norms, values, and structural arrangements that surround government financial management information
systems. The latter are largely unstable over time given frequent changes to administrative personnel and
the broader authorizing environment. Consequently, coordination within information technology project
implementation spurs competition in legitimacy games between information technology subcontractors
and systems.
Under such conditions, forms of collective action around political accountability in urban governance
spur a double movement of information democratization and information closure in entrepreneurial issue
networks. As a result, the extent of effective local government financial transparency becomes
increasingly dependent on the internal characteristics and relative power of information gatekeepers. The
findings of the case study contribute to new knowledge on the relationship between information
technology and local public financial management procedures and practices.
The notion of legitimacy games draws stark contrast to conventional assumptions surrounding
competition in public sector outsourcing arrangements, namely that it is driven by the desire for larger
contracts so as to maximize profits or that it bids down prices in government outsourcing. The case
illustrates how behavioral incentives to link financial management information systems to public
transparency and accountability mechanisms emerge in highly localized confrontations not as a concerted
response to national policy. The real effect of such technologies on local state capacity has been limited in
the case of Bangalore. In order to achieve more transformational impact, policymakers, public managers,
and technology providers must carefully consider how to handle large volumes of financial information
corresponding to irregular transactions.
Thesis Supervisor: Bishwapriya Sanyal
Title: Ford International Professor of Urban Development and Planning
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Chapter 1: Introduction
1.1 A New Imperative for Municipal Finance Reform in India
The quality of local budget planning and execution, expenditure tracking and revenue collection,
and reporting and auditing has consequences for urban planning and the broader development trajectory
of cities and urban areas in India. This is the central implication of the "basics first" paradigm (Schick
1998) in public financial management (PFM) when applied to urban governments in developing
countries. Local PFM affects patterns of governance and development in cities through the traditional
objective of local government policy, namely the mobilization of revenues and the allocation of financial,
technological, and human resources to local development projects and services (Musgrave 1959; Oates
1972). The quality of local public financial management is a key factor contributing to the scope of urban
development planning (Smoke 2017), to the integrity of local governance institutions (Yilmaz, Beris, and
Serrano-Berthet 2010), and trust in the local public sector (Shah 2007).
Improvements to local public financial management may be key to sustainable urban
development and more transparent and accountable urban governance, but improved local financial
information is key to public financial management reform. As Rao and Bird (2010,20) describe,
"improving local finance information is not a small matter.. .the systematic collection, analysis, and
reporting of information that can be used to verify compliance with goals and to assist future decisions are
critical to successful urban development." Yet, while studies of municipal finance reform in India
frequently emphasize the challenges to urban management posed by limited local tax revenues or
ambiguity in authority over local expenditure responsibilities, most of the technical, social, and political
aspects of improving local finance information have been almost entirely overlooked.
This gap in the literature on reform is somewhat puzzling given three trends. First, urban local
bodies (ULBs)' around the country have attempted to shift their local accounting systems from single
entry cash-based systems to double entry, fund-based structures. Such a transition implies changes to
Urban local bodies (ULBs) are the formal classification for general purpose urban governments in India.
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financial information management practices, since double entry accounting generates different
perspectives on the position of local government finances (Chan 2003). Second, national urban reform
programs have increasingly bundled e-governance reforms with local budget and accounting reforms
through various matching intergovernmental grants to ULBs. Many ULBs have rushed to deploy a
growing array of computerized financial management information systems through national and state-
level reform programs. Third, national institutions of fiscal management have failed to create strong
mechanisms of vertical fiscal control (Rodden 2006; Rodden, Eskeland, and Litvack 2003) since
decentralization reforms in 1992, even as levels of transfer dependency among ULBs have steadily
increased. These three trends suggest an ongoing but uneven shift to financial management-led
decentralization in ULBs.
Much of the recent literature on the potential of municipal finance reform urban local bodies
(ULBs) to make the necessary financial, technical, and governance adjustments to effectively manage the
ongoing urbanization process displays a mix of optimism and pessimism (ADB 2012; R. Bahl 2012;
Mohanty 2014). The optimism can be attributed in part to the high expectations of conventional
decentralization theory (Smoke 2015, 2014) and the overreliance on it by public finance specialists
attempting to evaluate "what is desirable and feasible" (Smoke 2017, 153).2 Nearly a quarter of a century
following the enshrinement of political devolution to a third-tier of government in the Indian constitution,
surveys of the fiscal position of ULBs reveal cause for concern (Working Group of State Urban
Development Secretaries 2013). Whether the original impetus for decentralization was to reduce the
power of state governments or genuine sentiment for democratic decentralization drove the adoption of
2 For instance, the High Powered Expert Committee's model of the changing revenue structure of ULBs from 2010
to 2032 assumes the share of own revenues to increase from 48 percent in 2011-12 to 68.5 percent in 2021-22 and
top out at 75 percent in 2031-32 (High Powered Expert Commitee 2011, 156). Following the 14th Finance
Commission's assessment of ULB finances, this seems like an overly optimistic projection.
S1
the 73rd and 74th Constitutional Amendment Acts (M. G. Rao and Singh 2007), the tenuous fiscal
position of ULBs in India is brought into stark relief against the scale of India's urban transformation. 3
Although recent national urban reform programs have sought to draw closer connections between
municipal finance reform and the quality of local development, political expressions of the urgency
surrounding financial reform of local bodies date back to at least to 1935. At the Provincial Local Bodies
conference that year in Surat, Sardar Vallabhbhai Patel, the Chairman of Ahmedabad at the time,
colorfully remarked (and merits quoting at length):
It is being said that the franchise of the electorate has been enlarged and the local bodies
have been given very wide powers. True, I accept it. But what good would come out of it
unless and until the question of local finances is settled first. The extension of the
franchise and widening the scope of duties would be like dressing a dead woman"
(Government of India 1951, 1).
Nearly a century after that assessment, many of the questions surrounding the finances of urban local
bodies remain unsettled. Recent estimates of urban investment needs to effectively support urbanization
through 2030 range from $640.2 billion (High Powered Expert Commitee 2011) to $1.2 trillion
(McKinsey Global Institute 2010). Yet, the annual revenue yield of urban local bodies (ULBs) currently
amounts to just one percent of gross domestic product (GDP) (Ahluwalia, Kanbur, and Mohanty 2014).
Given the scale of India's urban transition, with projections of nearly 600 million people residing in cities
by 2030, solving the question of municipal finance is one of the greatest governance challenges of the
21st century.
As the salience of urban reform has grown in recent years, public finance scholars have offered
reform ideas and frameworks that might bring the finances of India's cities to life (ADB 2012; Ahluwalia,
Kanbur, and Mohanty 2014; R. Bahl 2012; High Powered Expert Commitee 2011; Mohanty 2014). These
reform proposals vary in scale and scope and in the extent to which they are derived from, and seek to
balance, normative fiscal decentralization theory and the political economy of urbanization in India. They
3 Even Mumbai, the best performing agglomeration of municipal corporations in the country, faces much uncertainty
with the phasing out of the octroi tax following implementation of the goods and services tax (GST). The
Brihanmumbai Municipal Corporation has asked the Central government to bypass the Maharashtra government by
transferring compensation "in lieu of octroi" directly to the ULB and bypassing the state government.
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all conclude with the necessity of seriously rethinking of the position of ULBs within India's fiscal
architecture, for instance, by devolving new taxes to ULBs, restructuring intergovernmental transfers, and
investing in capacity development. They studiously avoid what Bahl (2012, 7) refers to as the inertia
solution, where policymakers make policy and administration changes "around the edges" but leave the
current fiscal structure alone.
While most research on municipal finance reform in India has focused on the deep structural
problems in tax and expenditure assignment among ULBs, much less has focused on the political and
social aspects of reform dynamics around the margins of local financial management in urban local
bodies (ULBs). The continued emphasis on structural reform has resulted in a gap in research on local
implementation capability. The notion that changes "around the edges" constitute a reform pathway that
could be classified as "inertia" belies the reason the edges, or boundaries, exist at all. As Schbn pointed
out many decades ago, a tremendous amount of work goes into maintaining a stable state (i.e. inertia) as
new technologies or events push systems into sometimes chaotic, turbulent states (Schon 1971).
On a more practical level, propositions regarding structural reform derived from normative theory
do not capture some of the subtler changes in the political economy of decentralization in India's federal
system. For instance, while the 13th Finance Commission (2010-15) identified the need "for a stronger
incentive mechanism aimed at persuading State Governments to decentralize further" (Finance
Commission 2009, 149), no such mechanism seems forthcoming. The 14th Finance Commission's
adoption of a "trust-based approach" to monitoring the use of finance commission grants to ULBs could
be interpreted as abandonment of the search for such a mechanism. Instead, the 14th Finance Commission
report focused more on local public financial management, specifically accounting, revenue mobilization,
and auditing and the potential role of information technology to enhance these core government functions
(Finance Commission 2014).
This dissertation is concerned with the design and use of information and communication
technologies (ICTs) to support public financial management capability in urban local bodies and how
political and social attributes of information technology projects shape the trajectory of implementation
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capability. Drawing on the experience of the city of Bangalore (Bengaluru) 4 from 2009-2015, the study
examines the deployment of two financial management information systems (FMIS) in the Bruhat
Bengaluru Mahanagara Palike (BBMP).5 The study focuses on understanding how improvements in
financial information contribute to coordination, the role of financial management information systems in
local political accountability, and the extent to which outsourcing the design and implementation of
information systems supporting local public financial management are consistent with the public good.
The adoption of financial management information systems is being driven partly by national urban
investment programs (Grant Thornton 2011; Kundu 2014) and partly by local experimentation with
innovations in information technology (IT). The deployment and use of ICTs in the fiscal domain of local
governments is embedded in broader technological and governance transitions in Indian cities (Datta
2015), which have led to the proliferation of institutional arrangements in core aspects of local
governance.
The design of flagship urban reform schemes like the Jawaharlal Nehru National Urban Renewal
Mission (JNNURM), the 100 Smart Cities Mission, and the Atal Mission for Rejuvenation and Urban
Transformation (AMRUT) have integrated objectives around information technology and local budget
execution, project monitoring, local taxation, municipal accounting, and social accountability in urban
local bodies (NIUA 2015; A. Rao 2016). The main objective of the first generation of ICTs in local
administration in India in the 1980s was to ensure top-down access to accurate data for rural local
development planning and decision making (Madon 1993). The latest generation of ICTs in the fiscal
domain of urban local bodies are far more embedded in local governance reform. Prevailing problems
relate to integrating existing computer systems, linking tax services to greater transparency and
4 The name Bengaluru dates to the 9th century, though readers will undoubtedly be more familiar with the anglicized
version - Bangalore. Bangalore was the city's official name until November 1, 2016, when the Government of India
officially recognized the change that had been made years earlier by the Karnataka Legislative Assembly. Although
I would prefer to use Bengaluru in the dissertation since it is the city's official name, I will submit to the antiquated
convention that applies under such conditions when official name changes are recent - ensure ease of understanding
on the part of potential readers. As a result, Bangalore will be used throughout the dissertation.
s The Bruhat Bengaluru Mahanagara Palike (BBMP) is the municipal corporation of the city of Bangalore.
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accountability, and mobilizing political constituencies around local revenue administration. Drawing on
new information technologies and novel delivery models, institutional entrepreneurs have been targeting
diverse reform objectives connected to basic elements of public management, while enabling new forms
of participation in local governance through fiscal transparency and social accountability.
Even as the breadth of local government reform issues taken up by national, regional, and local
actors in India expands, the concern held in common across the political system is the capacity of urban
local bodies to implement policy, to mobilize new funds, and to transparently and effectively manage the
fiscal resources at their disposal (High Powered Expert Commitee 2011; Planning Commission 2008;
Working Group of State Urban Development Secretaries 2013). The emerging consensus around local
financial management reflects growing alarm that the material systems of day-to-day fiscal management
are insufficient to match the complexity of the contemporary Indian city and the dynamic social, political,
and economic processes unfolding at different territorial scales (Finance Commission 2014). In response
to these concerns, departments and agencies across all three tiers of India's federal system have been
increasing investments in information and communication technology for core functions of local PFM to
support the provision of efficient and transparent services to urban residents.
Can information technology improve financial management in urban local bodies (ULBs)? Like
most aspects of municipal finance reform in India, there are layers of social and political complexity
behind ostensibly technical questions. For if information technology can augment the financial
management capabilities of ULBs, this capability will have to be acquired in the short term through
external support from a diverse array of organizations and institutions. Some urban local bodies are
increasingly opting to contract out public financial management responsibilities to private accounting
firms on multi-year contracts (NIUA 2015). With the confluence of growing political concern over the
financial management capability of ULBs and a shift in subcontracting assistance for technical
administration, the question of whether or not public financial management capability can be acquired by
local governments through external support is crucial to understanding the prospects of public financial
management reform initiatives converging on the fiscal domain of local governments. With a growing
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number of contractors, consultants, and other third-party vendors involved in the development and
maintenance of internal control systems that span the technical core of local government, this study sets
out to examine the implications for fiscal transparency, accountability, and the overall quality of urban
governance.
1.2 Information Technology and Local Financial Management in India
Local public financial management entails a broad array of basic functions integral to urban
governance such as financial accounting and reporting, cash management, procurement and corruption
safeguards, debt management, internal controls and auditing, and external auditing and performance
evaluation (see Shah 2007). Historically, information systems for managing public revenue have been one
of the enduring characteristics of the state (Tilly 1992). Kautilya's treatise on the state, written in the 3rd
century B.C. India, outlines the structure of a public financial management system for government
(Chaturvedi 2006). Developing the technical and organizational capability to impose tax obligations,
account for revenue inflows, and control expenditure has been a key factor in both successful state
building and the historical evolution of capitalism (Arrighi 1994).
As the information age has beset the public sector around the world (Bellamy and Taylor 1998),
local governments increasingly aspire to the use of networked software and hardware configurations -
commonly referred to as financial management information systems (FMIS) - to support a broad array of
tasks in public sector governance. Though financial management information systems (FMIS) can be
standalone applications supporting standalone functions, the nature of information technology and the
implementation models through which they are delivered to local governments confer on FMIS a
teleology that emphasizes the essential necessity of integration to achieve higher value and purpose.
Consequently, as social and political interventions into a contentious domain of public sector reform, they
are potential sites of coordination, collaboration, conflict, and resistance within and between institutions
of local governance.
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The growing use of FMIS in the domain of local public financial management reform in India
(Rupanagunta 2006; Yashwantrao Chavan Academy of Development Administration 2009) follows
patterns in public sector investment in electronic governance (e-governance) in India. E-governance is
broadly defined as the use of information and communication technology (ICT) in government services
(Heeks and Bailur 2007) and digital support for policy making and group work between politicians and
civil servants on policy development and management (Six 2004). Government expenditures on
information technology are projected to rise to $8.5 billion in 2018, with spending on software and other
IT services rising to $1.2 billion in 2018 following annual growth of 15.6 percent in 2017 (Gartner 2017).
One of the most comprehensive surveys of ICT use and local public financial management found that
FMIS deployment is concentrated among ULBs in the south and northwestern regions of the country,
particularly in the wealthier and more urbanized states of Gujarat, Maharashtra, Andhra Pradesh,
Karnataka, Tamil Nadu, and Kerala (Yashwantrao Chavan Academy of Development Administration
2009).
The use of ICTs in local bodies can be divided between two recent historical phases from roughly
1970-1990 and 1990 onwards (Madon 2008). The first phase focused primarily on internal government
applications to meet central government administrative requirements for defense, research, economic
planning, elections, the national census, and tax administration. During this period, the Computerized
Rural Information System Program (CRISP), with hardware and software developed by the National
Informatics Centre (NIC), was an important technical resource for development planning in district rural
development agencies and as such a precursor to decentralization (Madon 1993). The second phase,
marked by the formation of the National IT Task Force and numerous state-level information technology
policies, expanded ICT use within a broader governance agenda to a wider range of applications in urban
areas.
Among urban local bodies the e-governance reform agenda extends to property registries, online
property tax payment, bulk transaction processing, global positioning system and geographic information
systems for property assessment (Jain 2008), automated revenue receipts, project management, budget
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control, network protocols for intergovernmental transfers, and intra-organizational
communication (NIUA 2015). Objectives beyond the supply side of reform include exploiting the
potential opportunities provided by the Internet to experiment with new mechanisms of fiscal
transparency and accountability, such as online citizen grievance platforms and open budget data. For
these reasons, among the ones mentioned in the previous section, the second phase of e-governance in
India is also distinguished by deeper participation among domestic non-government and private sector
organizations, international development agencies, and global policy networks (Madon 2008).
IT-based reforms deviate from conventional municipal finance policy reforms that focus on tax
assignment under fiscal decentralization or modifications to the structure of local taxes and fees. First, the
adoption of financial management information systems in cities invites new actors into privileged
positions within the fiscal domain. Second, as a higher proportion of local government financial sub-
systems become computerized, the technological and institutional foundations of local fiscal systems shift
although not necessarily in an integrated, planned manner. As the evidence presented in this study shows,
the range of intended and unintended consequences are both big and small. For instance, moving property
tax payments to an online platform may facilitate transactions "at a distance" that otherwise would have
occurred in person and therefore eliminate opportunities for petty corruption. Potentially more influential
consequences extend to greater risk of large scale technology disruptions that reduce the tax yield and
generate acute stress on local cash management 6 , to information rents and fraud from technology or
service provider lock-in, to contests over the political legitimacy of the budget position and fiscal
performance reported by city government.
6 This occurred in Bangalore following the conclusion of my fieldwork for this study. A new version of the online
property tax payment system, through which a substantial portion of tax receipts flow, experienced prolonged
disruption and failure. Consequently, property tax payments collapsed at the beginning of the fiscal year in India.




1.3 The Case of Bangalore
The city of Bangalore is emblematic of the intensification of information technology in the fiscal
domain of municipal government and of a growing diversity of actors in privileged positions at the
technical core of the city's financial management bureaucracy, some of the key characteristics of the
second generation of e-governance reforms. In this section, I briefly review the case that is the basis for
the in-depth investigation of financial management information systems (FMIS) and implementation
capability in the dissertation. There are many actors in the study, but the focal player I examine most
closely is the Indian Centre for Social Transformation (Indian CST). The Indian CST is a relatively new
type of social enterprise that combines deep, substantive experience working in the public sector in India
with information technology capabilities, particularly among young graduates of Bangalore's many
universities, whose skilled labor can be purchased at affordable rates. Before describing the Indian CST
and their accomplishments in Bangalore, a review of contemporary Bangalore is needed to set the stage.
Bangalore is the third largest city in India and the largest single municipal corporation in the
country by territory, with over 10 million residents spread out across 709 square kilometers. The capital
of Karnataka state, the city's large information and communication technology (ICT) sector is organized
around both large transnational firms and localized small and medium-sized (SMEs) enterprises in the
information and communications technology (ICT) sector (Sudhira, Ramachandra, and Subrahmanya
2007). The urban economy is starkly bifurcated between multinational corporations with strong ties to
state government officials and state policy and small, labor intensive enterprises that manufacture or trade
products in highly dense, centrally-located areas of the city (Solomon Benjamin 2000). The Bangalore
municipal corporation (i.e. the BBMP) is the statutory local government authority and is led by a
municipal commissioner who is assigned to the post by the Chief Minister of Karnataka. The mayor of
the BBMP is selected annually (i.e. one-year term) by the local council and primarily serves as a political
figurehead with no executive authority. An elected council serves a five year term, with work divided
between twelve standing committees whose leaders are appointed by the council and serve one year
terms.
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The BBMP is responsible for investment and service delivery in the area of land use planning,
public building construction, roads and bridges, solid waste management, storm water drainage, public
health, street lighting, and poverty alleviation. In addition to the BBMP, eight additional parastatals with
accountability to the state government control regional land use planning and local service delivery in
specific sectors such as water. The city has a vibrant and active civil society. Elite organizations like
Janagraaha and the Public Service Centre (PSC) have a long history of policy reform work with the city
and state government. Resident welfare associations, neighborhood associations, slum networks, and
other issue and policy communities frequently mobilize around issues of service delivery quality and
accessibility (Harriss 2006; Kamath and Vijayabaskar 2014). According to the latest Karnataka Economic
Survey, per capita income in Bangalore is Rs. 271,387 ($4,523) (Government of Karnataka 2016).
Table 1 .1 Key Characteristics of Bangalore, India
Population (2014) 10.1 million
Estimated Population (2031) 20..3 million
Area (sq. km) 709 sq. km.
Per capita income (2015-16) Rs. 271,387 ($4,523)
Population Density (per sq. km.) (2011) 11,901
Population Growth Rate (2001-11) 44.6
Literacy Rate (2011) 87.67
Road Length (sq. km) 13,483
Intergovernmental politics have been very dynamic since the turn of the century. The municipal
council was led by the Janata Dal (Secular) party in the early 2000s, which struck an alliance with the
India National Congress party in state government that allowed Chief Minister S.M. Krishna to initiate a
sweeping set of municipal finance reforms in Bangalore. This reform initiative would last from 1999 until
his replacement by Dharam Singh in the 2004 legislative assembly elections. Two years later, Chief
Minister H.D. Kumaraswamy (JD(S)), gave show-cause notice to the Bruhat Mahanagara Palike (BMP)
council and dissolved the governing body of the city. For the next four years, the municipal corporation of
Bangalore would be led by an administrator appointed by the state government.
The purpose was to amalgamate the city corporation with 9 city municipal councils (CMC), 3
town municipal councils (TMC) and Ill villages on the periphery to form the existing corporation. Now
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comprised of 198 wards and stretching across 709 sq. km., the BBMP held elections in April of 2010
where the BJP swept to power by winning Il seats compared to 64 for the India National Congress
(INC) and 15 for JD(S). From the May 2008 legislative assembly elections through the 2010 BBMP
council elections to the May 2013 legislative assembly elections, the BJP controlled both the state
government and Bangalore, first by administrator rule then through the BBMP council. Siddaramaiah, a
Congress Party MLA, became Chief Minister of Karnataka in 2013 when the Congress Party won 122 of
224 seats. Most recently, the BJP retained control of the BBMP council in 2015, winning 100 of 198 seats
to Congress Party's 76.
Figure 1.1 is a basic schematic of the task areas in the public financial management system. Stars
are used to denote the presence of a digital financial management information system over the period
2009-2015. From a technical perspective, the public financial management cycle begins with budget
preparation in the upper left corner. As can be observed from the figure, certain task areas fell under a
single FMIS system, while others had multiple systems operating in parallel. Still, other key task areas -
like management of budget authorizations, cash and debt management, were carried out with paper-based,
manual procedures. From a normative standpoint, the relative benefits and costs between software-based
or paper-based public financial management systems are ambiguous. When placed into a local context,
particularly like what existed in Bangalore in 2010 (e.g. partial digitalization, new jurisdictional scale,
pressure to integrate peri-urban areas into new system, no local council for previous four years), the
balance tended to lean in the direction of substantial costs.
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Figure 1.1: Computerization of the Local Public Financial Management System in the BBMP
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*Stars represent presence of an independent financial management information system (FMIS) software
system.
Following the elections to the BBMP council in 2010, the city corporation rapidly began adopting
information and communication technology (ICT) systems for public financial management. From 2009-
2015, the officers, engineers, and staff of the BBMP relied on at least nine ICT applications, some
overlapping, but only two were "technically" integrated. There were others such as Khajane, Karnataka's
state treasury financial management information system. The ones listed in table 1.2 were locally operated
and sanctioned by the BBMP head office.
Table 1.2 Main ICTs Used in Bangalore Municipal Government for Public Financial Management
System Purpose
FBAS Core accounting software system
IFMS Personnel management, bill payment, receipts
GPMS Online project management system; bill payment
FMS Online automated receipts module; cash management; bill payment
GEPTIS GIS-based property registration system
Palike 2.0 Online property tax payment
WhatsApp Monitor the status of public investment project execution
TenderWizard Electronic tendering
MS Projects/ Excel Monitor projects; miscellaneous support
It is in this context that the Indian Center for Social Transformation approached the BBMP with
the offer to develop an first an online project management system (Global Project Management System -
GPMS) followed by an automated receipt and cash management system (Financial Management System -
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FMS). The Indian CST is a registered public charitable trust located in Bangalore. Founded in 2009 the
Indian CST is a relatively new form of non-government social enterprise that is rapidly entering into the
market for e-governance services for public financial management in urban India (Rupanagunta 2006).
These smaller, often non-profit organizations compete with local commercial software firms and major
integrated business and consulting firms like Tata Consulting Services (TCS). Because profit in the
software industry is a function of standardization and scale, smaller social enterprise firms compete on the
basis of customization combined with lower prices. In many cases, they offer their software systems free
of charge on a public goods basis.
This study takes this break between extant information infrastructures and the administrative
structure of the local fiscal system as a baseline for analyzing how capability for public financial
management is constituted through attempts to generate, distribute, and use local fiscal information and
knowledge to correct a large information asymmetry embedded deeply in local management and
accounting control systems. In light of these issues discussed above and the limited monitoring and
oversight that remained six years after the BATF introduced structural reforms, the project management
system in the BBMP continued to degrade even as the city had tripled in size and added over a thousand
new engineers, As backlogs of project documentation increased, reporting delays began to extend from a
week, to a month, to six months, and, at times, a full year.
The Indian CST was founded by a small group of Bangalore citizens, each with professional
backgrounds in civil service, public accounting, or information technology.7 The social dimension to the
organization is spelled out in its public trust deed, in which among other objectives the organization aims:
To promote democratic ideals and stakeholder management in publicly funded projects,
and to enable all interested persons to provide inputs, monitor, participate, and
7 One of the founding trustees is R. Sri Kumar, had also served as Vigilance Commissioner in the Government of
India's Central Vigilance Commission (CVC). Before starting the Indian Centre for Social Transformation, he was
the Chairman and Managing Director of the Karnataka State Police Housing Corporation from 2001 to 2008. It was
in this position that he gained practical experience managing public sector construction projects all over Karnataka
state and began to understand the real need for advanced and customizable information systems to increase the
efficiency of civil engineers in the public sector and make public sector operations more transparent and
accountable.
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meaningfully contribute to the implementation of projects, resolve issues in
implementation and to ensure that the jobs/tasks involved get done and done well.
Two other aspects of the organization distinguish it as a competitive entity in India's software market.
First, the trust deed enables the organization to "promote innovations through dedicated research and
development of new thoughts, ideas and products aimed at improving the quality of life, public peace and
order and protection of the environment." Second, the strategies by which it promotes innovation entail
working "to acquire, compile and store data, invest in, promote, develop and make available technological
solutions for data collection, storage and analysis and to build and maintain the infrastructure required in
this regard."
Table 1.3 Characteristics of the Indian Centre for Social Transformation
Registration Public Charitable Trust
Year Founded 2009
Main Office Shivaji Nagar, Bangalore
Mission Statement "To strive towards excellence in all spheres of individual and collective activity
so that the nation constantly rises to higher levels of endeavor and
achievement."
Government Project Management, Healthcare, Education, Taxation, Public Financial
Sectors/Industries Management, Rural Empowerment
Software Open source, software as a service (OpenSaaS)
Development Model
Employees 30-50 (Flexible, project-based)
A basic financial management information system (FMIS) project that began with the objective
of centralizing project information evolved over the course of six-year period into a durable interest
network connecting government officers, citizens, politicians, civil society organizations, political parties,
technology organizations around local public financial management. Along the way, the FMIS systems
helped improve public investment project monitoring, helped uncover a major project scam that resulted
in the blacklisting of 32 contractors', and helped recover more than 590 crores ($92.3 million at current
exchange rate) of tax and fee revenue that officers had failed to remit to the consolidated account of the
BBMP. Moreover, the FMIS were used as a political mobilization tool by the Aam Aadmi Party (AAP)
by organizing local residents to conduct a social audit of public investment projects and by a member of
8 See http://bangaloremirror.indiatimes.com/bangalore/civic/articleshow/49850380.cms?.
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the Rajya Sabha from Bangalore to support a public interest litigation (PIL) case against the BBMP, the
Karnataka state government, and the Government of India.
What makes the case even more intriguing is the extremely low cost at which the information
technology was supplied to the BBMP. While neither of the projects avoided acute and systematic design
and deployment problems examined in detail in chapters five through seven, the Indian CST succeeded in
delivering two FMIS modules at a total cost of 2.5 crores ($390,750 at current exchange rate) over the
course of 6 years. These costs covered training and support to more than 7,500 officers, engineers, and
staff spread across the head office, eight zones, 198 wards, and more than 450 city offices. Demonstrating
their extraordinary commitment to reform in the BBMP, the Indian CST not only sustained but expanded
the systems even at times when the BBMP failed to reimburse them for labor and bandwidth costs. Was
this simply a case of solution and personality-driven change, of a charismatic institutional entrepreneur
working the levers of reform? Or does the experience of the Indian Centre for Social Transformation
(Indian CST) with the BBMP hold more generalizable lessons for the use of FMIS to enhance governance
capacity in the fiscal domain of local governments in developing countries?
Notwithstanding the opportunity costs associated with authorizing and devoting substantial staff
resources to the implementation of financial management information systems, the potential return on
investment is substantial. Though the study did not set out to model the welfare gains associated with
FMIS in local governments, the fact that the Indian CST was able to deliver partial automation of
financial transactions in the BBMP at the cost of labor and materials is a significant development in and
of itself. This success is significant given two factors: (1) the profit expectations among private sector
providers of information technology (including licensing of proprietary software) and (2) the relative cost
of capital to labor in the public sector. In combination, these two factors drive down the potential return
on investment in FMIS from the agency perspective. Thus, the case of the Indian CST's work with the
Bangalore municipal corporation provided a useful opportunity to better understand the trajectory of
social mobilization with and around financial management information systems design and deployment.
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1.4 Research Problem
Even as financial management information systems (FMIS) have become more common
components in the technical public financial management reform package in developing countries,
research contains limited empirical examination of the implications of FMIS for government capability
and wider accountability relations among local institutions of democratic governance. While the e-
governance agenda among municipal governments takes different forms and directions depending on
national and subnational context, two features are increasingly common: operational delegation to
information technology contractors and the normative goal of information democratization. Because of
limited in-house technical capacity, ICTs in public sector financial management tend to privilege
outsourcing arrangements (S. Peterson 2006; S. B. Peterson 1998). Reformers are guided by the premise,
increasingly central to modernization in municipal administration (Goodspeed 2014), that "more
information will improve the experience of urban social life and lead to the creation of many useful and
efficient services" (Rabari and Storper 2015, 32). Both of these elements are prominent in framing the
discourse around FMIS in urban governments in India (Rupanagunta 2006).
The contribution of FMIS to local government capability and accountability in urban governance
is therefore premised on the extent to which delegating responsibility for information technology-enabled
public financial management to organizations external to the intergovernmental system is consistent with
increases in the accessibility of financial information. Yet, there is very little empirical evidence to show
that this is the case. In order to address this issue, it is important to first understand how financial
information generated through financial management information systems contributes to coordination in
local government. Doing so will also required unpacking the evolution of roles and role relations between
external software providers and politicians, senior civil servants, and front line officers to assess the
extent to which the externally provided software and other systems are consistent with the public good.
This is particularly important as demand for local government FMIS drives up the private value of public
information, expressed in changes in the supply and demand for software and system development
26
contracts with local governments. Addressing these three issues in the study will provide a holistic picture
of the emerging role of FMIS in the governance of local public financial management.
1.5 Theoretical Approach
This dissertation draws from the principal-agent model outlined by Andrews et al. (2016) in their
volume on building state capability. The building state capability (BSC) approach is a relatively new
research agenda and analytical framework that has emerged as a response to critical accounts of the
failures in international development practice (Pritchett and Woolcock 2004).' The research agenda and
approach traces its roots to heterodox thinkers in planning and project management that emphasized
experimentation, adaptation, and complexity in development projects (A. Hirschman 1958; A. 0.
Hirschman 1967; Lindblom 1959; Rondinelli 1983). As conveyed by its proponents, the BSC approach
"seeks to bring the analysis of policy implementation dynamics in development into direct dialogue with
the latest scholarly literature and hard-won experience of practitioners" (Andrews, Pritchett, and
Woolcock 2016, 2). Research adopting the BSC approach has advanced novel concepts such as capability
traps, isomorphic mimicry and premature loadbearing (Pritchett, Woolcock, and Andrews 2013) that are
useful for examining information technology and local government capability.
The BSC approach provides a practical principal-agent model to study the interaction of technical
and social attributes of financial management information systems (FMIS) projects in local government
through an organizational studies lens. Rather than view successful development outcomes as the result of
state capability, the BSC approach inverts the relationship by starting with implementation tasks and
linking different tasks to different types of capability. The repeated conversion of task execution into
successful outcomes builds state capability over time. In the BSC's theory of change, institutional
' Though the state capability for policy implementation approach was developed in response to the historical
experience of development practice in multi-lateral and bi-lateral development agencies, the dynamics captured by
the model of policy implementation are not limited to the specificities of official development assistance. The model
shares affinities with the principal-agent approach of public choice economics, but relies on an alternative set of
concepts and premises that are beneficial to policy reform planners in developing countries. The BSC approach is
particularly useful for this study's purposes because it provides useful analytical purchase on the behavior of
"organizations" and "agents" external to the intergovernmental system.
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entrepreneurs wage "good struggles" that build on existing resources ("folk practices"). Success is
consolidated into new practices and procedures that persist over time when policy, programs, or projects
are adapted to local context by local actors and organizations (Pritchett 2013).
The BSC framework is useful to correct for the longstanding normative bias in the study of
municipal finance in the context of decentralization (Smoke 2015, 2014, 2008). The BSC compensates
for, on the one hand, a superficial understanding of the mechanisms behind supply-driven planning and,
on the other hand, the actions and reactions of end users in the fiscal domain. Regarding the former, the
BSC helps focus attention on the task environment of public financial management and unpacks the
different types of individual capacity and organizational capability that are needed to pursue normative
objectives of financial control, revenue mobilization, or fiscal transparency. Under conditions of weak
capability, the BSC approach posits that outcomes of reform initiatives are unpredictable. Regarding the
demand side, the BSC distinguishes between policy compliance and institutional entrepreneurship in
settings where local actors must creatively pursue development opportunities beyond the level of
resources under their control (Stevenson and Jarillo 1990). Thus, the conceptualization of policy,
programs, and projects is as it is experienced by those inside the policy domain.
In doing so, the notion of administrative "modernization'" is reinterpreted as an "ongoing process
of discovering and encouraging which of the diverse array of context-specific institutional forms will lead
to higher functionality" (Andrews, Pritchett, and Woolcock 2016, 51). As such, an important element of
capability is the ability of organizations to "discover and act on a workably correct causal model of
achieving the policy's normative objective" (Andrews, Pritchett, and Woolcock 2016, 83). The state
capability framework posits the existence of capability traps where local implementation is divorced from
normative objectives of policies, programs, and projects.
In order to understand the relationship between information technology and state capability in the
complex, dynamic, and contentious domain of local public financial management, the study needs to
closely trace the tactics and strategies of different actors embedded in the process of organizing. Second,
the study should evaluate the emergence of context-specific institutional forms and the extent to which
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they led to higher functionality. Finally, echoing the research problem described above, the study would
also need to be specific to the contextual contingencies that supported or undermined the FMIS as a
workably correct causal model for the pursuit of normative objectives.
The actors who are emphasized in this study are mainly the managers and staff of the Indian CST
and the changing cast of concentrated and distributed agents (additional commissioners, deputy
commissioners, executive engineers, assistant revenue officers, accountants). The benefit of a single case
study like this one is that it immediately draws attention away from policy elites to external agents and
their interactions with senior and middle management and frontline workers. While all three external
organizations that supplied the BBMP with multi-purpose FMIS system services remained constant, the
composition of senior managers, engineers, and revenue officers within the bureaucracy changed
substantially over time.
The BSC framework starts with the common observation that government bureaucracies are often
caught in capability traps of varying degrees of severity. A capability trap refers to weak organizational
performance of delegated tasks, where doing the same thing is not only not improving the situation but
usually making things worse over time. Capability traps are visible where there is very little normative
traction between dejure policy, program, or project design and defacto implementation. The burden of
normative traction is, however, not entirely on the bureaucracy. Social institutions, such as cultural norms
surrounding tax compliance, and field-level organizations within which state bureaucracies are embedded
also matter. The BSC approach to local implementation aligns with the recent "governance turn" in the
literature on municipal finance reform in developing countries that stresses strategic implementation
(Smoke 2014), local diagnostic and evaluative work (Smoke 2015), and sensitivity to the wider field of
governance actors within and beyond the intergovernmental system (Smoke 2008).
Some of the foundational concepts in the BSC approach, such as isomorphic mimicry, are rooted
in the new institutionalist tradition in organizational sociology (DiMaggio and Powell 1983; Powell and
DiMaggio 1991). New institutionalism stresses the analytical distinction between organizational form and
function, allowing that both public and private sector organizational strategies might succumb to various
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types of institutional pressures (normative, mimetic, and coercive) emanating from the social environment
in which they are embedded that make them "look" successful without actually functioning successfully.
Isomorphic mimicry, understood as adopting the outward forms of capability without actually
performing, can lead to premature loadbearing on agents and organizations. Premature loadbearing is
excessive stress placed on an organization by the practical challenges of actual performance on the
ground. New roles and responsibilities overwhelm both the nominal capability of the organization on the
surface, as defined by its legal responsibilities, and its latent robustness to stress.
In combination, isomorphic mimicry and premature loadbearing generate pernicious capability
traps. In short, the state fails to do even the limited tasks which are required of it. While local capability in
the context of decentralization has often been understood as the capacity to carry out prescribed functions
(i.e. compliance) irrespective of politics or pecuniary motivations, the BSC approach does not put the
consequences of low levels of normative traction (i.e. gap between de jure policy and de facto
implementation) in a simple binary success/failure framework. Capability is conceptualized across a
continuum from ideal capability to negative capability. In summary, policy and implementation, done in
the wrong way at the wrong time, can be a net drain on state capability.
Figure 1.2 illustrates the relationship between the three levels in the BSC model and the
continuum of agential and organizational strategies and system characteristics. Systems relate to the fields
in which organizations and agents are embedded, which set agendas through processes that vary in the
extent to which policy objectives and programmatic direction reflect factual conditions on the ground.
Examples of organizations include line ministries, firms, non-government organizations, civil society
organizations, and political parties. Finally, agents are divided between leaders and front-line workers.
The BSC approach assumes coherence is sought between agent behavior, organizational strategies, and
the systems in which the former two are embedded.
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The horizon of organizational performance is understood as the extent to which the system is open to
experimentation, novelty is evaluated according to functionality, organizational strategies are based on
demonstrated success, and leaders structure task environments based on value creation and performance
(see figure 1.2). Organizations are neither completely under the control of leaders, nor completely subject
to the discretion of frontline agents (Andrews, Pritchett, and Woolcock 2016, 33). Both front-line workers
and leaders in organizations choose from an array of behavioral strategies existing on a continuum.
1.6 Methodology
This dissertation is grounded in theories of state capability and focuses on issues of technology
adoption, coordination, and accountability in urban governance. I employ a single, in-depth embedded
case study approach method that draws on shadowing, document analysis, direct observation, and key
informant interviews. The unit of analysis of my study is the municipal corporation of Bangalore (the
BBMP) and the external technology vendor to the ULB, the Indian Centre for Social Transformation
(Indian CST). As depicted in figure 1.3, the objective of the dissertation is to understand and document
changes in local coordination and accountability (dependent variables) given the design and deployment
of financial management information systems for bureaucratic functions linked to public financial
management (PFM).
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External technology organizations influence the planning, design, and execution of financial
management information systems in ULBs in India. Digital FMIS systems are required to map onto
bureaucratic tasks while also conforming to rules and regulations established in prevailing legal
frameworks. The objective of the study was not to evaluate a particular reform program or project led by
a particular technology organization, but rather to understand how financial management information
systems support or hinder coordination and accountability in urban governance. In order to more
comprehensively understand and explain the factors that affect these relationships, I focused on three
intervening variables: rules/regulations, decision-making arrangements, and actor/network relationships. I
was interested in comparing how these "contextual factors" mediate the process of digitizing the local
PFM system on the expenditure and revenue sides of the budget. These three mediating factors are
interactive, since rules and regulations are affected by actor and network relationships and implemented
through decision-making processes that are dynamic at the task level of the bureaucracy. The third
intervening variable - actor/network relationships - is critically important to the study because the study
aimed to assess the extent to which financial MIS can support local implementation capability and recent
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reviews of local performance under decentralization have concluded that building organizational
capability is a highly situated, local (i.e. "on site") phenomena (Green 2005; Smoke 2015).10
1.6.1 Fieldwork
The data and findings presented in this dissertation are the result of eleven months of fieldwork in
Bangalore. Field research was carried out over two periods in Bangalore, from October 2014 to July 2015
and from September to December 2015. The original research design intended to conduct a comparative
study of the determinants of implementation and use patterns at the ward level. Just short of the midway
point in my fieldwork a series of political events in Bangalore interrupted the research access I had
cultivated. These events included the dissolution of the BBMP council, the failure to pass legislation in
state government supporting the trifurcation of the BBMP into three smaller corporations, and subsequent
local elections necessitated by the legislative failure. During this four-month period, new senior officers
were appointed, some middle managers were reassigned, and the local elections cast a political shade over
even the most basic interview questions. As field researchers are required to do, I pivoted and did my best
to study the process as it unfolded.
1.6.2 Single Case Study Design
Despite the developments that forced me to make adjustments to the original research design, I
could still examine contrasting outcomes within and across functional areas of the local public financial
management system holding constant the city and the external contractors. From the earliest stages of the
GPMS and FMS projects, success was accompanied by disagreement, conflict, and resistance surrounding
the adoption of a low-cost open source system in the BBMP. The technology never fully stabilized across
the local PFM bureaucracy, helping to reveal social and political dynamics that get lost when systems
achieve a taken-for-granted status. During fieldwork the financial management systems in the BBMP rose
10 This statement is not intended to deny the importance of institutional factors and incentives that are established far
beyond the reach of local governments, such as the civil service pay rates, hiring restrictions, or conditions for the
use of intergovernmental transfers (Green 2005). The point is that the day-to-day aspects of implementing FMIS
projects, like all computerization projects in the public sector, are local and as such are heavily dependent on local
actors and networks.
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to full controversies played out across both executive and judicial institutions. In addition, senior
managers in positions of authority at the BBMP when the two systems were introduced had retired or
been transferred to different positions, providing useful intertemporal variation in independent variables
like "leadership" or "political will" considered of critical importance in the extant literature.
Consequently, I could compare contrasting outcomes across subsystems on the revenue and expenditure
side of the local PFM system and across periods of strong and weak managerial control with respect to the
systems under investigation.
A single, embedded case study approach was selected as the most suitable methodology for the
project (Yin 2009). An embedded case study design would facilitate within-case comparisons. Single case
studies have been shown to be valid and useful research designs to test theory, at least in the "soft sense"
of testing propositions or hypotheses (Flyvbjerg 2006). The selection of Bangalore follows a theoretical
sampling frame, with the intention of extending emergent theory and filling theoretical categories
(Eisenhardt 1989). As denoted in the previous section, there were a set of interrelated propositions
regarding information and technology derived from conventional frameworks I wished to examine in the
case of Bengaluru. Because of BBMP's history with information technology in the fiscal domain,
extensive growth in parallel digital PFM information systems, and deep problems with financial control,
Bangalore can be considered an "extreme case" (Yin 2009).
1.6.3 Research Questions
The research questions that guided this study were informed by the growing consensus that "there
is no grand framework to systematically guide improved reform" within local government finance in
developing countries (Smoke 2015, 256). Thus, the study set out to empirically examine the technical,
social and political attributes of FMIS as a means for increasing the accessibility of financial information
and strengthening local government financial management. The study was guided by the following
primary and secondary research questions:
RQI: How, and to what extent, do financial management information systems affect local
implementation capability?
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The primary research question was complimented by the following secondary questions:
RQ2: How do relevant actors mobilize and advocate for more public financial
management information?
RQ3: What are the effects of their activities on accountability relations and local
governance structures?
These research questions are grounded in the multiple aims of the study, which included
contributing to a better understanding of how local actors organize implementation of FMIS projects on
the basis of imperfect information and incomplete control and how this process motivates them in
practical struggles of administrative change. These research questions originate in the limitations of
dominant normative frameworks applied to the study of municipal finance in developing countries
(Smoke 2015). These frameworks tend to identify categories of severe technical, organizational, and
institutional "constraints" or "limitations" at the local level, while still positing a "rational," "linear,"
and/or "sequenced" pathway for governance reform in the local fiscal domain. Moreover, they tend to
ignore information technology factors within the institutional context such as the co-existence of multiple
parallel information and communication technology (ICT) systems.
1.6.4 Data Collection
Given the paucity of micro-level research on the governance of municipal finance reform in
India, reliable information on the internal fiscal operations of urban local bodies (ULBs) in India is
obviously hard to collect." With extremely sensitive issues at stake, data collection cannot follow the
standard methods of random sampling and survey questionnaires common to social science research.
Therefore, a combination of formal and informal data collection methods was required, guided by an
" While researchers examining local public financial management processes face well-known problems of key
informant access and trust, many tax and revenue officers confront tangible threats to their personal safety. For
instance, during fieldwork an additional commissioner for enforcement in the Karnataka Commercial Tax
Department, who had a record of bringing tax evasion cases against real estate and sand mafias in Karnataka and
winning, was found dead in his apartment. Investigators in the Karnataka government very quickly ruled the case a
suicide, but public outcry forced the chief minister to refer the case to the Central Bureau of Investigation (CBI).
The CBI has yet to file a final report on the case. In short, the personal and collective stakes can be extremely high.
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anthropological sensibility. The analysis and findings are based on a variety of sources of information. I
rely on official reports and data on local revenues and public expenditure; semi-structured interviews with
government officials in the BBMP, local politicians, current and past revenue officers and engineers, staff
in the Ministry of Housing and Urban Affairs in Delhi, Karnataka government officials; archival
information and news reports.' The remainder of this section describes the research methodology.
I relied on a range of techniques for obtaining data, including field observation, shadowing, semi-
structured interviews, and archival research. The opportunity to shadow the work of the Indian Centre for
Social Transformation over the course of 2015 links the study methodology to the tradition of
organizational anthropology." The study draws on this tradition to conduct an ergonography, an
ethnographic account of work organization (Czarniawska-Joerges 1995) or "how things work" in practice
(Watson 2011). Ethnographic research approaches in public sector management are devoted to deepening
our understanding of the wide variety of social and political linkages between actors, technological
systems, and social institutions that span organizational boundaries and scales (Huby, Harries, and Grant
2011).
Over the year-long period I was located at the Indian CST's office in Bangalore, the extent of my
participation fluctuated. Data collection began with immediate access to the GPMS and FMS systems and
the transactions stored in their databases. In addition to the information from the GPMS-FMS database,
primarily the spatial and temporal flow of transaction information, the Indian CST shared with me 2,180
documents that accumulated over the course of their engagement with the BBMP. These documents
included official and unofficial reports (internal and external), minutes from meetings, government
orders, internal and external communication. This very large cache of archival material included
" The study was granted exempt status by the Committee on the Use of Humans as Experimental Subjects
(COUHES) at MIT.
" Pragmatist realist principles within the anthropological approach, particularly the potential for close and intensive
field observation to add relevance to the practice of management reform in complex local governance systems,
provided a useful model for the study (Watson 2011). The study, however, is not an ethnography in the classic
sense. While I was offered substantial research access to the Indian Centre for Social Transformation (Indian CST) I
was not able to secure such immersion in the work of other organizations involved in the governance of public
financial management.
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information related to social factors that are often treated as important explanatory variables but typically
abstracted into concepts like "participation" and "capacity development." I constructed a detailed timeline
of operations and provided an enormous amount of contextual information. Key documents, such as
official ward and zonal level status reports related to project management and revenue administration,
supported recall during interviews. Archival material dates back to the earliest, most tentative activities
between the Indian CST and the city government.
Shadowing has been used in influential research projects in organization studies and has the
benefit of allowing the researcher to see and document actual practices, while concurrently revealing
shifts in perspectives as contextual dynamics change (Czarniawska 2008; Czarniawska-Joerges 2007;
Watson 2011). I began shadowing by attending staff meetings at the Indian CST, accompanying software
technicians and managers when they conducted training sessions and other forms of interaction with
bureaucrats and officials, and observing work conducted in isolation from others. Over the course of my
fieldwork, I mainly shadowed managers from the Indian CST in their day-to-day course of activities,
which varied considerably on a weekly basis. A leisurely morning, suddenly punctuated by a call from an
executive engineer, would give way to a rush to assemble updated figures and the most recent status
reports into binders and to quickly argue the merits of different options for tailoring the Indian CST's
strategy to the inferred interests of the stakeholder we were to meet. The spontaneity surrounding
organizing across the supply and demand divisions of the local fiscal domain provided considerable
insight into the challenges of providing technical support to urban local bodies comprised of officials and
bureaucrats that are perpetually on the move.
I conducted open-ended interviews with the leadership of the Indian CST about once a week for
the entire duration of my time in Bangalore. Some weeks these interviews were more frequent, such as
during periods of intense negotiation and coordination. These interviews ranged from fifteen minutes on
very busy days to over two hours on slower days. While these regular interviews were framed initially
around gaining access to the Indian CST and to various actors in the BBMP, they evolved over time to
focus on how the Indian CST was adapting their organizational strategy to changing conditions.
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I also collected data through 50 semi-structured interviews following a pre-defined interview
protocol." These interviews occurred at various city government offices and departments such as
accounting, revenue, and engineering .1 followed a snowball sampling method similar to that adopted by
Fainstein (2001), in which I gained access to key informants and other interviewees progressively over
time as I became more immersed in the research setting. Such non-probabilistic sampling techniques are
appropriate when more standard sampling approaches are impossible or prohibitively expensive
(Handcock and Gile 2011). I purposively attempted over time to balance interviews among a wider array
of actors to broaden the variety of perspectives on and experience with the research subject.
Each interview began with a description of the project and an invitation to participate, with
interviewees expressing their consent to participate verbally. When possible the interviews were recorded
and transcribed, although I communicated with each interviewee that recording was optional and they
could refuse to participate at any time. Higher level officials seemed more inclined to allow me to record
their interview. I took either hand-written or typed notes during all the semi-structured interviews. In
addition to key informants who were central actors during the design, implementation, and adoption
phases of the GPMS-FMS system, I interviewed end users of the system. These interviewees included
engineers, revenue officers, political party activists, representatives of civil society organizations,
computer technicians, and public finance experts.
The objectives of the interviews were to better understand how various actors utilized the GPMS-
FMS technology and the information generated by it, how financial information was interpreted by and
for bureaucrats and officials in Bangalore, and the problems associated with changes to existing
information management practices. Combined with the archival information, collecting actor perspectives
on these activities provided useful context for understanding how changes were made and the
consequences of those changes for coordination and accountability. Through the interviews I also
inquired about particular features of the social context that led various actors to use the GPMS-FMS
4 See the appendix for the interview protocol and list of interviewees.
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system in certain ways in addition to factors that discouraged them from using the technology in other
ways.
In addition to interviews, I was granted direct observation access to a variety of different
meetings, deliberations, and negotiations over the course of my fieldwork. Direct observations of various
types of meetings provide insight the research phenomena under investigation through the diverse
perspectives of highly knowledgeable participants and informants (Eisenhardt and Graebner 2007),
including the use of use of discursive tactics steer the direction of change. I observed 11 meetings and
group deliberations, including three review meetings by city officials (administrator/municipal
commissioner) and a series of contentious negotiations between the IT providers to the city government
and the Special Commissioner (Finance and IT). The meetings were not recorded with an audio device,
but detailed notes were taken during the sessions, including direct quotes, and were augmented by field
notes and discussions following the meetings.
Table 1.4: Direct Observation Opportunities during Fieldwork
Meeting Type Purpose #
Review To review the progress of implementation of the GPMS system in the 4
Meeting BBMP
Integration To demonstrate and negotiate the integration of core financial 2
Negotiations management information systems of the BBMP
Strategy To discuss implementation of the GPMS in the BBMP 3
Meetings
Training To review the GPMS and FMS system functions and educate BBMP staff 2
Meetings on procedures and practices
Total 11
1.6.5 Analysis and Interpretation
The use of interpretivist framework is "to understand phenomena through accessing the meanings
participants assign to them" (Orlikowski and Baroudi 1991, 5). Rather than the goal of generalization
from the particular setting to a larger population, "the intent is to understand the deeper structure of a
phenomenon" such that analytic generalization can be developed to inform similar work in other settings.
The goal was to analyze information technology in the context of municipal finance in India in order to
understand the technologies and tactics through which local technology-driven public financial
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management reform ideas and actions are conceived, justified, and enacted in governance settings with
high levels of institutional ambiguity.
To identify the ways in which actors appropriated the GPMS-FMS over time, I followed three
stages of coding practice outlined by Strauss and Corbin (1998). In the first stage - open coding - I
categorized data collected through observations, shadowing logs, interviews, and archives into groupings
of similar concepts. After all the data had been analyzed in this fashion, concepts were organized by
recurring theme. In the second stage - axial coding - these themes were linked by constructing
subcategories that regrouped the data into clusters of similar activities. Finally, in the third stage -
selective coding - I integrated all analyses for each category into a set of core findings.
The data collection strategy made rigorous triangulation a key aspect of the case analysis and
interpretation (Yin 2009). Drawing from different data sources and critically reflecting on my position in
relation to the case interactions helped to develop a deeper understand the multiple perspectives on
financial management information systems and their effects on coordination, transparency, and
accountability in local financial management reform. The substantial archival information proved useful
to corroborate data collected in interviews and during observations, as I could refer to previous reports,
studies, orders, notifications, and other material that was created and shared to account for the
development of the financial management information systems in the BBMP. To the extent possible, the
aim of triangulating data sources was to increase construct validity and strengthen the case presentation
and findings of the study.
1.6.6 Limitations
There are limitations to the study that merit acknowledgement and require a brief discussion.
First, the study is an in-depth examination of a single case. Though I situate the case analysis within
national and state-level trends in policy reform and technical assistance related to local public financial
management, there are bound to be variations in the extent to which my findings apply to other
municipalities within and outside Karnataka state and to other country contexts. Quantitative fiscal
indicators of urban local bodies in India are in many ways misleading. Though the rate of change in
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annual revenue yields may confer on them the characteristic of commonality, in fact the third tier of
government is a world of differences. As the study will reveal, Bangalore is somewhat unique in that it is
simultaneously highly dependent on intergovernmental transfers (a representative characteristic of ULBs)
while also completely autonomous from many powerful centers of institutional authority in state
government. While these macro-institutional factors certainly played a role in how the FMIS under
examination evolved over time and are accounted for in the study, they were not the core variables of
interest for the study.
The study privileges the perspective of the Indian Centre for Social Transformation (Indian CST),
which is both a strength and weakness and perhaps limits the generalizability of the study's conclusions.
The strength it confers on the study is based on the value of direct observations of how actors'
interpretations and ideas interact with path dependencies to affect the implementation of strategies and
practices in response to major social and political disruptions to the use of basic administrative systems
that support municipal finance performance. Such a perspective is lost with the reliance (often implicitly)
on certain assumptions that allow public finance scholars to assert interpretations of "political will" or
"capacity" on the basis of quantitative analysis of expenditure and revenue figures. I have tried to balance
this perspective with those of other actors and organizations involved in the processes under examination
through triangulating the data and interviews from other relevant stakeholders and critical interpretation.
Nevertheless, such decisions open the study up to accusations of bias stemming from research design and
my positionality as a foreign researcher (Herod 1999).
Research on municipal finance reform in India requires extensive engagement in order to build
trust with informants, as certain components of the subject matter can quickly become intensely
politicized. Focal actors in the study at times expressed suspicion in response to my requests for
municipal finance information. Some of these agents were new in their position and rightly worry (for
quite obvious reasons) they may be associated with previous performance. My information on local
expenditures and revenues, therefore, is a combination of officially reported statistics, my analysis of the
GPMS-FMS data, and reports supplied to me by local officials and other interviewees. I have done my
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best to confirm the figures. Nevertheless, "discrepancies" are more the rule than the exception and I note
where there is controversy surrounding the figures. While these issues complicated the research design
and execution, they also served as inspiration to understand the situation better.
Consequently, scholars looking to do in-depth micro-level fieldwork on local public financial
management in India must build an institutional affiliation at the local level. I was housed at the Indian
CST for the duration of my fieldwork. This affiliation provided me the unique opportunity to observe in
close proximity, and over an extended period of time, the work of an information technology provider to
city government. While I conducted interviews independently of my interlocutors at the Indian CST, over
time key informants and other interview subjects came to learn of my affiliation. This is an unavoidable
consequence of the immersion process. While it is possible knowledge of this affiliation could encourage
certain interviewees in my sample to distort their responses, I made diligent efforts during each interview
to ensure my independence as a researcher. I began each interview by discussing my research affiliation
in the United States (MIT) and India (School of Planning and Architecture, New Delhi) and would first
ask about positive aspects of the interviewees experience with the subject under investigation. Finally,
given that one of the major themes of the study was performance and my extended presence at the Indian
CST coincided with a particularly dynamic period for the organization, I should note the possibility that
my presence contributed to changes in morale and effort, and therefore shading the responses of
interviewees at the organization and affecting results that otherwise would not have obtained.
1.7 Significance of the Research
Recent literature on the governance factors that influence local financial performance aims to
advance the literature on municipal finance reform in developing countries beyond some of the more
reductionist tendencies of normative decentralization theory (Smoke 2015, 2014). The research findings
contribute to this literature. In doing so, the study also links the effects of partial devolution and the
governance of financial management information systems (FMIS) to the institutions and practices of
decentered governance in cities of the global South (Roy 2009). Adding to the emerging consensus on the
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absence of a grand framework to "systematically guide improved reform" (Smoke 2015, 256), this
dissertation reveals how policy reforms and projects in public financial management that have
traditionally been framed narrowly as technical interventions are deeply social and political phenomena.
The dissertation does not develop a new theory of the fiscal bureaucracy. Instead, following
Hirschman, I seek to uncover how certain "attributes of backwardness are not necessarily obstacles, but
can be lived with and sometimes can be turned into positive assets" (Hirschman 1970, 339). 1 concede
that some of the empirical observations will be familiar to policy and program practitioners working on
and in local government in India. The study aims to provide motivation for seeking the causes of
successful and poor results at the margins of endogenous (i.e. at the bottom of the intergovernmental
system) processes of change and implementation as local governments experiment with, and strive to
institutionalize, new systems of financial information management.
The core findings of the dissertation have implications at two levels. First, while scholars of
decentralization and local revenue administration increasingly seek to overcome the "technical" bias in
the conventional schools of public sector financial management reform, the dissertation shows how
deeply political and contested technical processes of public financial management (PFM) and urban
governance are on the ground. In the case of Bangalore, the situated construction of local PFM practices
and associated financial information, and the cycles of local social learning during implementation, fed
bureaucratic and political contestation. The types of informational and organizational reforms to support
municipal finance that were under investigation are emblematic of the core digitalization problem in the
smart cities literature. Advanced technologies are present yet the quest for democratization of information
and transformation in urban governance takes computerization of financial management information
systems (FMIS) on an uneven and, at times, tortured track.
The broader conceptual and theoretical contribution adds to the emerging critiques of how the
process of devolution and the development of accountability structures and institutional capacity play out
locally in cities in India. This poses implications for how change is understood and analyzed. The case
study reveals the many detours on the road to devolution and the democratization of information. While
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both first and second generation fiscal federalism theory view rules and norms as influential, if
individuals merely follow rules and norms they cannot be the cause of change. Even as "ideal" processes
and procedures can be inscribed in laws (e.g. right to information) and fiscal rules (e.g. medium-term
expenditure frameworks), public financial management reform is fundamentally political and ideological.
Unfolding action within even narrow areas of urban governance such as assigning unique identification
numbers to public investment projects leads to substantive dilemmas that require contingent responses
from individual agents and collective actors.
As a preview to the narrative presented in chapter six, consider automated billing and receipt
systems. These are common ingredients in the "smart cities" package offered by commercial technology
firms to cities around the world. They are also increasingly a target of e-governance and national urban
policy in India. While these technologies might indeed generate substantial efficiency gains in cities like
Amsterdam or New York by reducing billing errors between a monopoly provider (i.e. local government)
and consumers (i.e. citizens), they contributed to political contestation and the first public interest
litigation (PIL) case in India brought against, collectively, the national government, state government,
supreme audit institution (SAI), and municipal corporation on the grounds of improving public financial
management in a city.
Regarding municipal finance reform practice from the standpoint of information technology, one
implication of this study is that reformers must reconsider the appropriateness of their efforts to inculcate
change management in the fiscal domain of local government based on formal institutional channels.
When exceptions have been carved out of formal budget institutions and policies for monitoring and
evaluating local financial management as they were in Bangalore, simply engaging in formal institutional
channels may not be enough. A second implication is that more respect must be accorded to the personal
and organizational frameworks from which actors intervening in the municipal finance domain craft their
knowledge as the basis of intervention strategies. More consideration must be given to the unique ways in
which technology intermediaries participate in attempts to modify fiscal operations at the local level.
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One of the more intriguing implications of the study relates to the prospects of social
accountability and the form and extent of collective action necessary to resolve the "version control"
problem inherent in mixed paper and electronic system. Downs (1957) pointed out that ignorance is
rational when the cost of becoming informed is high, which suggests a certain paradox associated with the
role of operational public financial management information. The ambiguity of the PFM information
circulating in Bangalore did not discourage collective organizing for accountability. On the contrary, for
the Indian CST and many others operational information incentivized regular face-to-face interaction and,
over time, drew actors together in punctuated moments where controversy and other dilemmas rose to the
surface of local politics. Though the Indian CST and other actors were aware that financial information
available to them was not necessarily "administrative fact," they still managed to make it useful in the
context of their interests given the incentives they faced. While the prevalence of high or low-quality
information does not directly trigger the functioning of transparency and accountability relations in local
governance, the way different actors assemble information for their own purposes suggests actors can find
creative ways to use what is available to them to circulate partial perspectives on fiscal performance even
in difficult circumstances.
1.8 Chapter Previews
Chapter 2 is a review of the literature on information technology and public financial
management reform. While most of the literature on financial management information systems in
developing countries has focused on treasury systems in national and intermediate-level governments, I
discuss the political economy dynamics surrounding the emergence of FMIS as an international best
practice reform. The chapter also examines existing research related to three gaps in the limited literature
on financial management information systems (FMIS), namely their relationship to coordination,
accountability, and the role of the state and private actors in core areas of technical administration. I
conclude that a new broader approach to information technology in the fiscal domain of local
governments is needed that focuses less on normative policy justifications but rather hones in on how
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local actors put information technology to use in complex environments characterized by high levels of
incomplete and asymmetric information and the various roles of new information technology actors
external to the intergovernmental system.
Chapter 3 is an historical examination of the drivers of subcontracting arrangements for technical
administration in the fiscal domain of urban local bodies in India. I argue that centripetal dynamics
drawing a multiplicity of private sector and civic-minded extra-government organizations into core
technical functions of governance can be traced to the policy design of national reforms that increasingly
incentivize the use of ICTs but provide for limited intergovernmental monitoring and oversight. As the
largest federal country in the world, ULBs in India are extremely heterogeneous and no single analysis
can capture the immense variation across and within states. However, the explanation offered is more
generally valid in the sense that it reveals the cause of structural constraints on implementation capability
at the local level. While some urban governance scholars have traced this phenomenon to class interests
(Benjamin 2008; Kamath and Vijayabaskar 2009), I break new ground in linking it to the clash of
conflicting design principles expressed in the intergovernmental system.
Chapter 4 investigates the proposition that better financial information leads to better
coordination. To do so, I analyze changes in the task environment of public financial management in
Bangalore to understand changes in management relations. I trace these changes to similar patterns in the
expenditure and revenue subsystems newly covered by financial management information systems, such
as sizable reductions in the cost of verifying administrative fact. In doing so, I show that coordination
accompanies competition among the different institutional configurations for outsourcing information
technology services. The combination of competition amidst coordination decentered the governance of
public financial management in the city corporation.
Chapter 5 aims to understand the consequences of decentered governance for local actors,
examining the significance of polycentrism in the PFM system for the construction of legitimacy and as
mediator of accounting and social auditing practices within and beyond local government. To do so, I
examine two concomitant processes that were sparked by the abrupt dissolution of the BBMP council
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following a show-cause order by the Chief Minister of Karnataka in March of 2015. I balance the
emphasis of the analysis between the institutional environment and the communicative structures (Black
2008) through which legitimacy within government is constructed and social accountability is pursued.
The contribution of this chapter is a deeper understanding of the constraints and opportunities to
information democratization posed by polycentric regulatory arrangements.
Chapter 6 examines the extent to which FMIS deployment contributed to public accountability, in
particular changes in compact and/or changes in politics. The chapter compares two positive outcomes
that would, on the surface, seem to be consistent with conventional technical notions of performance and
accountability. The first outcome was the remittance of "floating funds" that were not being transferred to
the central account of the BBMP. The second outcome was the filing of a public interest litigation against
the Government of India, the State of Karnataka, and the BBMP for gross negligence in financial
management. Upon deeper examination, the two outcomes present a paradox: are internal audits
inconsistent with revenue mobilization? The public interest litigation provides empirical evidence for
growing social ties between local financial management and urban governance reform. The discussion
that follows the presentation addresses the third proposition under investigation in the study on whether or
not information technology improves accountability.
Chapter 7 concludes the dissertation with a summary of the results of the study and implications
for future research.
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Chapter 2: Government Information Technology Projects and Public Financial
Management Reform: A Review of the Literature
2.1 Introduction
Given the array of information problems in local governments reported in case studies and
reviews of municipal finance reform in developing countries (R. W. Bahl and Linn 1992; Devas 2003;
Smoke 2008, 1993), the prospects for reform driven by improved information technology continue to
push expectations in many development policy circles. Does technology make financial management
reform easier or harder for municipal governments? 5 Most studies on computerization and tax
administration conclude that IT projects are risky, complex initiatives that frequently exceed the
implementation capability of tax bureaus in both developed and developing countries. In one of the earlier
reviews of technology and tax administration in developing countries, Glenn Jenkins concluded that "if
we want to avoid the cycle of unfulfilled expectations, we need to have a clear strategy for administrative
reform, which is much broader and more sophisticated than one which simply implements information
technology" (G. Jenkins 1996, 13).
Most studies that have set out to understand what might constitute a broader and more
sophisticated strategy than one which "simply implements information technology" focus almost
exclusively on central and/or intermediate-level governments (i.e. state/province) (see Bird and Zolt 2008
for a review; Dener, Watkins, and Dorotinsky 2011; Dhillon and Bouwer 2005). Local governments are
mostly overlooked. A survey of the existing literature reveals a series of concerns. First, conceptual and
analytical approaches have tended to be framed in overly standardized and fragmented ways, focusing on
the functional areas of tax administration that are amenable to computerization and various technical
considerations associated with reform. There is a clear tendency to evaluate cases in a binary
"s There is another angle to this question that is beyond the scope of this study. By altering the economy,
technological change alters the tax base and therefore has implications for the overall design of national and
subnational tax systems. For instance, some studies have analyzed how growth in electronic commerce might shift
levels of dependence between consumption and income taxes (Ainsworth 2013). This issue is discussed thoroughly
in the context of transnational, national government, and regional government tax systems, but much less so for
local tax system design (Graetz 2000). Because this is not the focus of the current study, this literature is not
reviewed here.
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success/failure framework, even though public sector IT projects are more appropriately thought of as a
"winding journey" rather than a "specific destination" (Heeks and Stanforth 2007). Consequently, social
and political attributes of IT-projects, or how technical design decisions interact with changes to social
and political conditions in the context of implementation, are less well understood. 6 Second, broad
structural variables relating to state performance, such as organizational change, administrative capacity,
and political will, are often treated in a perfunctory manner. Third, because of the standardized and
fragmented approach in the literature, studies sometimes suffer from omitted variable bias. Fundamental
changes in hardware and software design, and the diversity of institutional arrangements these factors
open up for the production of public financial management, often remain unexplored.
These characteristics of extant studies point to major gaps in the literature on technology and
municipal finance reform. First, there has been little discussion of the important political economy factors
driving the rapid growth of IT-projects for public financial management in municipal governments.
Second, the highly technical framing of relevant issues overly simplifies the diversity of perspectives and
interests among and between a wide range of actors on the meaning and use of information technology.
Third, the conceptual boundaries between the intended purposes and objectives of IT-projects and the
functional areas of public financial management, while serving a clear analytical purpose, cannot be so
clearly enforced in the practical setting of implementation. Information technology, as distinct from other
forms of production technology, has the intrinsic characteristic of "drift" (Ciborra and Associates 2000).18
Some even argue that growth in the number of programming languages and the overall complexity of
" Peterson (2006) advances a similar argument. While it is obvious that information technology is not an integral
component of public finance knowledge, public financial management cannot avoid the gales of global digitalization
in the information technology revolution. There is a clear need in the literature on municipal finance reform to take
seriously the theoretical significance of the IT artifact (Orlikoski and Iacono 2001) in addition to the context in
which is introduced or the underlying dependent variables IT adoption is intended to affect.
7 After two decades of remote computing via desktop personal computers (PCs), virtualization and cloud computing
herald a return to mainframe computing. With the expansion of virtual data centers that pool storage, networking,
and computing resources and dynamically allocate them on-demand, conventional limitations of public sector ICTs
related from average and marginal costs of technology to institutional ownership of software and control over its
design and deployment are lifted for a wider range of municipal governments in poor countries.
"8 We do not have to go to the far side of postmodernism to recognize that information technology is increasingly
embedded in an complex ecosystem of technical, social, and political relations that makes it for more editable,
reprogrammable, and distributable (Kallinikos, Aaltonen, and Marton 2013) than in recent decades.
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software systems (i.e. lines of code for a given system to be sustained over time) has far exceeded
technical and organizational capabilities in both the public and private sector (Peled 2000). Modern
software systems evolve over time, have a tendency to grow beyond their original objectives and design
purposes. What are the implications for public financial management reform in municipal government?
The aim of this literature review is to broaden the debates on information technology and
financial management in municipal government and provide a theoretical foundation for the study. An
interdisciplinary perspective is needed since the technology question applied to local public financial
management has not received consistent attention in the applied field of municipal finance reform in
developing countries. Broadening the scope of the debates is also merited by the evident imbrication of
global smart city movement (Glasmeier and Christopherson 2015), which thrives on a set of
presuppositions related to the effectiveness of information technology applications for urban
development, and national urban policy in India with the Prime Minister Narendra Modi's Smart Cities
Mission (Rao 2016)." In order to broaden the debate, I organize this review of the social and political
attributes of IT into three areas of concern variably shared by policymakers, bureaucrats, civil society
organizations, private sector firms (technology, accounting), and citizens: efficiency and coordination in
bureaucratic functions, fiscal transparency and accountability, and the role of the state and private sector
in outsourcing arrangements for public financial management services.
2.2 Public Financial Management and Information Technology
Public financial management is an umbrella construct that cuts across the conventional divisions
of fiscal administration, encompassing information, processes, and rules that support both fiscal
policymaking and the instruments for its implementation (Budina et al. 2013). Public financial
management practice is deeply embedded in the ascent of new public management in development policy
" It should be noted that among the many advisors to Prime Minister Narendra Modi's Smart Cities Mission was
Bloomberg Philanthropies, the charitable arm of Bloomberg L.P., which leveraged "its expertise in designing large
scale competition for cities and its deep urban policy expertise and network to support the success of the Smart
Cities Mission."
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circles, though the field remains a "work in progress." The field is subject to ongoing debates about how
to define and measure success and failure, confusion over government roles, focus, and the relevance of
different budget formats for different development outcomes (Peterson 2014).20 Modem perspectives on
PFM, however, can be traced to the debate in the 1970s on federal government budget reform in the
United States (Schick 1966; Wildavsky 1978) and the rapid spread of program and performance
budgeting in the guise of "international best practice" in new public management (Andrews 2006).21
PFM also encompasses the implications of financial management procedures and practices in
local governments for political, social, and economic development. The various functions of local PFM
are distributed vertically within a national political system, from apex judicial institutions like courts
down to frontline workers in local government. PFM functions are also distributed horizontally across
government departments and civil society (Andrews et al. 2014). Public financial management practices
are embedded in overlapping processes, systems, and institutions of state and society including the legal
frameworks that empower government to collect and spend tax revenue, political and technical decisions
related to budget design and execution, and the routine tax and fee transactions between the state, firms,
and citizens.
The past three decades have seen public financial management in developing countries
increasingly fashioned into a sector that deploys information and communication technologies (ICT) for a
growing array of purposes. What started out with a fairly limited scope in the 1980s as a tool for rural
development planning and urban land registration systems (Cohen 2001), frequently delivered to poor
countries through official development assistance, has now transformed into a global industry. The
variety of hardware and software systems to support public financial management in developing countries
has grown rapidly. For instance, radio frequency identification (RFID) tolling systems are now used on
20 Peterson (2014) identifies control, management, and planning with roles; inputs, outputs, and outcomes with
focus; and line item, performance, and program with budget format.
21 Among prominent public finance advisors in development policy circles, the debate was refashioned into a "basics
first" school and a "performance based" school (Schick 1998). The "basics" of PFM include a reliable annual
budget, cash-based budgeting, itemized control of expenditures, while performance-oriented PFM entails medium-
term fiscal frameworks, accrual accounting, and budgeting for outputs and outcomes (Caiden 2010).
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roads throughout the developing world. Web-enabled property tax portals have proliferated in city
governments across Asia and Africa.
Two characteristics of local governments in developing countries help to problematize the
technical perspective on public financial management. First, the incentives that influence bureaucrats and
politicians in and around local government authorities are heavily influenced by the extent and quality of
decentralization policy implementation. As decentralization is related to but distinct from public financial
management, coordination between the actors and institutions that influence the adoption of changes to
local financial procedures and practices is important (Fedelino and Smoke 2013). Sound public financial
management practices are an essential ingredient to generating the long-term benefits of decentralization
reform. Yet, uneven and partial implementation of decentralization policy that constrains the fiscal
autonomy and accountability of local governments leaves them with few resources, and fewer good
reasons, to support or sanction frontline PFM officers to enforce national PFM reform principles and
objectives (Fedelino and Smoke 2013). As the lowest unit in the intergovernmental system, local
governments are frequently forced to make do with competing and conflicting incentives between public
financial management and devolution policy.
Second, for much of the recent period during which public financial management has emerged as
a distinct field, local governments in both developed and developing countries have operated under major
"soft budget" conditions. As such the budget process "masks the real distribution and spending...all the
actors, from civil society, government, and donors seem aware that many of their statements and actions
have little bearing on actual distribution of resources. Yet, all stakeholders 'act' strategically as if the
budget planning and formulation will actually have a bearing on the actual implementation and
distribution of resources" (Rakner et al. 2004). In other words, the budget is a myth and the budget
process is theater. In such a setting, the budget is not a collection of hard facts or what Schumpeter
referred to as the "skeleton of the state stripped of all misleading ideologies" (Schumpeter 1918, 100)
Conventional municipal finance theory derived from the normative decentralization theory
perspective assumes the presence of a social mechanism to discipline local government performance,
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either through voice (i.e. elections) or mobility (i.e. exit) (Cheema and Rondinelli 2007; Tiebout 1956).
The extent to which local governments or other service delivery organizations respond in practice to the
expression of public interests, however, depends critically on the structure and exercise of local political
power. In the context of public financial management, local elections are a blunt and therefore weak
instrument of accountability. This is case, in part, because local taxation simply has not made it onto the
public political agenda in the global South (Moore 2004b). Consequently, the literature on
decentralization and municipal finance reform in developing countries has been focusing more on local
institutions of financial management and accounting control (Baltaci and Yilmaz 2007, 2006; Yilmaz,
Beris, and Serrano-Berthet 2010).
2.2.1 Financial Management Information Systems (FMIS) as the Rise of a Global Best Practice
Financial management information systems (FMIS) are perceived as a compelling public
management tool to address fragmented financial management systems that inhibit information sharing
and knowledge management capabilities in financial administration (Diamond and Khemani 2005; S.
Peterson 2015). FMIS are intended to support diverse objectives for financial administration, control,
reporting, and auditing. The broad scope and functionality of IFMIS make them complex boundary
objects (Bowker and Star 1999) among the multiple actors involved in coupling local fiscal policy to
evidence and the broader trajectory of public financial management reform. As technical interventions,
FMIS are multi-year development projects that typically exceed the tenures of both elected officials and
senior and mid-level managers.
The World Bank and International Monetary Fund began incorporating integrated financial
management information systems (IFMIS) into the standard public financial management reform package
for middle and low-income countries in the early 1990s ( Andrews et al. 2014; Dener, Watkins, and
Dorotinsky 2011). In an examination of national PFM reforms in Africa, Andrews (2010,43) found that
performance reports in 20 of 31 countries "refer explicitly to FMIS/IFMS or some form of
computerization in budget execution especially (and another 10 refer to the need for this)." From 1984 to
2009, the World Bank financed 87 financial management information systems projects totaling $2.2
53
billion, of which $938 million was for information and communication technology (ICT) (Dener et al.
2011). The rapid growth in PFM inputs in development assistance to national governments culminated
with FMIS becoming "gold standards" in operational lending and technical assistance among the donor
community (Dener, Watkins, and Dorotinsky 2011; Hove and Wynne 2010).
The deployment of information and communication technologies (ICTs) can be seen within a
broader evolution of the discourse on government finance in developing countries to create reciprocal
benefits between democratic governance and market transactions and to improve the supply of financial
and other accounting information to monitor and enforce economic, social, and political contracts (Chan
2003). These shifts are promoted, in part, by the World Bank and International Monetary Fund (IMF) as
part of their lending and program support for public financial management reforms (Dener, Watkins, and
Dorotinsky 2011; Diamond and Khemani 2005; A. Khan and Pessoa 2010; Lewis 2009).22 The ascent of
business principles in the public sector as a result of the New Public Management (NPM) agenda and
notions of technological determinism attached to e-government projects (Muid 1994; Reschenthaler and
Thompson 1996) has also contributed to the trend. Major private sector financial and consulting firms
have also accelerated growth in the market for ICTs in financial administration by linking them with
structural adjustment and economic growth in developing countries. They promote ICTs to drive the
standardization of public management reforms - such as medium-term expenditure frameworks and FMIS
(Fyson 2009; Schiavo-Campo 2009).
Various themes related to the political economy of decentralization, such as the tradeoffs between
central oversight and local autonomy, are noted in technical publications on IFMIS. For instance, Hashim
(2014, 83) observes that local governments prefer "to be able to control payments without reference to a
functionary at the center." It is argued that central government FMIS can successfully alleviate some of
the technical capacity constraints observed in local governments if "the system is provided as a service
22 In a review of the first generation of World Bank urban assistance projects, Cohen (2001) concludes that there are
few instances where urban land registration systems can be shown to have increased property tax revenue.
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rather than an attempt to control local government budget execution by the center" (Ibid.: 83).
Subnational considerations include whether an FMIS designed for a central government has relevance to
local government's fiscal management and the logistical issues with extending network functionality to
hundreds or thousands of subnational government units distributed across a large national territory.
There are concerns among development practitioners that FMIS applications, as one product in
the larger suite of information and communication technologies for development (ICT4D), are simply a
solution in search of problem (Choudhuri 2012). The critique is that they are inappropriate for a
developing country context and serve, in the final analysis, to reinforce conditions that sustain the budget
institutions of the state as "theater" (Hove and Wynne 2010; Rakner et al. 2004). Despite the rapid
expansion and penetration of cellular technology into poor areas in developing countries, the "digital
divide" between rich and poor in developing countries persists (James 2004). This divide calls into
question the extent of effective, broad-based demand among the poor for these particular technology
applications in government.
As large, multinational software companies and accounting firms turned their attention to public
financial management in the late 1990s, global diffusion patterns were driven by commercial off-the-shelf
(COTS) integrated IFMIS systems. The business case for COTS was straightforward. Commercial
applications were considered more sustainable and avoided technology lock-in to obsolete standards or
protocols since commercial firms could be relied upon to update technology (Bird and Zolt 2008). With
some support from new public management that stressed the potential for electronic government to
support business process reengineering, a new reform discourse emerged that stressed the potential for
FMIS to drive public financial management reform. The global diffusion of FMIS was further shaped by
the conjunction of two phenomena. First, private financial and accounting consultancy firms gained
influence in national public financial management in the wake of the Asian Financial Crisis. Second,
public financial management (PFM) began a rapid and deep colonization of official development
assistance (ODA).
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In practice, as the ratio of successful IFMIS projects to partial or complete failures began to skew
in the direction of the latter, ideas drawn from the "basics first" debate seeped into the growing but still
limited literature on the computerization of public financial management (Peterson 2006). The hegemonic
perspective on the value of large, integrated systems developed by the global technology firms gained a
competing perspective that argued for incremental computerization starting with core budget control and
payment/receipt processing functions .2' After these "basics" had been mastered first, then governments
could move on to performance budgeting. This alternative position was informed by evidence from e-
governance studies on the technical parameters of successful information and communication technology
projects in developing countries. These empirical studies concluded that digital information systems
software are powerful technical inscriptions that frequently do not conform to procedures and social
relations embedded in local contexts and that adjustment of systems purposefully designed for private
sector firms or those imported from the West was insufficient to close the design-reality gap (Heeks
2002).
The current debate over appropriate technology in the limited research is framed between
commercial off-the-shelf integrated applications or the local development of customized, "bespoke"
software applications (S. Peterson 2006; Prichard 2014). Conceptually, there is a strong case that because
information technology is not their operational core, local government information technology capacity is
likely to be low and therefore they should rely on COTS software (Bird and Zolt 2008). On the other
hand, COTS have particular risks for local governments. They lock the public sector into proprietary
software distributed in expensive per seat licenses. They require extensive customization and can be
designed in ways that are inappropriately configured for rapidly urbanizing cities in developing countries.
In contrast, locally developed software applications that are modular can support incremental changes in
organizational structures and administrative procedures.
" While early guidelines on public financial management reform did stress that governments should not go for an
integrated financial management information system until basic double-entry, accrual accounting reforms had
stabilized (World Bank 1998), these standards were not followed in practice.
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Countries like India present a unique political economy context for some of these debates. The
country is no longer dependent on international donor assistance. It occupies a dominant position in
global information technology markets, led by regional software industries such as Bangalore and
Hyderabad while smaller but no less dynamic local markets sprout up across national landscape. The
information and communication technology sector, spanning health care, education, and online
government services among other public and private sector domains, is a major pillar of the country's
national development strategy.
2.3 Information Technology and Coordination
Fostering effective horizontal and vertical coordination is a central concern of public finance and
development administration among municipal governments, though most of the research on coordination
mechanisms in the fiscal domain of developing countries has focused on central or intermediate-level
(state/province) governments. Research on local user committees as mechanisms for connecting and
coordinating citizens and local government service delivery has shown them to be effective in some
localities, while being used to bypass poor residents altogether in others (Manor 2004). The literature on
national fiscal reforms and public financial management has examined the effectiveness of various formal
coordination mechanisms. Much of the literature has focused on new organizational structures such as
semi-autonomous revenue authorities (SARAs) (Fjeldstad and Moore 2009) or interagency committees
(Budina et al. 2013). Bahl (1999, 15) envisioned a "fiscal analysis unit" in national governments that
would supervise and improve intergovernmental financial flows. A fiscal analysis unit provides an
essential monitoring feature by assessing the effectiveness of grant programs in meeting objectives,
including simulating the potential impacts of alternative transfer formulae. Perhaps the most common
coordination mechanism over the past 10 or 15 years has been the adoption of medium-term expenditure
frameworks (MTEF) (Brumby and Hemming 2013; Le Houerou and Taliercio 2002). MTEF have
encouraged inter-ministerial coordination, particularly as line ministries and agencies become more
involved in expenditure projections (Schiavo-Campo 2009).
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Coordination is a central concept in theories of public administration and management. Early
research on public administration and management reform in developing countries focused primarily on
unpacking the conceptual dimensions of coordination and operationalizing it in the public sector in both
developed and developing countries. Caiden and Wildavksy (1974) found four distinct connotations to the
concept of coordination in their examination of planning and budgeting in developing countries, which
are at times contradictory. They argue coordination means achieving efficiency, reliability, coercion and
consent (Caiden and Wildavksy 1974, 278). Coordination can be understood as collective attempts to
improve the consistency and coherence between and among political decisions and the implementation of
policies, programs, and projects (Wollmann 2003). Coordination has both a procedural and substantive
dimensions (Simon 1945). Procedural coordination refers to lines of authority and the domain of activities
for managers and other bureaucrats. Substantive coordination refers to the content of the work.
As a basic starting proposition, obtaining coordination in a decentralized bureaucratic
environment is more difficult than in a highly centralized structure (Peters 2014). When FMIS are
provided by external software development organizations, the organizational context FMIS transforms
beyond just a multi-unit setting into a multi-organizational environment. Information technology
increases shared responsibility for pieces of work in public financial management. Therefore, FMIS
projects require managers to balance the prospect of efficiency gains through centralization with
responsiveness to the requirements of sub-units of public financial management. On the one hand, FMIS
implies that the highest returns to administrative efficiency can be achieved through standardization based
on common, integrated software that crosses department and unit boundaries. The limited research on
FMIS in developing countries has suggested that integrated approaches require coordination, but this does
not necessarily imply restricting use to a single IT system (Wescott and Schiavo-Campo 1999). On the
other hand, they must meet the expectations of heterogeneous end users of the FMIS - politicians,
engineers, revenue officers, accountants, and other front-line bureaucrats - which do not share the same
incentives, knowledge, and exposure to information technology.
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While municipal governments are constantly balancing tensions between bureaucratic discretion,
organizational autonomy, and institutional control, such multi-organizational project development and
delivery arrangements create structural barriers to the alignment of goals and activities between central
and sub-unit actors. In classic public administration theory, decision-making and reporting relationships
are asymmetrically divided between the external contractor, senior bureaucratic officers, and unit-level
staff (Peled 2000). Yet, these divisions often inhibit communication and collaboration between the actors
responsible for system design and development and those who will be expected to use the system. When
coordination fails to occur or is otherwise blocked, a number of problems can occur that increase the costs
of FMIS, reduce the benefits, or threaten the overall adoption of the system. For instance, a lack of
coordination can result in unnecessary duplication of training activities at too small of scales that delay
implementation. Inefficiency and ineffectiveness can set in from the implementation of technology
incompatible with the local context. Limited returns on investment might occur because of failure to
move highly decentralized spending or service delivery units onto the FMIS.
The failure to effectively coordinate can result in diseconomies of scale, technological and/or
vendor lock-in, degrading of operational capacity, wasted resources, unnecessary complexity, reduction in
accountability, and an increase in rent seeking opportunities (Prichard 2014). The development of
coordination mechanisms is therefore needed in order to manage many of the risks associated with FMIS
projects but also to make use of new information that is generated in the FMIS application. The former
relates to the sustainability of the system, while the latter relates to the productive use of the technology to
achieve broader goals of public financial management. While the two can be distinguished for analytical
purposes, in practice they are interdependent.
2.3.1 Coordination among Concentrated and Deconcentrated Actors
Studies of public financial management (PFM) reform have focused on how the transaction
intensive, highly distributed nature of public financial management systems increases the complexity and
difficulty of reform implementation and creates a wide range of obstacles to coordination. Drawing from
a survey of public sector accountants, Andrews argues this is the case because deconcentrated agents are
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more likely than concentrated agents to support existing institutional arrangements, question reform
alternatives, and be less engaged in reform design (2014, 3). Deconcentrated agents include those
bureaucrats involved in budgeting, accounting, transaction execution, and extending to citizens (Andrews
2010). Andrews (2014, 2) describes these as the "day-to-day end users of the systems and the key
transactors in such." On the opposite end are those actors most heavily involved with elite policy services
and decision making - elites and senior bureaucrats - who are far more embedded in prevailing
institutional orders than distributed agents. Their position endows them with substantial resources for
enacting reform, but also cautions against risking their resources by disrupting institutional structures that
benefit them. In contrast, distributed agents located towards the frontlines are the least embedded. Their
position makes them aware of potential alternatives but they lack the minimal level of resources necessary
to address prevailing problems (Maguire 2007).
The central proposition in public financial management reform studies is that concentrated and
distributed agents are embedded in different institutional fields and are unlikely to share similar incentives
or interests related to reforms (Andrews 2011, 2010; de Renzio, Andrews, and Mills 2010; Glynn 2008).
Consequently, asymmetries in the interests of central and distributed agents engender inter-institutional
conflicts related to the legitimacy of changes and the process by which reforms are implemented.
Andrews (2014,7-8) outlines four conditions that are predictive of the degree of change to incumbent
institutions. First, a disruption must cause agents to question incumbent institutions. The second condition
is the degree to which concentrated and distributed agents judge differently the legitimacy of incumbent
institutions. The third condition is the degree to which concentrated and distributed agents judge
differently the legitimacy of alternatives. The fourth condition is the degree to which distributed agents
are engaged in the design and implementation of reforms.
Studies of public financial management reform in developing countries increasingly focus on the
latter condition. The bourgeoning literature on public financial management has yet to qualify how
information technology, as distinct from other reform mechanisms such as rules or management, cuts
across the concentrated-distributed divide. Drawing on new institutionalism (Greenwood, Hinings, and
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Suddaby 2002; Whittle, Suhomlinova, and Mueller 2010) they stress the centrality of fostering broad
engagement with distributed agents through problem-driven, bottom-up iterations of ideas and
experiments to increase support for and the legitimacy of changes to bureaucratic routines (Andrews
2015; Andrews, Pritchett, and Woolcock 2013; Pritchett, Woolcock, and Andrews 2013). In principle,
ongoing participation by distributed agents in decisions about organizational procedures and routines is
assumed to align incentives and interests. In practice, front-line workers in large, distributed
bureaucracies co-inhabit multiple institutional fields that fashion heterogeneous interests and perceptions
towards the reform of administrative procedures and work routines (Lipsky 2010). Similarly, senior
managers and other elite actors can simultaneously hold a multiplicity of interests, not simply responding
mindlessly to macro-level external incentives encapsulated by conventional notions of the state, market,
or society (Sanyal 1994).
Even in local contexts where all local actors with stakes in the direction of change are in
agreement on goals, coordination problems can arise from more mundane change management issues like
synchronization, design fit, assignment, realization, and problems associated with the discrete attributes of
innovation (Dunleavy et al. 2006). All of these issues make predicting outcomes difficult and subject to
the nature and extent of interactions between government, organizations, and citizens each confronting
different incentives. This implies positive returns from coordination between concentrated actors working
in close functional proximity. Turning from the emphasis on the coordination between concentrated and
deconcentrated agents, a relevant question is who coordinates the coordinators? Can transparency sought
through FMIS technologies and delivered in outsourcing arrangements inadvertently add impenetrable
layers of bureaucratic organization to the local context and thus reduce accountability?
2.4 Information Technology and Accountability
Transparency is often perceived as a precondition for political accountability since holding civil
servants and elected officials begins with information on their actions (Meijer 2009). With the broadening
of the e-governance reform agenda in many countries, the prevailing discourse around public sector IT
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projects treats them as a mechanism to simultaneously promote efficiency and transparency (Von
Haldenwang 2004). Information technology, however, is not in principle a part of the foundational
accountability equation in society (Heeks 1998). Information, not technology, is essential to
accountability. When technology is forced into the accountability equation, the operative question
becomes "who is accountable when computerized information systems in the public sector are involved in
decisions and subsequent actions that are judged to be substandard?" (Heeks 1998). Nevertheless, as
interest in public sector accountability has grown over the past decade, research on public sector ICTs and
research on transparency and accountability have begun to converge on the role and prospects of
information technology.
Comparative studies have identified a number of social and institutional determinants of fiscal
transparency in local governments. Some studies have shown that macro-variables like the presence of
democratic institutions, competitive elections, and country income explain variation in the level of fiscal
transparency across countries (Esteller-Mord and Polo Otero 2012). At the local level, the size of the
urban jurisdiction affects the extent to which financial reporting is accessible in US municipalities (Styles
and Tennyson 2007). Esteller and Polo-Otero (2012) add that the size and growth of municipal debt
increases the transparency of local government financial reports, likely because of an increase in reporting
requirements to more diverse actors. Most of this literature has tended to adopt standardized financial
reporting or open budgets (Harrison et al. 2012) among local governments in Western countries as the
research subject, such as local governments in the United States (Justice, Melitski, and Smith 2006) and
Spain (Rodriguez Bolivar, Caba Perez, and Lopez Hernandez 2007).
Transparency is difficult to define and measure directly. At a fundamental level, transparency
implies accessibility to information. Research has added an array of qualitative conditions to the baseline
definition. Some studies emphasize the "timeliness" of fiscal information and whether disclosure to the
public is proactive or demand-driven. Fox classifies two types of transparency: clear and opaque (Fox
2007). The distinction is important because simple notions of transparency do not account for the
potential responses from the targets of transparency demands. Opaque (fuzzy) transparency, therefore,
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refers to information that does not reveal how institutions operate in practice. Clear transparency refers to
both information access and the performance of institutions, particularly the relationship between the flow
of public funds and the performance of elected and/or appointed officials.
Efforts to increase public sector transparency have led to new institutions of accountability. Such
transparency and accountability initiatives (TAIs) (Gaventa and McGee 2013; Joshi and Houtzager 2012)
often begin at the subnational level, where the salience of financial management is better understood and
information more accessible. Paradigmatic cases of demands for transparency that led over time to
political movements include the work of the Mazdoor Kisan Shakti Sangathan (MKSS), a worker's rights
movement in Rajasthan state, that led to the Right to Information Act in India (Goetz and Jenkins 2001).
Demand-led initiatives by citizens often are fundamentally linked to government accounting, as gaining
access to information on public sector financial flows is perceived as a basic precondition for combating
corruption through stronger demands for accountability (Jenkins and Goetz 1999).
On the other hand, increases in the availability of information through transparency and
accountability initiatives can have unintended consequences, particularly when information and
communication technologies (ICTs) generate rapid and sustained increases in the production and
circulation of financial information. Feldman and March (1981, 171) noticed long ago that "organizations
systematically gather more information than they use, yet continue to ask for more." Information overload
can cause confusion, limiting the possibility action in response to information gathered locally by actors.
Tsoukas (1997) refers to this phenomenon as the "tyranny of light." The information society is full of
temptations, based on the notion that more information and more knowledge will lead to improvements in
social regulation and rational management. Instead, more information implies a rise in mediated
interactions and mediated quasi-interactions within society as a result of greater dependence on
transmission of information through technological mediums.
Greater transparency, paradoxically, can led to demobilization of the "demos" through
resignation, rather than enhancing accountability through the popular expression of "indignation" (Bauhr
and Grimes 2014). Such a conceptual argument, put into practice, points to the roles and actions of
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various actors involved in transparency and accountability initiatives. However, few empirical studies
have looked at how networks of actors form around demands for fiscal transparency and the effects of
their actions on local government accountability (Gaventa and McGee 2013). In a meta-analysis of the
literature, Fox (2015) argues for a new analytical distinction between tactical and strategic approaches to
enhancing the influence of citizen voice to public sector performance. Tactical approaches are
information-led and exclusively located on the "demand side" of reform. Strategic approaches, in
contrast, embed information access in changes to the enabling environment. Doing so enables initiatives
to achieve scale and coordinate efforts at greater information accessibility with supply-oriented reforms
that promote responsiveness of the public sector to the expression of citizen voice.
The numerous ways transparency can be qualified allude to tensions in the relationship between
transparency and accountability. They also point to a gap in the literature connected to the treatment of
micro-context (Joshi 2014) and how information accessibility is enacted in complex settings. For
instance, Darch and Underwood (2010) argue that financial information is not just abstract and technical
but is also politically salient. The timeliness of information might affect transparency when judged in a
normative framework. However, in practice, public sector information that was irrelevant in the past
might gain political salience, and therefore, an effect at some point in the future. Such a perspective
complicates the assumption that straightforward incentives to collect, maintain, and manage financial
information can simply be given top-down through law and codified in policy frameworks.
2.5 Information Technology and the Role of the State
Having reviewed the literature on coordination and accountability that can be associated with
information technology in the public sector, the issue of the supply and availability of skilled human
capital for such technology systems to be deployed and function properly must be considered. While
information technology applications can be mapped onto discrete components of the budget and
accounting process, how this is achieved in a transitional environment characterized by high levels of
incomplete information between senior officers and frontline staff complicates standardized conceptual
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divisions in project proposals. These attributes of FMIS projects complicate determining the role of the
public and private sector in IT-based PFM reform projects. The stakes are potentially high, given how
social and economic changes have driven up the private value of public information.
One of the enduring findings of research on municipal finance reform in developing countries is
that local governments in low and middle-income countries have limited capacity to manage the reform
process. Capacity is typically defined in technical terms, though the literature registers persistent deficits
in capacity at the individual, organizational, and institutional scale. Bardhan (2002) attributes the problem
of local knowledge and skill deficiencies for basic tasks like accounting and record keeping to
agglomeration economies that concentrate skilled labor in central bureaucracies in capital cities. A
common factor across emerging economies is the persistently large wage differential for skilled labor
between private firms and the public sector, which often saps technical capacity from the public financial
management sector by incentivizing bureaucrats trained on-the-job in government to transition into the
private sector. Regarding organizational dynamics, other scholars note how expertise on decentralization
is often fragmented across different departments and agencies and that this fragmentation can impede
implementation (Smoke 2015, 257).
Few would deny the spillover potential from software applications developed by private sector
technology firms, particularly for local governments that normally have little control over hiring and
broader civil service under decentralization (Green 2005). Debates over the role of the public and private
sector in tax administration are not new. With respect to information and communication technology
(ICT), there is a continuum of institutional arrangements ranging from complete privatization (i.e. full
assignment) of responsibilities to subcontracting specific tasks. However, as the previous two sections
described, there are multiple perspectives and objectives associated with information technology for
public financial management. When reform goals are broad and service conditions are highly variable (as
they are in local government bureaucracies in developing countries), what government wants the external
contracting organization to do is often difficult to narrowly define.
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2.5.1 The Comparative Advantage of Private Technology Firms
The presence of external contractors, consultants, and vendors in core areas of local public
financial management in India only partially reflects the traditional economic justification for contracting
out urban service delivery. Though municipal governments in India run budget deficits financed by public
bank loans and transfers from intermediate (state/provincial) governments, it is not the case that their
fiscal position has rapidly deteriorated as was the case when privatization became popular in the industrial
countries in the 1970s-80s (Ferris and Grady 1986). Rather, the prevailing discourse centers on
perceptions of persistent deficits in execution capacity within urban local bodies (ULBs) and belief that
that private sector companies are more efficient and effective than existing management and operations in
municipal governments.
Normative theory suggests that, where possible, local public financial management should be
structured to achieve three objectives - minimize costs, exploit economies of scale, and overcome local
capacity constraints. These objectives can be achieved by contracting out a portion or all of PFM
responsibilities on the basis of technical specialization and comparative advantage. For instance, local
governments can hire private mass appraisal firms to manage property assessment, drawing on the
technical expertise, experience, and scale of a specialized firm (Mikesell 2007). Outsourcing allows local
governments to concentrate scarce human and financial resources on other elements of public financial
management.
Yet, contracting out requires monitoring and oversight mechanisms, often of a different nature
than under public provision. There are two main concerns. First, private provision can convert service
contracts into commodities with substantial value among networks of bureaucrats, local politicians, and
contractors. If the purpose of privatization was to circumvent corruption between taxpayers and the state,
the effect was to shift the locus of corruption to the state-contractor nexus (Iversen et al. 2006). Though
formal, standardized, and transparent rules and operating procedures can be initiated, they are often
difficult to enforce over long periods of time. Consequently, the new chain of delegation encompassing
private firms falls back into patterns of behavior based on vested interests and pre-existing social relations
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(Fjeldstad 2006). As an alternative, a local government could enter into joint outsourcing agreements, in
which multiple local governments enter into a contract with a single organization to achieve economies of
scale and reduce their average monitoring and oversight costs.
Second, as described in the previous section, financial management information has dimensions
of political salience and personal privacy. The research on privacy has documented an array of potential
abuses of information access by government officials and non-governmental organizations. Some
research on the institutional arrangements for urban service delivery has noted the use of extensive
confidentiality clauses in commercial firms that curtail information democratization. Confidentiality
clauses are a standard operating procedure in the private sector and likely a necessary condition for
market formation over the long run. However, the combination of strict confidentiality clauses in
contracts and clauses that call for the contracted firm to "cooperate with the government and the
corporations in the implementation of the communications program designed to inform people about the
demonstration project" complicates the achievement of full transparency (Sangameswaran, Madhav, and
D'Rozario 2008, 64).
2.5.2 Public Financial Management as State Building
The recent emphasis on the potential benefits of relying on local software developers for financial
management information systems shifts the emphasis away from techno-determinism of "global best
practices" or "software solutions" imported from distant markets and puts it squarely back on the role of
the state. While market conservatives in public management have argued for some time now that very
little about the state is sacred, traditional statists argue that reliance on external agents for public financial
management capacity is no shortcut to developing state capability. Such a historical process of repetition
and reinforcement of institutional reforms puts the burden of change on actors within the
intergovernmental system and the incentives that shape their behavior within bureaucratic cultures.
Drawing on as exchange-based theories of the state, fiscal sociologists argue taxation (and public
financial management) is a core state function which must remain internal to the state apparatus
(Brautigam, Fjeldstad, and Moore 2008; Joshi and Ayee 2008; Moore 2007; Timmons 2005). Quite apart
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from short-term efficiency gains (or losses) from specialization and delegation on the basis of
comparative advantage, this literature emphasizes the long run issue of the relationship between fiscal
administration and the quality of governance (Brautigam, Fjeldstad, and Moore 2008; Moore 2007,
2004a). For instance, the argument against outsourcing tax collection is based on both the interests vested
in private sector actors and the overall sustainability of the arrangement. With the objective of
maximizing revenues, private contractors are liable to engage in coercive means at their disposal to
augment the revenue yield in any way possible. Coercive methods exacerbate tensions between the state
and citizens and, over the long run, limits the development of effective local bureaucracies (Monkam and
Moore 2015).
Successfully insulating revenue administration from either direct political interference or the
straightjacket of antiquated civil service systems is not a panacea. Even with independent authority to set
and maintain comparatively higher salaries and performance incentives, administrative reforms might, as
was concluded in the case of Tanzania, "leave behind them not only a highly paid, but also highly corrupt
civil servants" (Fjeldstad 2003, 173). A growing body of research focusing on the relationship between
revenue administration and the quality of governance has highlighted the influence of situated social
relations and vested interests in reversing or otherwise circumventing the procedural and organizational
recommendations in normative decentralization theory (Fjeldstad, Chambas, and Brun 2014).
The tradeoff seems to be between consolidation within the intergovernmental system and
organizational autonomy with the real challenge being how to thread the labyrinth of overlapping
individual, organizational, and political networks. The literature suggests various degrees of
organizational externalization, determined by local conditions. Extreme externalization run amok, such as
in the case of donor assistance to district governments, can increase tax effort but at the expense of local
accountability and democratic consolidation. In an examination for why revenue performance differs
between local authorities in Tanzania, the presence of donors was found to induce tax effort but at the
expense of local accountability and democratic consolidation (Fjeldstad 2001). Donors operated as
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principals encouraged greater tax effort among local authorities ("agents") but in doing so sidelined
elected councilors.
2.6 Conclusion: A Broader Approach to Information Technology and Local Public Financial
Management
This chapter has identified knowledge gaps in the literature on public sector financial
management information systems and reviewed studies on coordination, accountability, and the role of
state and private actors in IT-driven public sector reform. Three major knowledge gaps with particular
relevance to municipal government can be identified. These gaps are the relationship between computer-
based FMIS and procedural coordination, accountability, and the role of state and non-state actors. These
gaps can be organized according to process, outcome, and values of FMIS projects in municipal
governments. The limited but growing literature on information technology and public financial
management now argues that IT should "support, not drive, public financial management reform"
(Peterson 2006, 4 emphasis original). Rather than technology-driven change, it is argued that financial
reform should be led first by strategic changes to financial procedures. In particular, the fundamental
decision relates to either the improvement or replacement of existing procedures. Once a new system of
procedures is established, a strategy of automation can be determined and mapped onto a policy
framework characterized by stable and integrated budget, accounting, reporting, and auditing practices.
Following the stabilization and institutionalization of new financial procedures, the key decisions related
to reform are the determination of which procedures are to be left manual, which are to be automated, and
of the manual and automated procedures which are to be integrated (Peterson 2006).
While these normative debates about the benefits and risks of FMIS design and its relationship to
financial management reform are conceptually relevant to municipal finance, there are important
differences between PFM reform in national and local governments that are missing in the literature. As
both managerial and legal instruments, IFMIS must conform to budget laws, public finance rules and
restrictions, accounting rules and reporting requirements (USAID 2008).Yet, decentralization studies over
the past two decades have largely confirmed that devolution does not necessarily generate common
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budget, accounting, and reporting institutions shared across local jurisdictions (Cheema and Rondinelli
2007; Poteete and Ribot 2011; Smoke 2015). Planning studies demonstrate that local governments within
the same country devise various structures and procedures to handle their internal and external financial
information flows. Moreover, most local governments operate under scarce human and financial
resources and confront various incentives located both within the intergovernmental system and locally,
which influence how financial flows and associated information are managed and communicated across
the boundaries of the complex, multi-actor and multi-level governance system in which they are
embedded.
While the policy regime that structures the public financial management domain may outline
financial procedures and delegate responsibility for them, it is an axiom that PFM policy frameworks lag
behind the pace of technological change in the case of local governments located at the bottom of the
intergovernmental system. From the perspective of local planners and public managers in devolved
settings, there is little incentive to wait for new procedures to solve the acute information problems that
affect their capability to execute financial management functions and thus cannot wait for new
procedures. Policy coordination between decentralization and public financial management reforms is
rare (Fedelino and Smoke 2013) While this creates an environment that encourages pragmatic
experimentation to solve practical problems, it also leaves local government managers discretion to
interpret an array of policy signals that can either align or be at odds with the goals of central or state-
level departments and agencies. As the tool-based view of technology (Orlikowski and Iacono 2001)
becomes more widely accepted among civil servants and skilled middle managers who are responsible for
executing financial management tasks in local governments, these interpretations are likely to
increasingly include some technology component. This will be particularly true in countries like India,
where software development markets are mature, capital costs are relatively low compared to labor costs,
and national policies strongly frame e-government as a public good and therefore irrespective of rates of
success or failure.
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On the one hand, there is consensus that the present state of material systems that support local
public financial management are inconsistent with the pace and quality of urbanization and social change
in cities. Yet, for a variety of reasons, most local governments have insufficient internal organizational
and technical capacity to design and deploy new systems. The puzzle relates to the role and effectiveness
of external agents in supporting reforms to local public financial management and how this process
unfolds through the interactions of technical and social attributes of ICT projects as they extend into the
foundational systems required for efficient, transparent, and accountable urban development planning and
management.
Despite growing interest and emphasis on the dynamics of implementation (R. Bahl and
Martinez-Vazquez 2006; Eaton, Kaiser, and Smoke 2011; Smoke 2015, 2010; World Bank 2008), limited
research has examined the role of locally-embedded technology organizations and the support they
provide to an array of local government managers and frontline agents aiming to introduce and
institutionalize changes to the rules of the game in the fiscal domain.2 ' The extant literature on local
financial reform in a decentralizing context has thoroughly identified the challenges and obstacles to
bridging the supply and demand side of the reform equation at the local level. The challenge now is to
understand which resources are available in the immediate operational and political setting of FMIS
projects and how local actors draw on them to forge stronger connections between the demand and supply
side of local reform. How do localities, situated as they are below layers of political and institutional
complexity within the intergovernmental system, acquire the capability to implement local public
financial management policy? To what extent can success or failure be attributed to local agents that are
external to the intergovernmental system? How do FMIS projects affect, and come to be affected by,
bureaucratic politics, inter-organizational relations, and extant financial administration practices in urban
local bodies?
24 A growing body of literature draws on theories of fiscal exchange to examine the effects of official development
assistance on domestic taxation and governance (Brautigam, Fjeldstad, and Moore 2008; Fjeldstad 2014; Moore
2004a).
71
Chapter 3: Bit by Bit: Information Technology and the Transition to Financial
Management-Led Decentralization in India
"We are of the opinion that proper accounts are the starting point for financial accountability.
Non-maintenance or delayed compilation of annual accounts means compromised accountability. It also implies
that reliable financial data for determining the need for resources for local bodies is not available. We observe that
it has been more than twenty years that municipalities and panchayats were sought to be empowered, through a
Constitutional amendment, to act as institutions of local self-governance and also to provide certain basic services
to citizens. It is inconceivable, and certainly not desirable, that local bodies seek an ever increasing share of public
moneys and yet continue to keep themselves beyond the ambit of accountability and responsibility for the public
money placed with them."
- The Fourteenth Finance Commission of India
February 24, 2015.
3.1 Introduction
This chapter reviews changes in the political economy of decentralization in order to understand
where information technology fits in the current policy formula for municipal finance reform in India.
The prevailing ideas and values held by national government policymakers on how to pursue
decentralization can be significant for the incentives experienced by bureaucrats in local government,
particularly in how they interact with domestic and external political and economic dynamics (Eaton,
Kaiser, and Smoke 2011; Smoke 2015). The design of flagship national urban reform programs and
changes adopted by successive Finance Commissions suggest decentralization is increasingly viewed
through a financial management lens. As this perspective has emerged as dominant, however, it has not
been accompanied by a substantive push for more central control and local fiscal discipline.
On the contrary, recent policy developments indicate a shift in regulatory authority downwards to
state governments and outwards to private actors.25 This arrangement partially reflects the assignment of
urban local bodies as an exclusive function of the states in the Indian constitution and a continuation of
privatization following the balance of payments crisis in the early 1990s. It is also the case that central
ministries and agencies have not made significant efforts to build the mechanisms of monitoring,
oversight, and control that are associated with policy ideas and perspectives that frame decentralization in
PFM terms (Rodden 2002; Rodden, Eskeland, and Litvack 2003). Against this backdrop in shifting
25 For instance, despite recognition of information problems within the intergovernmental system, the national
government has left basic regulatory functions such as monitoring the fiscal position of municipalities to private
credit ratings agencies.
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federal relations, municipal governments are adopting diverse information technology applications for an
array of public financial management functions.
The concerns with local financial management expressed in the quote by the 14th Finance
Commission reflect a natural progression within the broader landscape of municipal finance reform in
India, but also a growing imbalance in the coordination between public financial management and
decentralization reform. Since the turn of the century, the country's urban governments shifted to a fund-
based accounting structure upon which double-entry, accrual procedures and practices could be built.
While reports have noted the substantial efforts of state governments and ULBs to begin the transition,
there has been no systematic assessment of how many cities have successfully completed a full transition
as defined by removal of old single-entry systems that continue to operate in parallel. The rapid adoption
of new digital financial management information systems to support financial management is less
acknowledged, though no less substantive. Though there exists a strong conceptual relationship between
these institutional and technological transitions, their connection in practice has been limited. 2 6
What are the implications of these shifts for the governance of local public financial
management? The current political economy of intergovernmental relations sustains two institutional
voids in ULBs: financial information and regulatory control. While conventional decentralization theory
treats these institutional voids (Khanna and Palepu 2010) as problems to be "fixed" through policy
reform, local private sector entrepreneurs in cities perceive them as opportunities for experimentation in
support of local government reform. Thus, the current setup generates centripetal institutional forces that
pull in an array of new extra-governmental actors into the technical core of ULBs. While some studies
have noted an uptick in private sector participation in technical aspects of urban planning (Baindur and
Kamath 2009) the involvement of extra-governmental actors (e.g. commercial firms, nonprofit
26 Urban local bodies in the state of Tamil Nadu are, for many reasons, an exception. Municipal corporations,
including Chennai, had strong support from the state government and sustained assistance over the course of a
decade from the World Bank, the Asian Development Bank, the USAID (INDO-US FIRE project), and the Housing
and Urban Development Corporation (HUDCO) (see Das 2008). They also had largely completed their budget and
accounting reforms before major computerization initiatives.
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organizations) in core public financial management functions has been largely overlooked in the literature
on municipal finance reform in India. I develop this argument with evidence from the design and
implementation of flagship national urban reform schemes, the evolution of finance commission transfers
to ULBs, and changes in local government accounting and budgeting policy in states.
The remainder of this chapter proceeds as follows. In the second section, I briefly review the
current status of decentralization to ULBs across administrative, fiscal, and political dimensions. The
review is necessarily high level and therefore cannot account for all state-level and local variation across
India's large federal territory. In the third section, I examine the extent to which the design of large
national urban reform programs and intergovernmental transfers are consistent with the regulatory
mechanisms and practices that are required to achieve their objectives. I focus specifically on the
Jawaharlal Nehru National Urban Renewal Mission (JNNURM) and grants-in-aid to ULBs from the I 1th
to the 14th Central Finance Commissions. In the fourth section, I review changes in budget and
accounting policy in ULBs, focusing in particular on Karnataka state. In the fifth section, I describe how
these institutional voids have been addressed in Bangalore since the early 2000s. This final section sets
the stage for the analysis presented in chapters five through seven.
3.2 Stalled Devolution to Urban Local Bodies
While state governments exhibit variations in the extent and quality of administrative, fiscal, and
political devolution to urban local bodies, the overall process of devolution to municipal governments
envisaged in the 74th Constitutional Amendment Act has stalled. As the next sections will demonstrate,
the level of autonomy exercised by municipal governments from states has largely remained the same
since the early 1990s. A number of factors explain the failure to realize the spirit and letter of the 74th
Constitutional Amendment Act. Liberalization of the economy, which kicked in right as decentralization
reforms were adopted, empowered state governments far more than local governments. State legislative
assemblies have also avoided strengthening the state finance commissions by various means, such as
limiting their staffing resources or outright ignoring their recommendations. This section paints a broad
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picture of the stalled devolution agenda in order to set up the following section's analysis of monitoring
and oversight mechanisms in national and state-level urban reform initiatives. A central contention of this
chapter is that the absence of robust monitoring and enforcement mechanisms over time have created
institutional dynamics whereby a broader array of technology actors are being drawn into core aspects of
technical financial management. In short, the reform agenda centered on devolution that emerged through
the Congress Party's efforts in the early 1990s has given way to an idea of decentralization as financial
management reform in India's urban local bodies.
3.2.1 Administrative Dimension
Schedule 12 of the 74th Constitutional Amendment Act outlines 18 functions that state
governments are supposed to devolve to urban local bodies (ULBs) (see table 3.1 below). Though the
74th CAA placed urban local bodies (ULBs) to the "exclusive list" of responsibilities for the states, the
expectation was that by including functions in Schedule 12 that fell under the concurrent list (i.e. shared
by Union and state governments) the national government would retain a lever to influence states to fully
devolve responsibilities to ULBs. As analysts of urban governance in India regularly note, many of the
functions in Schedule 12 are taken up by parastatal bodies whose recognition in state constitutions
predates the 74th CAA (S. Benjamin and Bhuvaneshwari 2006). However, the compromise made to get
the states to sign on to the 74th CAA was that expenditure responsibilities assigned to parastatals in state
constitutions would be gradually transferred to ULBs over time.
Table 3.1 Functions of the 12th Schedule
1 Urban planning and town planning 10 Urban forestry
2 Regulation of land-use and construction of 11 Safeguarding the interests of the weaker
buildings sections
3 Planning for economic and social development 12 Provision of urban amenities and
facilities
4 Roads and bridges 13 Promotion of cultural, educational, and
aesthetic aspects
5 Water supply for domestic, industrial and 14 Burials and burial grounds
commercial purposes
6 Slum improvement and upgrading 15 Cattle pounds; prevention of cruelty to
animals
7 Public health, sanitation conservancy and solid 16 Vital statistics
waste management
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8 Urban poverty alleviation 17 Public amenities
9 Fire services 18 Regulation of slaughter houses
Consequently, states vary in the extent to which they have fully devolved the 18 functions listed
in the 12th Schedule. For instance, Kerala has assigned 165 functions to ULBs divided between three
categories - mandatory, sector, and general functions. Karnataka argues it has transferred 14 functions to
ULBs, while two are administered concurrently (urban forests and slum upgrading) and two more are
retained by the state (urban planning and fire services). However, in Bangalore water is provided by the
Bangalore Water Supply and Sewerage Board (BWSSB). Even within states, the devolution of functions
to urban local bodies is uneven. Bandyopadhyay and Bohra (2010) found in Jharkhand that only 8 ULBs
were performing urban planning functions, while 23 were performing building plan approvals and 27
were performing functions related to slum development.
State governments frequently argue that access to finance to cover the cost the 18 functions
remains a major constraint to devolving full responsibilities for the 18 functions. The most recent
estimates on the cost of the 18 functions outlined in Schedule 12 by the High Powered Expert Committee
noted that most ULBs do not meet even minimum levels of outlays on basic services (High Powered
Expert Commitee 2011). Mohanty et al. (2007) examine local spending in 30 municipal corporations by
adopting the Zakaria Committee expenditure norms, which were formulated in 1963 to prescribe
minimum expenditure levels on basic services like water and sanitation. Updating the Zakaria norms to
1997 prices, they show that from 1999-00 to 2003-04 municipal corporations averaged levels of capital
investment that were 76% below the 1963 norms. Underspending has historically been associated with the
limited tax base assigned to ULBs.
3.2.2 Fiscal Dimension
Surveying the literature on municipal finance reform in India, no issue seems as urgent as revenue
mobilization in ULBs. Since the first attempt at constitutional decentralization reform in 1989, the share
of municipal receipts in the combined revenue of central and state governments has declined from 3.71 %
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in 1990, to 2.43% in 2000-01, to less than 2% in 2014 (Mohanty 2014, 120). Notwithstanding the
vibrancy and churn of local politics, civil society, and commercial interests in Indian cities (Solomon
Benjamin 2008), a narrow reading of the fiscal statistics might suggest that India, at least in its cities, has
been on a decades long journey of centralization. The 13th Finance Commission reported that the share of
own revenue to total revenue is also declining. From 2002-03 to 2007-08, the share dropped from 63 to
53%. The High Powered Expert Committee updated this figure as lower, at 48%, as of 2011-12 (High
Powered Expert Commitee 2011). As this proportion has continued to drop, many states and some federal
grant schemes have loosened restrictions and guidelines that allow the funds to be spent on local salaries.
Along the fiscal dimension of decentralization, many ULBs have completely lost their identity as the third
and lowest tier of government.
Studies frequently link the municipal revenue problem to the difficulties of property tax
administration in rapidly urbanizing localities (ADB 2012; Sahasranaman 2012) and to the historical
absence of performance standards on either side of the municipal budget (Working Group of State Urban
Development Secretaries 2013). This absence leads to two particularly negative consequences. First,
urban local bodies have no hard incentive to formulate plans to reduce internal inefficiencies in revenue
mobilization and broader resource management. Second, with no performance standards, it is very
difficult to hold them to a hard budget constraint. Others advance an explanation for the revenue problem
that is much simpler, given the limited number of municipalities that actually generate own source
revenues reasonably equivalent to their tax capacity. What generally explains better performance is
simply permission to levy octroi (High Powered Expert Commitee 2011, 125), which was limited of late
to ULBs in the state of Maharashtra and Gujarat."
" Here, the mandatory requirement in JNNURM to withdraw it seems counterproductive. The decision to include
the revocation of the Octroi tax as a mandatory reform was not taken in consultation with participating urban local
bodies (ULBs); there were limited consultations with ULBs in general on the design of JNNURM. ULBs that still
levied the tax had limited opportunities to prepare a transition plan or strategy. The Surat Municipal Corporation
shifted a portion of the revenue burden onto betterment charges and impact fees for new construction, but total
revenues had not recovered to their trend growth rates by the end of the JNNURM program period even accounting
for untied state compensation grants "in lieu of Octroi" (Cook and Chu 2018). In short, under JNNURM the
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In order to close the vertical gap, the 7 4th CAA had introduced the state finance commissions in
Article 243(Y) (every five years) to make recommendations on taxes and other revenues, shared tax
revenue, and grants-in-aid and Article 280(3)(c) requiring the Finance Commission to "augment" the
Consolidated fund on the basis of state finance commission recommendations. The 14th Finance
Commission broke from previous central finance commissions by reinterpreting the constitutional role of
the Finance Commission relative to ULBs. Rather than allocating transfers to ULBs as a share of the
divisible pool, they converted the transfer to a grant-in-aid. They increased the transfer to ULBs to 87,144
crores ($13.6 billion), three times higher than the 13th Finance Commission. The amount still only
represents around 1 % of total income and other taxes collected by the federal government.
With the recent introduction of the Goods and Services Tax (GST) the tax instruments available
to municipal corporations are likely to shrink further. The GST will replace the entertainment tax, octroi
tax, and any remaining cities that receive the proceeds of stamp duty on real estate transactions. Local
revenue autonomy and local representation simply has fallen out of vogue among national policymakers,
even as the urgency to "transform" the finances of ULBs grows. In the push for enhance the
creditworthiness of ULBs and lower borrowing costs, some states have even signed off on escrowing
constitutionally-guaranteed transfers to urban local bodies (Seddon 2014). Given the fungibility of
revenue, escrowing constitutionally-guaranteed transfers to ULBs reduces public control over
intergovernmental finance.
3.2.3 Political Dimension
Among the questions surrounding political institutions in urban local bodies, the still unresolved
issue of the structure and functioning of metropolitan governance looms large (Sivaramakrishnan 2013).
The limited existence of wards committees, intended by the 74th Constitutional Amendment Act to be the
lowest unit of self-governance in municipal corporations, is also a source of concern (Sivaramakrishnan
Government of India was asking local bodies to restructure both their finances and administration simultaneously,
failing to acknowledge that restructuring their finances might limit their capability to restructure administration.
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2006). Recent literature on the political economy of urban governance in India documents substantial
differentiation in the approaches taken by interest groups to gain access to resources within the local state
(Chatterjee 2004). Comparing across fragmented geographic and bureaucratic subunits of urban
governance structure, this research has demonstrated the porousness of the local state both in terms of the
composition of services and in local government performance at the point of service delivery. Some
scholars have tended to attribute patterns associated with these tactics to relatively homogeneous class
interests, such as elite multi-national (Ghosh 2005), middle-class (Harriss 2007; Kamath and
Vijayabaskar 2009) and the urban poor (Solomon Benjamin 2014). Other studies have documented
convergence among tactics of collective action between middle-class and slum-based associations in
Bangalore (Kamath and Vijayabaskar 2014).
What has replaced local autonomy, which although muted as a value by the compromises of the
74th Constitutional Amendment Act (CAA), was a prominent objective in the earliest days of devolution
reform? Even as structural aspects of administrative, fiscal, and political devolution have followed the
trends described above, a phenomenon far less documented in studies of local finance in India has been
the rise of field-level consultants, commercial entities as nodal firms with reform responsibilities, and
software development companies in core areas of technical administration of local public finance
(Rupanagunta 2006). The intensification of participation by these actors external to the intergovernmental
system has been driven, in part, by policy design within intergovernmental finance to ULBs. As local
revenue autonomy stagnates and dependence on intergovernmental transfers grows, the outsized influence
of certain design elements of national urban policy and intergovernmental transfers on the governance of
public financial management in ULBs becomes more evident.
3.3 National Reform Institutions
This section analyzes the institutional reforms attempted over the past two decades within the
intergovernmental system aimed at incentivizing improvements to the "maintenance of accounts, their
audit and disclosure" in ULBs (Finance Commission 2014, 110). The first subsection focuses on the work
79
by the Ministry of Urban Development, particularly in the design and enforcement of national urban
governance reform schemes. The second subsection turns attention to the Finance Commission and their
relationship to ULBs. Examining the experience of these two apex bodies helps to understand to what
extent these agencies have been successful and the implications of these changes for patterns of
institutional change in public financial management among urban local bodies.
While apex ministries and agencies in the national government have combined historically
unprecedented amounts of public finance with a defined policy reform agenda in ULBs, there has been
limited effort to substantively strengthen mechanisms of upward accountability in the intergovernmental
system. The latest shift in national urban policy, from the Jawaharlal Nehru National Urban Renewal
Mission to the more recent Smart Cities Mission, is set to further push local PFM systems in the direction
of electronic government while reducing national-level controls and restrictions on grant transfers. This is
happening under Prime Minister Modi's stated intention of initiating a new paradigm in Indian federalism
based on both cooperative and competitive principles in order to achieve "less government, more
governance."
3.3.1 Ministry of Urban Development
The Jawaharlal Nehru National Urban Renewal Mission (JNNURM) was the Government of
India's flagship urban finance and reform program from 2006 to 2012. Following a series of centrally-
sponsored conditional transfer schemes targeting urban governance reforms in large metropolitan cities,
JNNURM emerged out of the desire to advance a central-local partnership model within the development
policy platform of the United Progressive Alliance (UPA) coalition government, called the Common
Minimum Program (CMP). In the urban sector, the CMP sought to implement a comprehensive urban
renewal program focused on increasing public and private investment in all areas of basic urban
infrastructure and slum upgrading. The purpose of this section is not to make an assessment of JNNURM,
which can be found in Sivaramakrishnan (2011) and Grant Thornton (2011). Rather, I identify the
dissonance between the design of JNNURM and the regulatory mechanisms necessary to monitor enforce
the program.
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Designed by Congress Party planners with clear inspiration from the World Bank's structural
adjustment programs in the 1990s, the reform program combined matching grants with a large menu of
"mandatory" and "optional" reforms. JNNURM is a variant of performance-based grant systems (PBGSs)
but with allocations linked to subnational reforms instead of minimum standards of service delivery
(Steffensen 2010). The program sought the use of conditional matching grant transfers for urban
infrastructure and basic housing for the urban poor to pursue five major urban reform objectives.28
Attaching conditions to fiscal assistance to states and local governments was not new. What was unique
about JNNURM was the opportunity to test the capability of the Government of India to use its fiscal and
regulatory powers to shape the direction of reform in cities, given the scale of public funds made available
and the breadth and depth of the reform package. Table 3.2 lists the set of mandatory and optional reforms
assigned to state and municipal governments.
Table 3.2 Reforms under JNNURM Program
* Implementation of all
decentralization measures in 74th
Constitutional Amendment (CAA)
* Repeal of Urban Land Ceiling and
Regulation Act (ULCRA)
* Reform of rent control laws
* Reduction of stamp duty to less than
5%
* Enactment of Community
Participation Law
* Enactment of Public Disclosure Law
* Assignment of city planning
functions to ULBs




information systems for services)
* Property tax (collection rate at 85%)
* Complete cost recovery through
" Introduction of property title certification
system in ULBs
" Revision of building bylaws to streamline
approval process
" Revision of building bye-laws to make rain
water harvesting mandatory
" Earmarking at least 20-25% of the
developed land in all the housing projects
(both public and private) for low-income
groups
" Simplification of legal and procedural
frameworks for conversion of agricultural
land
" Introduction of computerized process of
registration of land and property
" Bylaws of reuse of recycled water
" Administrative reforms
" Structural reforms
28 Those five major objectives were (1) establishment of city-wide framework for planning and governance; (2)
modern and transparent budgeting, accounting, and financial management systems; (3) financial sustainability for
municipalities and service delivery institutions; (4) transparency and accountability in service delivery and
management; and (5) universal access to a minimum level of services.
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Mandatory Reforms Optional Reforms
user charges (collection rate at 85%) * Encouraging public private partnerships
" Budget earmarking for basic
services to the urban poor (25%)
" Security of tenure at affordable
prices
The areas of ULB management that were targeted by the e-governance reforms advanced by
JNNURM were extensive. Eight basic services were prioritized: (1) vital registration and issue of birth
and death certificate; (2) payment of property tax and utility bills; (3) citizen grievances; (4) building plan
approvals; (5) electronic procurement and project monitoring; (6) health and solid waste management
licenses; (7) municipal accounting system; and (8) personnel information systems (Kundu 2014). In total,
37 cities completed all 8 e-governance reforms during JNNURM. In Maharashtra, the Navi Mumbai
municipal corporation used JNNURM funds to further develop or introduce 17 e-governance modules.
Nagpur municipal corporation introduced 11 modules under JNNURM, covering all areas of reform under
JNNURM including the accounting and financial management modules. 29 For 35 mission cities, a study
found that the number of e-governance reforms for accounting had increased from 16 cities to 20 cities
from 2006-2009. For project management information systems, the number increased from 12 cities to 17
cities, and citizen grievance portals increased from 11 to 17.30
Existing criticisms of JNNURM have focused on different aspects of the scheme. For instance,
there was a big-city bias in the design of the program. Some of the ULB-level reforms required state
action, so were beyond their control of local governments, despite their contributions of between 10-25%
of the matched funding for public investment projects (Khan 2014; Kundu and Samanta 2011).
Mismatches in project implementation capability and policy reform created significant confusion around
whether or not the reforms and project funding were actually related in practice. Other criticism has
focused on the manner by which state governments ignored directives to avoid using JNNURM funds for
projects executed by parastatal agencies (Baindur and Kamath 2009).
29 Total costs were 1,344.82 lakhs. Cost sharing between national, state, and local government was 50% (672.2
lakhs), 20% (269.05 lakhs), and 30% (403.57 lakhs), respectively. See http://icrier.org/pdf/maharashtra-oct20l2.pdf.
30 See https://nisg.org/files/documents/A03060016.pdf.
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The inclusion of mandatory reforms alongside optional reforms stemmed from a compromise
within the Union government. On the basis of the vertical fiscal gap, the case for the largest federal
budget appropriation for urban investment in the history of post-independence to plug the urban output
gap was compelling. It is on this point that Sivaramakrishnan (2011, xxiii) relays a common assessment
of JNNURM, "that it has done no harm." Nevertheless, on the basis of federal politics, the national
government could not give the funds away for free without asking for something in return. More
importantly, with such a historically large appropriation for urban investment, there were concerns that
the national government would be perceived as trying to bypass the state governments and create a direct
and permanent link with ULB governments." In addition, the position among the Planning Commission
and Ministry of Finance was that the scheme had to be both conditional and time-bound or the national
government might undermine its policy position demanding fiscal probity in the urban sector.
The impermanency of the incentive, combined with a lack of local capacity to implement large
infrastructure projects, led to issues with project quality and stalled implementation (See HPEC Report,
Grant Thornton Report). Most studies of JNNURM have attributed this problem to the technical capacity
of ULBs. Few analysts of JNNURM have acknowledged the complete absence of vertical control (i.e.
upward accountability) within the program and the extent to which low levels of central capacity severely
curtailed the anticipated benefits of the program. The apex institution at the top of the regulatory structure
overseeing JNNURM implementation in the national government was the Central Sanctioning and
Monitoring Committee (CSMC). The CSMC was delegated responsibility to sanction the transfer of
funds to states and ULBs and monitor compliance. In such a high-profile investment and reform scheme,
the CSMC would certainly anticipate political pressure to disburse grants quickly. Yet, the apex body was
" The Urban Development Secretary made this much clear in his speech at the launch of the program: "I wish to
emphasize...that JNNURM is merely a platform being provided by the Central Government to the States and Urban
Local Bodies (ULBs) for improving the urban infrastructure. Therefore, active involvement and support of the State
governments and ULBs is essential in this endeavour. Only through a combined effort of all of us, will it be possible
to achieve this gigantic task" (emphasis added).
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unprepared for the tasks assigned to them. As a member of the CSMC from the Planning Commission
described:
When they [state governments and ULBs] came to CSMC, the CSMC was overwhelmed
because it had no wherewithal to check so many projects. See out of the seven years you
have planned 2,834 projects, now look at 2,834 project presentations on each. So there
was lot of effort by both the municipal bodies as well as the state government to get the
project sanctioned... And since there is hurry to get and grab as many projects as possible
so the state government gave answers whatever the consultant told them and the entire
process remained completely unplanned.
When mismatches immediately opened up between the timing of fund disbursements and reform
implementation, the response by the CSMC was to introduce an entirely new framework for evaluating
the extent of reform progress that would qualify ULBs for release of later tranches of matching funds. The
idea was by introducing a flexible scoring system, they could give minimal space to subnational
governments without appearing as if they were overstepping constitutional limitations on interactions
between the national government and ULBs. In short, the CSMC assumed what was missing were more
transparent and credible signals to serve as incentives for state governments and ULBs to fulfill their
commitments. They devised a scoring system whereby the CSMC would rank progress on each reform to
generate a cumulative score, granting flexibility to state and local governments to pursue certain non-
complex reforms more fully while partial progress on other reforms did not hamper project
implementation. This also granted the CSMC discretion to interpret the meaningfulness of reform efforts
on the ground, which they did often by comparing reform proposals to the reform primers and templates
that had been created by the Ministry of Urban Development (now Ministry of Housing and Urban
Affairs). The CSMC divided reforms into two categories: complex and non-complex and assigned points
to each reform. If a city or state scored higher than 71.5 on non-complex reforms, the second or third
tranche of central assistance was released.
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2 Cited in Cook (2012).
Table 3.3 Regulatory Mechanisms in National Urban Reform Programs
Regulatory Agencies Monitoring/Sanctioning Information Sharing
Mechanism Mechanism
JNNURM Central Sanctioning and Reform progress scores Quarterly Progress
Reforms Monitoring Committee (CSMC) Reports
State-Level Nodal Agency (SLNA)
JNNURM Central Sanctioning and Service-level Quarterly Progress
Projects Monitoring Committee (CSMC) benchmarks Reports
State-Level Nodal Agency (SLNA) , I _I
Any delays in the transfer of funds to cities were made on the basis of omitted or ambiguous
details contained in project reports submitted to the CSMC. The system for evaluating reform progress
the CSMC devised might have looked flexible on paper, but it simply failed in practice given the
complexity of the reforms. For instance, the CSMC included e-governance, accrual based double entry
accounting, 85% property tax coverage, and 90% collection efficiency within the "non-complex" category
of reforms. As the following chapters will show, e-governance reforms are anything but "non-complex."
Yet, even the complexity and difficulty of e-governance reforms do not compare to accrual based double
entry accounting." While many ULBs have adopted an accrual based double entry accounting structure,
most still rely in practice on parallel single-entry accounting systems on a day-to-day basis.
Without a robust oversight and monitoring structure and a meaningful threat of sanctions, there
was simply no way for the CSMC to confirm or disconfirm whether or not the ULB had successfully
implemented the reforms. International experience suggests that such a mechanism would require
vertically integrated information reporting structures spanning from national to municipal government.
Such mechanisms are characterized by tight feedback loops that transfer information upward from local
agencies and trigger automatic sanctions and responses from central authorities transferring funds to local
government authorities. For the threat of sanction connected to the misallocation of project funds or
failure to meet timelines to be credible, the range of potential scenarios and associated consequences must
" In a review of accrual accounting in industrial country national governments, Torres (2004) finds that true accrual
accounting is difficult for even high capacity national government ministries and agencies.
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be specified in advance and communicated transparently to participating governments. This essential
characteristic of conditional grant transfer schemes was entirely missing from JNNURM.
On the project side, the CSMC progressively introduced service-level benchmarks into the project
sanctioning process beginning in 2009. There is some evidence in the minutes of CSMC minutes that they
used the service-level benchmarks, which prescribed universal coverage in water, solid waste
management, and storm drainage, as a standard to judge the beneficiary projections in JNNURM project
proposals. If the CSMC perceived that the project beneficiary projections as described in detailed project
reports submitted by participating cities were too conservative relative to benchmarks of universal
coverage, they might delay the initial fund release. At other times, they used the service-level benchmarks
to threaten the release of second and third tranches of funding. However, by not transparently and
consistently linking the release of central government funds to achievement of development targets
outlined in the city development plan (CDP) for each participating city, the CSMC was left without
concrete commitments to which they could hold participating ULBs accountable.3 4
3.3.2 Central Finance Commission
The Central Finance Commission (CFC), which convenes every five years, has been
progressively elevating financial information management for the past two decades. The first CFC to
substantively address both municipal accounting and the issue of computerized financial management
information systems (FMIS) was the 1 1th CFC. The computerization of municipal accounts was such a
priority to the 11 th CFC that they ranked the "maintenance of accounts and audit" and the "development
of [local] financial database" above core service delivery for the use of CFC grants to ULBs. Though the
11th CFC allocated 200 crore rupees (approx. US $44.4 million) for the creation of local financial
14 The absence of a functional sanctioning mechanism created problems for ensuring that disbursed funds from the
national government were utilized to complete public investment projects. For instance, the Comptroller and Auditor
General (C&AG) found that the Bangalore city government failed to complete their JNNURM projects within the
seven-year timeline stipulated by JNNURM rules, but only drew down 70-75% of project funds from the central and
state government.
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databases, only 98.6 crores were actually utilized from 2000-2005. Moreover, only 113 crore of 483 crore
allocated to maintenance of accounts were utilized (Finance Commission 2004, 153).
The development and adoption of financial information systems was also covered by the Twelfth
Finance Commission, which declared that "municipalities should give high priority to expenditure on
creation of database and maintenance of accounts through the use of modern technology and management
systems, wherever possible" (Finance Commission 2004, 154). The Thirteenth Finance Commission took
up the topic by reporting that "additional investments necessary for improving the accounting system,
computerization of operations, tax administration, and project monitoring" had contributed to increasing
the expenditures of local bodies (Finance Commission 2009, 155). Consultations with local body
representatives resulted in two main recommendations: first that "the Finance Commission should support
the establishment of a geographic information system (GIS)-based property tax system for all local bodies
aimed at strengthening their revenues" and second that "funds should be earmarked for creation of
databases at the level of local bodies while providing the flexibility to hire or outsource specialized
manpower to undertake this" (Finance Commission 2009, 157). The 14th CFC also prioritized the
maintenance of ULB accounts, their audit, and disclosure above revenue mobilization and local
expenditure on basic services. The latter followed consultations with state governments, state finance
commissions, and ULBs. Each requested funds for "preparation of simple accounts and data formats"
(Finance Commission 2014, 103)."
Table 3.4 summarizes the assistance provided to ULBs for computerizing their accounting
systems from the 11 th Finance Commission to the 14th Finance Commission. Two things are important to
note. The first is that while each CFC has prioritized computerization and auditing of ULBs, the
1s The 14th Finance Commission claimed that "in our view, a common issue that emerges from SFC reports is the
need to have reliable data on the finances of local bodies in order to enable all stakeholders to make informed
decisions. For this, the compilation of accounts and their audit assumes importance. Another common issue is that
the local bodies need to be encouraged to generate own revenues and to improve the quality of basic services they
deliver" (Finance Commission 2014, 107).
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regulatory mechanisms that would serve to feed information up from ULBs to the national government
and "discipline" downwards have been progressively offloaded and weakened.
Oversight has been offloaded to the Comptroller and Auditor General (C&AG), beginning with
the 11 th CFC. During this period, the Comptroller and Auditor General developed the oversight modality
of "technical guidance and supervision." Technical guidance and supervision includes four elements: (1)
setting audit standards and audit planning; (2) adoption of improved audit methodologies; (3) training in
audit and accounts; and (4) annual transactions audit by random selection and supplementary audit of
institutions audited by the State Director of Local Fund Audit. While these functions are certainly critical
to a supreme audit institution, they do not include any disciplinary mechanism to compel ULBs into
compliance. The CFC's have encouraged state governments to adopt laws that would require C&AG
compliance and performance audits of ULBs to be tabled in state legislatures, however not all states have
done so and many states have simply ignored the requirement. More importantly, the intervals between
C&AG audits stretch between 3-5 years and at most they target specific departments or specific types of
transactions. They are never comprehensive audits of ULB accounts.
Table 3.4 Central Finance Commission Grants for ULB Financial Management Information Systems
Priorities Funding Regulatory Enforcement
Mechanism (Incentive
System)
11 th Central Maintenance of 483 crore (113 * Maintenance of * Comptroller
Finance accounts crore utilized) accounts and local and Auditor
Commission financial database General
(2000-2005) *Development of 200 crores (98.6 had first charge on (CAG)
[local] financial utilized) grants ("Technical
database * Nine conditions Guidance &
fulfilled each year to Supervision)
qualify for * State
performance grant governments
12th Central * Building database Earmarks from total * No conditions * Comptroller
Finance and maintenance of grants-in-aid to except examination and Auditor
Commission accounts consolidated fund of utilization General
(2005-2010) of the states certificates (CAG)
* State
governments
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12th (2004), 13th (2009), and 14th (2014) Central Finance
The other important point is that, even as the central agencies have "offloaded" oversight
responsibility to the C&AG, enforcement (sanctioning) responsibilities have been shifted downward to
state governments. The 13th Central Finance Commission emphasized the role of the local fund audit
department in state governments. The 13th Central Finance Commission adopted the principle of
"prudential" conditions, seeing the establishment of minimum expectations for accessing grant funding as
a "gateway" to the performance grants. For the 131h CFC performance grant, ULBs were required to
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submit current coverage levels and targets for the following year at the same time. However,
demonstrating progress or achievement was not required to continue accessing funds (Working Group of
State Urban Development Secretaries 2013).
Assessing the experience of the previous three CFCs, the 14th CFC settled on three conditions to
access the performance grant funding: (1) submission of a single-year accounts audit within two years
preceding the grant claim; (2) show an increase in own revenue during the preceding year (excluding
income from octroi and entry taxes); and (3) publish service level benchmarks for devolved functions.
The 14th Central Finance Commission (CFC) introduced a "trust-based approach" to monitoring and
compliance putting the onus of responsibility for monitoring and sanctioning on state governments and
essentially removing all conditions and restrictions imposed by the central government for release of
funds. In terms of sanctions, the 14th CFC recommended that "stern action should be ensured if
irregularities in the application of funds are noticed or pointed out" (Finance Commission 2014). The shift
to a trust-based approach to the release of grants follows Prime Minister Modi's political reform project to
convert India's federal system to a new, hybrid mix of cooperative and competitive federalism.
While the 1 3 th Central Finance Commission argued that stronger consideration was merited for a
mechanism that could force states to devolve the Schedule 12 functions in the 74th Constitutional
Amendment Act, any mechanism that could accomplish such an objective would have to be based on
better information and stronger intergovernmental regulations and enforcement. However, as the previous
sections have demonstrated, these two building blocks of a stronger devolution mechanism remain
institutional voids (Khanna and Palepu 2010) in India's fiscal federal system. The report of the 14th
Finance Commission issued in 2015 capped a remarkable 20-year transition within the apex national
public finance institution towards formally acknowledging and prioritizing problems of basic financial
information management in urban local bodies. The 14th Finance Commission's statement on the
linkages between fiscal management, transparency, and democratic local governance, however, expose
the growing rift between strong vertical mechanisms to monitor and sanction local public financial
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management procedures and the willingness and ability of the Government of India to carry through with
constitutional commitments made in the 74th Amendment Act.
3.4 The Emergence of Fund-Based Accounting Structures in State Reforms
The most significant institutional change in local public financial management in India is the
coordinated shift, beginning around the turn of the century, in national government agencies pushing
double entry, accrual accounting in ULBs through the adoption of a standardized funds structure for
municipal accounts. Different agencies and institutions have contributed to the structural change in
national policy, including the Finance Commission, the Ministry of Urban Development, and the
Comptroller and Auditor General (C&AG).36 State governments have eschewed modifying their general
purpose municipal acts, instead opting to issue local fund authority "rules" that outline fund-based
accounting standards and their implications for budget structure (e.g. chart of accounts) and function.
While international agencies like the World Bank noted as far back as a decade ago that audit functions
would need to be redesigned in light of prevailing computerization trends to allow for concurrent audit in
a computerized environment (World Bank 2007), there has been limited substantive regulatory changes at
the national level reflecting the increased dependency of ULBs on digital financial management
information systems to maintain ULB accounts. Some states, particularly those that successfully initiated
accounting reforms prior to large scale computerization such as Tamil Nadu, have handled the transition
better than others.
Following the completion of the National Municipal Accounts Manual in 2004, the national
government ordered state governments to produce their own state-level accounts manuals but did not
provide much direction beyond the order. While some state-level technical guidelines and handbooks on
municipal budgeting and accounting have captured the complexities of transitioning to a funds-based
3 Through project lending and technical assistance to various states, the World Bank and Asian Development Bank
have developed a limited number of municipal budgeting, accounting, and auditing manuals. Most of this work,
however, falls under the Financial Institution Reform and Expansion (FIRE) Project, financed and coordinated by
the United States Agency for International Development (USAID) since the early 1990s.
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double entry accrual accounting system, there has been little substantive regulatory reform reflecting the
growing use of digital financial management information systems to maintain ULB accounts. State
government municipal accounting manuals tend to be comprehensive, covering both general and specific-
purpose accounting procedures in manual environments. The Bihar Municipal Accounting Manual is 834
pages long. The Orissa Municipal Accounting Manual is 455. However, despite the transition to
computerized operating environments, these manuals make limited reference to budgeting and accounting
in hybrid paper-based and digital systems.
Recognizing the extensive use of paper-based procedures, these manuals have only intimated that
the budget classification structures and chart of accounts are amendable to computerization. That is to
say, they all concede that changes to guidelines for formats and procedures may be necessary in an
information technology environment. Yet, as recently as 2012, the Kerala Government published a
Municipal Financial Audit Manual (released by Local Self Government Department with assistance from
the Asian Development Bank). The manual, unlike the municipal accounts manuals, is much shorter at 72
pages. The manual only includes a 3-page section on auditing in a computerized environment, focusing
on computer-assisted audit techniques. What is completely absent from the manuals are guidelines,
procedures, and directions for the transition to digital FMIS.
The Karnataka Municipalities Accounting and Budgeting Rules (2006) contains one page out of
92 on computerized accounting and budgeting (in Part E Misc. of Chapter 25). The section outlines who
is responsible for ensuring "that appropriate controls and procedures are exercised for the integrity and
security of the data files and programs and storage of backup of this data and its retrieval" (2006, 89). The
Karnataka Municipalities Accounting and Budgeting Rules (2006) assign that responsibility to either the
Municipal Commissioner or the Director of Municipal Administration (who leads the Directorate of
Municipal Administration in state government). The KMAB rules allow for the director of municipal
administration to modify the information requirements prescribed in KMF forms in the case that this
information is already collected in other software systems and therefore available for reporting. The
KMAB Rules (2006) nominally empower the director of municipal administration as the authority to
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submit requests to the state government to discontinue manual accounting (i.e. manual maintenance of
forms and registers) in a given ULB. While the KMAB Rules ensures ex post control over the division of
accounting between digital and manual systems, there are no ex ante controls in place to circumscribe or
control the growth of digital FMIS in ULBs.
State governments have been reticent to modify municipal acts that govern urban local bodies in
light of the substantial shift in national urban policy and programs that have encouraged the transition
away from old institutions of public financial management. For instance, most municipal acts still
reference public financial management practices based on handwritten, paper-based processes, even as
ULBs across the country have adopted computer-based information systems. While many have been
updated to include concepts like double-entry accounting or references to the national municipal accounts
manual, computerization and its associated implications are still conspicuously absent following nearly a
decade of initiatives to introduce digital information systems in core accounting processes.
Instead, state governments have tended to rely on rules and bylaws to address the issue of
computerization in ULB budgeting and accounting. Table 3.5 lists references to computerization in the
various acts and rules that structure the financial management domain of urban local bodies in Karnataka.
Some states have developed dedicated support divisions that provide specialized consultancy services to
ULBs related to software and hardware implementation for local public financial management. These are
subsumed under larger e-governance agencies, for instance, the Municipal Reforms Cell (MRC) which is
the state-level nodal agency for implementing computerization and other reforms in ULBs under the
directorate of municipal administration in Karnataka state. However, without systematic capacity
development initiatives for councils and other legislative bodies that intervene in urban governance, the
extent to which these rules and bylaws are subject to ongoing enforcement is limited.
Table 3.5 Karnataka Policy Framework for Budgeting and Accounting in ULBs
Key Legislation Reference to Computerization of Budgeting and Accounting
(Date)
Karnataka Municipal No reference.
Corporation Act
(1976)





Karnataka Local Fund Section 3 (6) - The Medium Term Fiscal Plan shall have a functional focus
Authorities Fiscal and provide for backend modalities such as fund based accounting system
Responsibility Act (FBAS), computerisation and a realistic and transparent budgeting process.
(2003)
Section 6 (10) - "The local fund authority shall introduce and strengthen
appropriate internal audit measures and a sustainable computerization
programme using appropriate technology."
National Municipal "The codification structure and input forms recommended are amenable to
Accounts Manual computerisation also. However, the registers are designed keeping in mind
(2004) that ULBs will be implementing the recommended system mostly in a manual
environment to begin with. Changes to the formats may be required for IT
enablement (p.9).





Karnataka Municipal Drafted but has not received state government approval.
Accounts Audit
Manual
Two of the twenty principles of financial management outlined in the Karnataka Local Fund
Authorities Fiscal Responsibility Act (2003) contain references to transparency - "ensuring transparency
at all stages of policy making and implementation" and "disclosing sufficient information to allow the
public to scrutinize the conduct of fiscal policy and the state of local fund authority finances." The
problem continues to be one of coordination. In Karnataka state, the State Accounts Department is the
authority that is given power to enforce compliance with the Karnataka Local Fund Authorities Fiscal
Responsibility Act (2003). However, the separate Directorate of Municipal Administration is the technical
support agency for developing capacity and ensuring that technical systems in ULBs correspond to the
principles and design parameters established in the Karnataka Municipal Accounts Manual. What this
section has demonstrated is the near complete absence of resources for municipalities that will, for the
foreseeable future, operate in a hybrid "computerizing" environment. This oversight is particularly
troubling, given the limited existence and reach of intergovernmental monitoring and accountability
mechanisms.
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3.6 Locked in Place: Public Financial Management in Bangalore
The material, social, and institutional entanglement of digital information technologies, local
public financial management systems, and political organizing around municipal finance reform and
urban governance in Bangalore can be traced back almost two decades. Bangalore was one of the first
cities in India to combine both local tax and accounting reforms with local information technology design
and development. The turn of the century in Bangalore saw an ambitious reform agenda advanced by
Chief Minister S.M. Krishna and implemented under the aegis of the Bangalore Agenda Task Force
(BATF). The reforms included a unit area value (UAV) property tax system based on self-assessment
(SAS scheme) and the introduction of a double-entry accrual municipal accounting framework called the
funds based accounting system. The latter was supported with a custom digital PFM information system
that shared the same name - FBAS.
Along with Chennai the municipal finance reform experience in Bangalore at the turn of the
century has done more to shape the design of national urban policy than any other city in the country.
Chief Minister S.M. Krishna's sweeping financial reform agenda was designed and implemented by the
Bangalore Agenda Task Force (BATF), a committee of chief executives from information technology
firms in Bangalore and elite civil servants. In a time span of three years, the municipal corporation
changed the property tax structure to a unit area value (UAV) system based on self-assessment; abolished
the 2% stamp duty charge; changed the Karnataka Municipal Law to make it easier to borrow funds from
private lending institutions; introduced a funds-based, double entry accounting structure; and developed
and implemented a financial management information system (FMIS) referred to as the Funds Based
Accounting System (FBAS).
Whether the BATF constituted a traditional or unconventional public private partnership has been
debated (Ghosh 2005; Paul 2005), but reliance on elite executives from private technology firms to
coordinate and execute local finance reforms was novel for the time. The philanthropic organization of
the former founder and CEO of Infosys, Nandan Nilekani, covered the software development costs of
FBAS. The software was developed by the local software company, CrossDomains. When S.M. Krishna
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lost the state elections in 2004, the BATF was removed from power and a retainer contract was signed
between the city corporation and Management and Governance Consulting (MaGC), a private consulting
firm in Bangalore that specialized in business advisory, public sector governance and public finance,
information technology, training, and research.
With tremendous investments in time and resources provided by the Bangalore Agenda Task
Force, the accounting reforms were made to be initially successful." The city designed the new
accounting structure around corporate accounting institutions. The BATF succeeded in publishing the
first asset registry for the city in 2003 with the completion of the FBAS software system. They redesigned
the chart of accounts for revenue and expenditure in the local budget. More importantly, the system was
organized around a unique 14-digit public investment project ID, called the work code, issued by the head
financial officer located in the zones: the assistant controller finance (ACF). The idea was that the city
government should be able to trace and account for expenditures down to a lightbulb installed in a
streetlight on a back alley in any of the 100 wards of the city. FBAS was designed that way because the
city was shifting to an area-based contracting model, where construction firms and other contractors
would bid for multiple sector projects within a defined area of the city.
By delegating authority to issue work codes to the Assistant Controller Finance (ACF) in the
zone, incentives would be more aligned and decisions could be more easily audited. Nevertheless, the
Bangalore Agenda Task Force was skeptical of delegating information oversight and monitoring to the
zones, so they located the FBAS system on a local area network solely within the FBAS Cell in the head
office. Such an organizational design required project files to be transported daily (either on paper or
floppy disk) from the zone, division, and ward offices to be entered ex post by operators in the FBAS cell.
" These reforms were lauded, both domestically and globally, as the future of urban reform in India. For many
reasons, including the access enjoyed by members of the Bangalore Agenda Task Force to powerful Congress Party
politicians in the national government, the reform template tested in Bangalore was taken up by national urban
policy makers (Baindur 2017, 127). However, as will be described in later chapters, while these reforms conformed
to a standard normative vision of municipal finance they were inappropriately sequenced and little effort was made
to develop support structures to ensure they would be nurtured over time. Indeed, one can tie the design and
implementation of the reform package to the weak and unsustainable financial position of the current BBMP.
96
Though paid for by the BATF, the software code was proprietary to CrossDomains, the local software
development firm.
The BATF's reform package generated immediate increases in annual revenue yields from the
property tax and, to a lesser extent, efficiency gains in project control and management. The net revenue
effect was likely still limited, because of the loss of income from the 2% stamp duty surcharge that was
transferred directly from the state government to the city corporation. Of more long-term relevance, the
BBMP never took full ownership of the FBAS system nor the accrual accounting reforms. No study has
offered a definitive explanation as to why, but the sheer breadth of the reforms, qualifying as a "big bang"
approach, likely far exceeded the organizational and institutional capacity of the city government's
existing bureaucratic institutions. After three to four years devoted to massive structural reforms in
Bangalore, it was not difficult for S.M. Krishna's opponents to frame his tenure as Chief Minister in
terms of systematic neglect of rural areas in Karnataka. He was removed as Chief Minister in the 2004
elections.
The city of Bangalore, however, was entering an inescapable period of growth. Sensing an
opportunity to pull forward the financial and economic benefits of urban growth, the new state
government delivered show-cause notice to the 100 members of the city council that the state government
was moving to dissolve the Bangalore Mahanagara Palike. The BMP would be merged with nine city
municipal councils, three town municipal councils and Il l villages on the periphery to form the Bruhat
Bengaluru Mahanagara Palike (BBMP). Appointing an administrator to oversee local government, it took
the state government four years to amalgamate the jurisdictions into a new city with 198 wards spread
across 709 square kilometers as it now currently exists. As an outcome of the amalgamation of
jurisdictions, the official population of Bangalore grew considerably during this transition period
beginning in 2006-07 as noted in figure 3.1.
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Due to the rapid expansion of the city, the new chain of delegation for expenditure management
and revenue administration was long, fragmented, and geographically dispersed. Residents could enter
one of 260 revenue department help centers, 10 citizen service centers, 68 sub-division offices, and 198
ward offices, or online for the property tax. Payment by cash, check, demand draft, or pay-order had to be
accepted and documented which included handwriting the transaction in the collection register and, until
the introduction of the Financial Management System (FMS) was introduced, handwriting a paper receipt.
As I stated earlier, the FBAS unit was housed in the head office of the BBMP. The initial
management team that had developed the system and helped deploy it in the BBMP was forced out of the
project when S.M. Krishna was voted out and the new Chief Minister arrived. CrossDomain, the local
software company that developed the FBAS software, failed to transfer the source code to the city during
the political transition. They would later argue that because the system was developed under a freeware
agreement they were under no obligation to supply the code. FBAS was developed on Delphi 5 (1999)
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with an Oracle 8i database, which means by 2007 when the city began amalgamation the software and
hardware were seven and four versions old, respectively. MaGC coped with the obsolescence of FBAS by
developing Excel-based spreadsheet "modules" that supported budget, projects, and payment reporting.
FBAS however could not keep up with the pace of change in the BBMP.38
The BBMP had not had an integrated approach to the use of financial management information
systems since 2004 with the BATF. Without an integrated approach and political oversight following the
dissolution of the BBMP council in 2006, engineers and project officers across the zone, division, sub-
division, and ward had enjoyed substantial discretion to develop their own procedures. This put executive
engineers firmly in control over the flow of project information within the BBMP. A summary of the
status of the BBMP's financial position in 2011-12 in table 3.6 helps describe just how much slack had
entered the system a full decade after the BATF set out to remake the municipal finance system.
Table 3.6 Expenditure and Revenue Management in the BBMP (2011-12)
Income Heads Expected Actual Gap Gap (%)
(Rs. 100,000) (Rs. 100,000) (Rs. 100,000)
Estimated Income (3 Sept 2011) 931,580.00 407,599.05 524,020.94 56.25
Estimated Expenditure (3 Sept 2011) 939,855.00 392,700.03 547,154.97 58.21
Finance and Accounts 215,233.00 125,495.95 89,737.05 41.69
Revenue 273,675.00 131,146.00 141,529.00 51.71
Markets 5,662.00 2,046.14 3,615.86 65.86
Advertisements 19,800.00 3,042.67 16,757.33 84.63
Town Planning 111,640.00 21,597.58 90,042.42 80.65
Public Works Department 135,391.00 25,065.18 110,325.82 81.49
Source: Bruhat Bengaluru Mahanagara Palike (BBMP) Audit Report for FY 2011-12
Though it is impossible to trace the factors that led to the dissolution of internal control following
the removal of BATF and strong state government oversight, by 2009 public financial management in
Bangalore appeared to be "imaginary" (Bruhat Bengaluru Mahanagara Palike 2016, 11). The revenue and
expenditure estimates for budget formation were inflated by more than 100 percent. The revenue
8 The system suffered from four major problems. First, many transactions had to be entered from the backend of the
system which is neither secure nor safe. Second, the system is not web-enabled so it cannot be integrated with any
other FMIS or ICT system in the BBMP. More importantly, it has a hard limit to the volume of transactions it can
handle which was exceeded during the amalgamation. Third, the structure of the accounting system, include the
budget and accounting codes, was not compliant with the National Municipal Accounting Manual (NMAM).
Because the source code was lost, no changes could be made to bring it into compliance.
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department, which oversees property taxation, collected just half of what it projected it would that year.
As a result, the BBMP began to rely heavily on long-term loans from public and private banks. Long-term
debt obligations held by the BBMP increased 292% in four years, from Rs. 887.64 crore ($221.01
million) in FY 2007-08 to Rs. 3,476.13 crore ($692.45 million) (Bruhat Bengaluru Mahanagara Palike
2016).39
The rapid expansion of the city's territorial jurisdiction combined with the incompatibility
between the core BMP zones and the new areas combined into the BBMP put enormous pressure on the
BBMP's existing structures for public financial management. During the period, the number of bank
accounts authorized to receive deposits and issue payments for the BBMP increased by the hundreds. The
number of bank accounts had grown from around 300, registered when FBAS was developed (Ramesh
and Murali 2006), to over 900. Moreover, in the six years of operation, the FBAS system did not supplant
other legacy programs within the public financial management system but instead operated in parallel.
Nor did the double-entry accrual accounting system fully displace the previous single-entry system.
The other major information management problem related to control over project files (tappal).
Project files contained the measurement book and any supporting documentation for public investment
projects, such as tender agreements, intermediate bills to contractors, and letters of credit. The
measurement book was a handwritten book registering the different steps of the construction process, the
materials and quantities used, and the rates for physical inputs and labor. It described implementation
across the entire project cycle and was a source of project-level accountability because the input rates
recorded in the measurement book are to match the final estimates before project approval. Following
amalgamation of the BMP into the BBMP, project files remained with contractors from the date of
submission of project estimates until the final clearance of contractor bills.'
39 To calculate the value in US dollars, I use the monthly average exchange rates for the final month of the fiscal
year (March) in both 2008 and 2012.
' Sunitha Rao. 2 November 2011. Who has all the Palike Files? Contractors! BBMP is Clueless on its Own Works.
Times of India. http://goo.gl/XNB75B.
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High population growth rates, continuous expansion in the supply of private vehicles, and
unplanned development on public land has put enormous strain on the city's financial information
management systems. Existing civil service rules and regulations set restrictive limitations on hiring and
firing permanent workers. According to interviewees, the city also tends to have relatively higher turnover
rates for senior managers deputed to Bengaluru on rotation by the Karnataka Administrative Service
(KAS). According to the Engineer-in-Chief, it had been difficult to recruit, hire, and train enough skilled
labor since the BMP transitioned to the BBMP. The engineer-in-chief described the state of the
engineering bureaucracy:
Day to day we are being stressed getting information, divulging information, and reports
are taking too much to handle. We are at extreme stress beyond our capacity. They are
paying us only to negotiate the stress, not to do the work. When there is a deficiency in
the system we make engineers run behind it.4 '
There is a generalized staff shortage of around 35% from the level sanctioned by law and no systematic
induction program that covers task-specific training for new hires (BBMP Restructuring Committee
2015).
Two key institutional factors bear on the relationship between information technology and public
financial management in the BBMP. First, there is a complete absence of a dedicated state-level policy
framework related to information technology in the local fiscal domain. Neither the Karnataka Municipal
Corporation Act nor the Karnataka Municipalities Accounting and Budgeting Rules (2006) list specific
requirements for information technology use in urban governance (see previous section). Second, the low
level of institutional capacity related to information technology in the local fiscal domain led to heavy use
of different information technology over time. Following amalgamation parallel expenditure and revenue
management applications were allowed to continue operating at different locations across the extended
public financial management bureaucracy of the BBMP. The FBAS system had been designed to
introduce Bangalore to double-entry accrual, but instead municipal accounts continued to be prepared on
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" Interview, 11 December 2015.
a single-entry cash based system. This failed transition was reflected in the Comptroller and Auditor
General of India's 2015 report on municipal governments in Karnataka state:
The Annual Accounts of BBMP were not prepared and certified within the stipulated
dates. The ledger accounts prepared under FBAS were not properly balanced at the end
of each financial year. The bank accounts were not reconciled periodically. Cash books,
grant registers and records envisaged in fund based accounting manual for recording the
transactions out of borrowings were not maintained. Internal audit system was not in
existence in BBMP. These deficiencies in maintenance of books of accounts and absence
of internal audit system indicated that the internal control was not effective in BBMP.
This meant that receipts (income) and expenses were recorded when they were actually received. While
the BATF had worked to establish an asset registry, the failure of FBAS meant that the full picture of
performance and the overall financial position of the BBMP could not be ascertained. Rather, the
proliferation of digital PFM information systems in the BBMP was leading towards more and more
"stovepipe" or partial perspectives. The BBMP had no medium-term or unified information technology
strategy nor a focus on ensuring high quality and competent staff looked at the existing problems and
sought solutions on an ongoing basis. Instead, the absence of a policy framework for information
technology in the fiscal domain created conditions where senior and mid-level managers continuously
opted for new solutions.
3.7 Conclusion: Institutional Voids in Underdeveloped Organizational Fields
This chapter contributes to the literature on municipal finance reform by linking evidence of
centripetal institutional dynamics in urban governance to forces within national policy and
intergovernmental relations. Considering these institutional dynamics in light of the distinct aspects of
information technology projects in local government and characteristics of the information technology
industry in India points to parameters of a policy formula that would be beneficial to ULBs. These
parameters must eventually deal with information and upward accountability within the
intergovernmental system if the national government is going to continue funding the computerization of
4 Comptroller and Auditor General (CAG). 2015. Report on Urban Local Bodies in Karnataka. New Delhi:
Comptroller and Auditor General.
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financial management systems in municipal corporations. Given the structure of India's information
technology industry, particularly the relatively low cost of external labor to develop information systems,
such institutional supports would provide boundaries and accountability for the many external
organizations being drawn into core areas of financial management thus limiting the institutional risks
associated with strong centripetal forces in ULBs.
Yet, after two decades of attempts in India by central and state government departments and
agencies to increase the availability of local fiscal information and improve the functioning of
management and accounting systems within both city governments and intergovernmental transfer
systems, the results range from mixed to complete failure. National urban policy and other apex
institutions of intergovernmental finance like the central finance commission have pursued different
approaches to accelerating local reforms. What has generally been missing is strengthening upward
accountability between ULBs, state governments, and the national government. Even as model policies
and laws are released at the national level to encourage convergence of policy frameworks across the
states, regulation and information continue to be institutional voids in the local public financial
management system. The Jawaharlal Nehru National Urban Renewal Mission (JNNURM) and Smart
Cities Missions in the Ministry of Urban Development have deepened the opportunities for organizations
external to ULBs to assert authority over decision-making at the technical core.
This follows a continuing shift in national approach to incentivizing/disciplining local reform
patterns by moving the locus of responsibility for implementation to special purpose vehicles. Combined
with a shift in monitoring, oversight, and auditing responsibility to the Comptroller and Auditor General
from the 13th Finance Commission onwards, centripetal forces encouraging more extra-government
participation in core technical administration of public financial management will overrun the vertical
oversight mechanisms in intergovernmental relations. The long-term outcome is likely to be a polycentric
regulatory system for local PFM, distributed unevenly within and between dominant institutions of urban
governance. Without strengthening upward monitoring and evaluation mechanisms, the transition to
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digital financial management information systems in ULBs will likely generate structural barriers to
deeper democratic control and levels of local transparency and accountability.
Concerns about administrative and fiscal devolution to urban local bodies as outlined in the 74th
Constitutional Amendment Act, dominated as they have been over the past decade on the abolition of
octroi tax and stamp duty, are increasingly supplanted by concerns of basic financial management in
ULBs. As the 14th Finance Commission recently argued, it is "inconceivable, and certainly not desirable,
that local bodies seek an ever increasing share of public moneys and yet continue to keep themselves
beyond the ambit of accountability and responsibility for the public money placed with them" (Finance
Commission 2014, 1 10).Urban management and finance reforms are increasingly entangled with the
deployment of networked information technology. On a general level, the growth of ICTs in the fiscal
domain of local government can be traced to a combination of factors. At the national and state-
government levels, apex policy and public finance institutions have included more and more e-
governance elements in urban reform schemes (Grant Thornton 2011; NIUA 2015). The World Bank,
USAID, and Asian Development Bank have included them in urban loans (Abraham 2013; USAID
2005).
Tracing Bangalore from the turn of the century through the conclusion of the Administrator
period in 2010 following amalgamation reveals a city in what the building state capability (BSC)
approach refers to as a "second jump circumstance" (Andrews, Pritchett, and Woolcock 2016,74). Rather
than economies of scale, the transformation of the BMP to BBMP had led to organizational disability.
Local public financial management capability was retrogressing; senior managers could not enforce even
desirable regulation. When a new Karnataka Administrative Services (KAS) officer, deputed to the
position of Special Commissioner (Projects), asked upon arrival, "how many public investment projects
am I responsible for?" the response was, simply, "no one knows." Yet, to paraphrase Marc Andreessen,
an American software engineer and entrepreneur, software was eating the fiscal domain of Bangalore's
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city government.43 As a result of this transition and as the next chapters will show, more than just bits and
bytes are encroaching on the manual systems of financial information management in ULBs.
* Andreessen, Marc. 2011. Why Software is Eating the World. The Wall Street Journal. August 20.
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Chapter 4: Asymmetric Implementation: Between Coordination and Competition in the
Quest for Integration
4.1 Introduction
One of the defining aspects of information technology is its configurability in context, both in
technical terms and interpretive meaning (Heeks and Stanforth 2007; Orlikowski 2005). Financial
management information systems (FMIS) need to adapt over time to connect and integrate with other
digital and paper-based components of the public financial management system and respond to changes in
the administrative and political context. Theory suggests that this process happens successfully through
various coordination mechanisms, such as rules, programs, hierarchy, orders, or targets that match the
information requirements of organizational tasks with the information processing capability of the
organization (Galbraith 1974). In short, the production and circulation of improved financial information
is an essential resource for coordination in complex environments characterized by high levels of
incomplete information.
Depending on the capacity of agents and available resources, connecting different tasks within
public financial management to relevant technical systems through coordination is important when levels
of organizational capability are retrogressing or extremely low. Success doing so often depends on an
array of factors, including the type and amount of information and degree of planning. In the classic
model of contracting out in public administration, there is a clear division of labor between government
and external vendor. That is to say, there is a strong relational asymmetry in roles between principles (the
bureaucrat) and agents (the vendor). Political models of outsourcing distinguish between the political
clout of vendors and the technical proficiency of bureaucrats (Peled 2000).
Drawing on the relationship between capability and accountability elements in the building state
capability framework, I examine two interrelated processes to understand the extent to which information
generated through the Global Project Management System (GPMS) and Financial Management System
(FMS) affected coordination. The first is the trajectory of the GPMS and FMS systems deployments in
the Bangalore municipal corporation and the second is changes in the distribution of tasks between the
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Indian CST and their BBMP counterparts. The latter helps understand shifts in vendor responsibility and
management action by examining how the planning functions of bureaucrats intersect with the execution
tasks of contractors in the settings in which they operate (Peled 2000). Rather than integration in
hierarchical command structures, the patterns of information production, circulation, and coordination
among actors that emerged followed a quasi-market structure. I trace the emergence of patterns of quasi-
market competition to three main factors: (1) the pursuit of asymmetric integration by the Indian Centre
for Social Transformation (Indian CST), (2) rapid declines in the verification costs of financial
information (i.e. administrative facts), and (3) finally the co-location of competing outsourcing
arrangements.
4.2 The Global Project Management System
4.2.1 The Challenge of Incomplete Information
As the previous chapter described, the amalgamation of the Bangalore municipal corporation with
peri -urban jurisdictions had substantially increased the level of slack in the financial information
management systems. A new Special Commissioner (Projects) was deputed through the Karnataka
Administrative Services (KAS) to the BBMP. With responsibility for managing the portfolio of public
investment projects in the BBMP, the Special Commissioner (Projects) initially requested detailed
information on the portfolio of projects from the Funds Based Accounting System (FBAS) cell in the
head office. Requests to the FBAS unit for various spending reports of aggregate projects took six months
to fulfill, making the information supplied in them more or less useless for strategic planning decisions.
Performance assessments of the work of engineers was impossible. More importantly, the FBAS system
only covered 100 of the 198 wards but the office of special commissioner (projects) now had
responsibility for monitoring construction and broader project execution across an additional 98 wards
(450 square kilometers) that were effectively outside the official accounting information system of the
BBMP. Centralizing project information would be necessary to building closer relationships with the
engineers in zone, division, and ward offices that were newly a part of the BBMP.
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The BBMP had become too big with too many projects and too many parallel systems. Initially,
the main challenge was determining what to do with the existing information systems architecture and the
institutional incumbents that supported its maintenance. While the municipal commissioner was
supportive of introducing a new management information system for projects, no high-level political
support for decommissioning and replacing the FBAS system would be forthcoming. Though FBAS was
obsolete and crippled by the transaction volume of the new BBMP, it served a vital purpose as custodian
of the BBMP's accounting information. Were the city to be audited by the Comptroller and Auditor
General (C&AG) or the Karnataka State Accounts Department, the information would have to come from
FBAS because it was the official system used to assemble annual budget proposals.
The BBMP had been approached by the former director of the Karnataka State Police Housing
Corporation (KSPHC) to offer a web-based project management system (WBPMS), which had been
developed to support the KSPHC's work constructing infrastructure and housing for the Karnataka state
police. The KSPHC's headquarters were in Bangalore, but the public corporation had projects spread
throughout the state. The parastatal had successfully transitioned to a new project management system
and the director had aimed to get the expanded BBMP to adopt the system to increase the legitimacy of
the project information system and in doing so reinforce its legitimacy within the KSPHC. The KSPHC
offered their online project management system for free.'
During the initial feasibility assessment for adopting the WBPMS in the BBMP, the KSPHC team
tasked with transferring the technology discovered two problems. First, when the state government
amalgamated the area around the periphery of the Bangalore, they did so under the misguided assumption
that those towns and villages had already transitioned to a similar funds based accounting structure at the
BBMP. Second, in discussions with the FBAS cell, they learned that the source code to the software had
been lost during the administrative transition from Chief Minister S.M. Krishna to Dharam Singh
following the elections in 2004. Consequently, any significant business process reengineering would be
I Because the KSPHC was a public corporation under the Government of Karnataka, the technology transfer was
conducted under memorandum of understanding (MoU) agreement.
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too costly and likely to fail, since there were now no available options for decommissioning the FBAS
software.
The team from the KSPHC and special commissioner (projects) concluded that the main
objective of the WBPMS would be to channel the flow of project information up to senior managers in
the BBMP. The KSPHC team convinced the BBMP commissioner that once the new system had
sufficiently centralized project information and contributed to incremental improvements in expenditure
control, the FBAS system could be slowly phased out. The transfer of the WBPMS system used in the
KSPHC could be made relatively smoothly to the BBMP. All that was required were modifications to the
project entry screens to match the BBMP project cycle, limited additional investment servers and other
hardware, and training to educate engineers and project management consultants on the new system. The
number of personnel in the BBMP's engineering department had grown by a third after amalgamation,
but no one was certain how many public investment projects had fallen under the BBMP's jurisdiction.
These issues helped justify the need for a new project management system, but also meant that the
transfer from the KSPHC to the BBMP would need to be efficient and effective given variation in levels
technology exposure among engineers.
As the project team began to deploy the WBPMS in the BBMP during the summer of 2009, the
implementation was being closely monitored in daily review meetings by the municipal commissioner.
The project ran into three initial problems. First, the KSPHC was expected to post a dedicated technical
officer inside the BBMP to oversee coordination, but staff shortages forced them to send different officers
on a rotating basis. Second, the municipal commissioner had requested that the WBPMS be integrated
with the city's new human resource information system referred to as the integrated financial
management system (IFMS). IFMS had been configured to electronically process salaries and adding
contractor bill payment would be relatively easy. The IFMS team, however, had been reluctant to
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coordinate resulting in delays in linking the two systems. Third, the project team45 had underestimated
some of the hardware specifications required to effectively transfer the system from KSPHC to the
BBMP. Connectivity in wards on the periphery of the city that had recently joined the BBMP were not as
dependable as anticipated. Basic end user problems like delays to loading the project entry webpage were
an inconvenience to engineers who were often on the move between project sites and division, sub-
division, and ward offices.
The biggest challenge, however, was determining how to respond to the rapid increase in the
number of registered projects in the new system (see table 4.1). With the objective of quickly gaining
spending control in the engineering division, project entries were being added to the system by teams
following training in both the head office and division offices. Senior managers in the BBMP had
anticipated an increase from what was reported in FBAS, but could only guess at the total figure. As
engineers and the Indian CST began entering project information into the WBPMS system, the rate of
increase and the absolute number far exceeded their initial estimates. Between November and December
alone, the number of projects in the system increased from 3,098 to 20,000.
Table 4.1: Distribution of GPMS Projects by Zone (2009)
November December
East Zone 470 4,111
West Zone 448 2,607






Head Office 232 1,843
Total Projects* 3,098 20,000
*Includes projects entered without a zone.
Source: Indian CST
45 The KSPHC team had contracted a local technology firm, Business Intelligence Technologies, to provide
technical support to the transfer.
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The WBPMS project team and the special commissioner were caught off guard. The immediate
challenges presented by such a high number of projects began to shape how the special commissioner
(projects) understood the problem he confronted:
See when we started work in 2009, the number of projects we found actually were much
more than what we thought. Then the gap was as much as 7 times our initially thought of
2,000 to 3,000. Then the projects crossed 20,000 and then more. So then the next
question immediately was how to meet the expenditure related to those projects?'
The authorizing environment surrounding the WBPMS project was shaped primarily by the day-to-day
needs of senior project managers in the BBMP. There were ongoing information management problems
with ownership over project files that were left unresolved during the administrator period when no
BBMP council existed. Amalgamation of the small jurisdictions in the peri-urban areas of Bangalore was
exacerbating the shortcomings of the existing institutional arrangements for financial management. Bill
payment was delinked from project management. The chief accounts officer was responsible for issuing
payments to contractors, contingent on approval from executive engineers and review by project
management consultants. During the administrator period with no local council, much of the financial
discipline that had been gained during S.M. Krishna's tenure as chief minister was lost. A considerable
portion of public financial management was conducted through informal channels:
Someone at the BBMP makes a plain call to bank and whatever the bank says they right
down that figure. And only then do they issue outstanding checks [payments] to
contractors. They were not doing accounting, they were not doing auditing. It was all by
word of mouth."?
The steep increase in registered projects provoked a reconsideration of the original plan. Over the course
of the next three months, the WPMS project team and the special commissioner investigated alternatives.
4.2.2 Reframing the Problem and the Design of a New Model
Even as the number of projects were rapidly increasing, there were concerns about how the
system would be transferred to the BBMP. Given the amount of time it was taking to transfer the
III
' Interview, 3 July 2015.
47 Interview, 15 December 2015.
WBPMS to the BBMP, the KSPHC was reluctant to commit scarce resources to a long-term project that
could fail. Though the web-based project management system had features that were advantageous to
centralizing project management in the BBMP, the implementation model could not scale to the needs of
the BBMP. Following a series of review meetings between the municipal commissioner, the special
commissioner, KSPHC officers, and the WBPMS implementation team, the municipal commissioner
concluded that the WBPMS would not be appropriate for the BBMP's needs. The decision was to
transition Business Intelligence Technologies into a registered public trust - the Indian Centre for Social
Transformation - that could support the BBMP with innovative technology delivered through an
alternative social outsourcing model.
Given permission by the municipal commissioner, the newly constituted Indian Centre for Social
Transformation (Indian CST) set out to conduct a more thorough assessment of the opportunities and
risks associated with a range of potential system designs. The Indian CST held focus group discussions
with engineers and other BBMP staff to solicit ideas and end user needs.
We came on the scene as system designers to look at the process and obviously the legacy
systems were engrained in powerful stakeholders so they wouldn't allow us to change it.
So you capture the data and try to replicate the same process for them.'
Rather than displacing existing systems, duplication of existing procedures seemed to be the only
pathway forward. Increasing redundancy in the system was perceived as a potential benefit given the high
number of choke points to the flow of information inside the BBMP. Control over key pieces of project
information remained widely distributed throughout the project management system. Contractors,
engineers, project management consultants, and the finance department all had various levels of veto
power over any structural reform to internal governance. Engineers still filled out project records
manually in the maintenance book. Contractors held onto project files until completion of project quality
reviews by project management consultants.
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4 Interview, 30 July 2015.
Locating the Funds Based Accounting System in the head office required project files to be
physically transferred from division, sub-division, and ward offices to the FBAS cell in the head office.
The existing workflow in the engineering department thus introduced a structural barrier to promoting
accountability in internal governance. The necessary reform was decentralizing project information
management in the BBMP. The system that would replace the WBPMS would have to enable the full
delegation of project information management responsibilities to the zones. As the experience introducing
the WBPMS made clear, centralization of project information was only a means to an end.
The core software design principle that emerged from the assessment by the Indian CST related
to adaptability of the system. The basic idea was that the system would need to be:
Flexible by ensuring we capture the inputs completely and put in a process to validate
them completely. Capture as much data as possible and ensure the purity. It is not in
changing the business process you are concentrating on. It is data you are concentrating
on. 4
Considering the previous four years of governance in Bangalore and the observations from the internal
assessment of the BBMP, the Indian CST concluded that the traditional model of private sector software
development was not appropriate. Two factors influenced their thinking. First, traditional in-seat licensing
with proprietary software had substantial cost implications for an urban local body that was growing and
would clearly require higher capital investment in information technology over time. Second, hosting the
software system on internal BBMP servers increased dependence on information technology staff that
was stretched thin by the amalgamation and generally struggled with high staff turnover rates. A system
that could be jointly hosted on servers both inside and outside the BBMP and run non-proprietary code
would be resilient to hardware failure and more adaptive to organizational stress resulting from changes
to administration, politics, and policies. The Indian CST offered to develop an open source project
management system hosted on a cloud computing platform and delivered to the BBMP on a Software as a
Service (OpenSaaS) model.
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Compared to traditional public private partnership (PPP) models for e-governance in India, the
OpenSaaS model had features that were tailored to the BBMP's needs and consistent with the direction of
various national policies regarding information technology governance in the public sector. The
OpenSaaS model allowed the system to be hosted on both internal BBMP and remote servers. As a public
trust interested in governance reform, the Indian CST would not charge the BBMP for the product. The
premise supporting such a move was that it would help limit any opportunities for bribery or other forms
of contracting corruption. Consistent with the Software as a Service (SaaS) business model, the Indian
CST's public trust did permit compensation for services rendered. The Indian CST informed the BBMP
that if they were pleased with the services provided that the Indian CST would accept payment only to
cover the cost of labor and the remote servers.
The special commissioner (projects) and the Indian CST concluded the OpenSaaS model would
provide the strongest opportunity to succeed in delegating end-to-end responsibility for project
information management to the zones. Consequently, the objectives of the IT-project had expanded to
encompass a double move: initial centralization of updated project information in the special
commissioner's office and delegation of project entry responsibility to the zones. Under such conditions,
the special commissioner (projects) could then make better decisions related to improving management
control over the 198 wards of the new BBMP.
Figure 4.1 is a schematic representation of the proposed changes. The downward blue arrow
represents the assignment of responsibility for data entry into the Global Project Management System. At
the time, the FBAS cell was recognized not only as the formal accounting agency within the BBMP but
was assigned responsibility for data entry. The upward black arrow represents the flow of information that
GPMS would have to enable. The BBMP was simply too large a jurisdiction to continue with the highly
centralized FBAS model. The special commissioner (projects) and the Indian CST agreed they must insist
that transaction information and other information related to project execution be entered in the zones and
divisions at the point of transaction.
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The front end of the global project management system (GPMS) software could be developed and
deployed immediately, even if new server capacity or desktop terminals would need to be purchased over
time. Server capacity could be added to the system on demand. The OpenSaaS cloud based model would
allow a form of joint ownership and control over the code, where both the BBMP and the Indian CST
could continuously make system upgrades and updates while not being solely dependent on a single actor.
As open source software, the data would be "owned" by the public. The system would have all the
characteristics of adaptable and agile public financial management technology: robust to changes in
policy, politics, timelines; limited switching costs and vendor lock-in risk; ability to downscale and
upscale on demand; while allowing for rapid design iteration at the lowest cost (Peterson 2006).
The results of the business process assessment conducted by the Indian CST encouraged the
selection of an open front-end design that would aim to capture as much project information as possible.
Because the GPMS would be hosted on an OpenSaaS cloud-based architecture, the BBMP and Indian
CST did not have to build an integrated system from the outset. They could adopt a modular approach
starting with project management system, while waiting for the right opportunities to expand system
functionality with additional features or entirely separate modules linked to the same relational database.
115
The implementation strategy was based on achieving "plateaus," instead of "summits of international best
practice (S. Peterson 2011). As a not-for-profit organization, the Indian CST avoided the logics of
standardization and over-specification among commercial software companies.
Table 4.2 lists the most important project information captured on the project entry page. The first
version of the GPMS system contained 60 entry fields with the objective of sweeping up as much
information as possible.' The work code was the 14-digit numeric code generated by the finance
department that served as the project-level identifier. The work code formed the basis of the Funds Based
Accounting System (FBAS). The project code corresponded to the major head codes of the municipal
budget.
Table 4.2 - Project Information in GPMS
Project Details Location Details Approval Details Stakeholder Details Work Status Details
" Work Code * District e Approved By * Zone Engineer e Agreement Date
" Project Name e Zone 9 Budget Head (Chief Engineer) e Commencement
" Project Code e Division * Scheme * Division Engineer Date
* Estimated Cost 9 Sub-Division (Executive 9 Scheduled
" Approved Cost 9 Ward Engineer) e Contract
* Expenditure e Area * Sub-Division Completion Date
Incurred * Assembly Engineer 9 Work Status
Constituency (Assistant 9 Anticipated Date
0 Department Executive of Completion
Engineer) * Actual Date of
e Ward Engineer Completion




In addition to the project management system, one additional module was of strategic importance
to the Indian CST from the outset. As a mission city in the Jawaharlal Nehru National Urban Renewal
Mission (JNNURM), the BBMP was expected to implement an online citizen complaint (grievance)
' In addition to the entry fields, the system could also store scanned project documentation such as copies of tender
agreements, contractor bills, the measurement book, and any other project execution reports.
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system under the mandatory e-governance reform for urban local bodies (ULBs).' Most online citizen
grievance platforms in ULBs simply provide a space for residents to enter complaints. The OpenSaaS
architecture of the GPMS system went a step further by linking the citizen grievance site to the public
investment project database (see figure 4.2). Anyone could use a computer or any mobile device that had
access to the Internet upload information to the complaint module, so the Indian CST integrated it with
the project management system.














Acknowledging the tenuous condition of public financial management in the BBMP, the Indian
CST perceived the citizen complaint module to be equal parts helpful and risky. On the one hand, if the
application became popular among the public it could potentially compensate for the negative effects of
internal resistance to the system that are felt most acutely in the basic steps of capturing project
' The e-governance reforms encompassed eight functional areas of local government: property tax, accounting,
water supply and other utilities, birth and death certificate, citizen grievance monitoring, personnel management









information. Because information technology was woven into the fabric of the city's identity., the Indian
CST perceived that potentially:
Huge numbers of stakeholders in the chain of delegation located in different departments
and different locations. Public stakeholders are many, so if the engineer is not giving
information take it from somewhere else. Capture is most difficult and biggest hurdle
because BBMP is dependent on engineer."
Still, the Indian CST was concerned about being associated with the software system that gave citizens
the opportunity to lodge complaints against the BBMP. This could put the organizational into an
antagonistic relationship with BBMP employees, arguably the most important end users of the system
they were designing. If the complaints were too critical and too numerous for the BBMP's staff to
address, they might overload the initial capacity to adopt to the system. The Indian CST decided to leave
the first version of the citizen complaint module untouched and would focus their resources on updating
the project management module as they moved forward. Consequently, the complaint system suffered
from some serious design shortcomings in the user interface, but it did enable citizens to upload
grievances and service requests to the BBMP and link them to particular projects. This latter feature was
used less extensively. Initially, BBMP engineers and staff responded to complaints on a voluntary basis,
though the complaints became politically useful down the road (see chapter 5).
The initial goal of the GPMS application was not to replace FBAS, but rather to continue to
centralize project information in order to introduce minimal project execution and payment control and,
over time, increase public transparency. That the FBAS system would remain in the BBMP even though
it only covered 100 wards presented an acute problem in information system design called the single
version of truth (SVOT). The SVOT is a data governance problem, referring to the need to have non-
redundant information storage to streamline management decisions and limit confusion and conflict. In
the context of public financial management, the SVOT problem applies to having a common source of
information on the budget position, resource availability, and unit performance. The budget and accounts
of the BBMP were prepared according to the Bangalore Mahanagara Palike (Accounts) Regulation, 2001
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52 Interview, 4 June 2015.
which was drafted in tandem with the design and development of the FBAS accounting information
system. This coupling of the accounting information system with regulations, combined with the loss of
the FBAS software code, ensured that the new project management system would not initially share the
same database. The Indian CST would have to turn to an alternative mechanism for the SVOT problem.
The Indian CST's solution to the SVOT problem came in the final step of the initial system
design. The Indian CST devised a framework for ensuring that the project and transaction information
processed in the GPMS would have a clear interpretive frame applied to it in order to define its meaning
to an array of end users. Drawing on principles of financial auditing, the Indian CST developed an
internal data management framework they referred to as CVCMARK (see table 4.3). The use of
preventive controls was not an initial option, given that the GPMS was not going to immediately replace
the FBAS system. Nevertheless, internal governance and decision making could potentially benefit from a
data management framework based on detective controls.
The Indian CST devised a data management framework divided into seven steps: capture,
validate, correlate, measure, analyze, report, and key performance indicators. The first element in the
framework required unit officers (engineers, revenue officers, hospital staff, etc.) to be responsible for the
entry of information at the point of transaction. Parts of the user interface would be automated, while
others would remain manual. This initial requirement would at least create nominal lines of accountability
back to the officer responsible for the task. The remaining elements of the framework are described in
table 4.3.
Table 4.3 CVCMARK Framework
Step Description Responsibility
1 Capture The initial step of information entry into the financial Unit officer (point
management information system. of transaction);
public
2 Validate Validate relates to internal software design elements that Internal software
restrict information entry against a second variable to limit feature (BBMP/
discretion and ensure the veracity of the information. Validate Indian CST)
is an internal process.
3 Correlate Associate one form of information with another (tax payment Internal software
with bank deposit; site photo with project entry) feature
I , (BBMP/Indian CST)
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4 Measure Measurement of data relevancy and secure storage along with Internal software
indexing. feature
(BBMP/Indian CST)
5 Analyze Compare information against various parameters to understand Internal software
progress against an established benchmark (e.g. cost overrun, feature
time overrun) (BBMP/Indian CST)
6 Report Accounting reports, management reports, project, reports, Internal software
feature
(BBMP/Indian CST)
7 Key New benchmarks against which progress can be evaluated based BBMP/Indian
Performance on the performance displayed in reports. CST/public
Indicators
Steps one through five constituted a cycle that repeats over time as new information flowed into
the system. Reports were progressively brought online to meet the needs of the moment and avoid
overwhelming the system with features that were unnecessary given the level of system adoption. The
usefulness of the CVCMARK was that by encompassing both human procedures and automated
technology it standardized the treatment of different types of PFM information collected in different
locations, and of different quality within the same framework. If full automation is not achieved, the steps
can be supported by human actors. For instance, while the PFM information system can automate
validation and correlation, the measurement and analysis steps might require consistent human
intervention.
4.2.3 Piloting the Global Project Management System
Data entry in the FBAS system was conducted in the FBAS cell in the head office. Zone,
division, sub-division, and ward offices would send project files (digital and paper) but most engineers
were not expected to enter information. These features of the existing system provoked the Indian CST to
solicit another round of end user feedback on the GPMS system. The new system would require engineers
and other BBMP employees to directly input information into the system. While it was true that another
software system would initially complicate lines of accountability and be the direct cause of internal
13 It is common in local governments for bureaucrats to enter information with slight discrepancies - entries that
contain small differences - which are often rejected in other systems as unacceptable entries. Each step can be
progressively introduced to an implementation process.
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confusion in such a large, bureaucracy distributed across 709 square kilometers, the FBAS system was
obsolete and sunk deeply into the formative context of information and communication technologies
(ICT) in the BBMP.
As the GPMS software began to take shape, the Indian CST was eager to pilot it. The special
commissioner projects held meetings with joint commissioners and chief engineers, who are the senior
executives of the zonal offices and oversee project management at the sub-division and ward offices. The
joint commissioner from the west zone expressed the most enthusiasm for the project, so the initial pilot
was conducted there. Executive engineers and assistant executive engineers were reluctant to adopt the
system during the pilot. The immediate response was that the project entry pages were too extensive and
therefore far too time intensive for engineers. As one engineer in the roads division expressed:
The BBMP had thousands and thousands of projects ... and there were too many fields [in
the GPMS] and engineers wanted to go back to the manual way of managing.4
The Indian CST responded by limiting the number of mandatory fields required for completion, but
because the rollout would require substantial technical assistance the Indian CST thought they could use
the additional labor to augment the data entry done by engineers. As a result, they left the project entry
page as it was originally designed.
While the user interface was a primary concern for the Indian CST, internally the concern
centered on overcoming the internal divisions between senior officers and senior engineers in the zones.
Historically, chief engineers that oversaw project management in the zones were posted on deputation
through the Karnataka Administrative Services (KAS). However, changes in state regulations had allowed
for regular BBMP employees to be promoted to the position on the basis that it was impossible to hold
external officers from the KAS accountable. Still, salary differences and strong social ties to local BBMP
council members and political officials in state government contributed to stark divisions between the
special commissioner (projects) and the chief engineers who would be essential to asserting authority in
the zones.
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The special commissioner (projects) had little to offer as incentive to adopt the system. The
GPMS team considered building support to approach the state government to request the employee
guidelines for the BBMP be revised to reference the GPMS system. This would take considerable time
and ultimately require support from the Karnataka Legislative Assembly (KLA). With a new BBMP
council following four years of administrator rule, the corporation was just beginning to build working
relationships with new councilors. Thus, the project team was left to motivating the engineering
department with the promise of time savings from entering the project information in the GPMS system,
framing the requirement for engineers to repeatedly hand write copies of project documentation as both a
nuisance and bottleneck to improved project execution.
Having gone through two rounds of diagnostic assessments of the public financial management
system in the BBMP, the Indian CST and special commissioner (projects) devised a strategic
implementation plan that was endorsed by the municipal commissioner. As the piloting phase came to an
end in the West Zone, the Indian CST subcontracted with the Project Management Institute in Bangalore
to implement a large-scale training program. Maintaining a staff of fifty employees (many part-time), it
was necessary to subcontract support from the Project Management Institute. Doing so allowed the PMI
to gain exposure to the Indian CST's technology, while also drawing on the expertise of the PMI staff.
Figure 4.3 GPMS Trainin Sessions at the BBMP7 S
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Because existing projects were still being added to the BBMP's expanding project registry almost
a year after the initial project management system adoption, engineers were instructed to bring any project
documentation connected to ongoing projects. The training sessions combined directions on how to use
the system with data entry in small work groups. At each session, engineers were instructed to form
groups of three or four each from different divisions or zones. As a group, they would monitor the entry
process and then each engineer was requested to present to the entire group a summary of the project and
how she would use the information stored in the GPMS. Having watched data entry, the other members of
the group were asked to confirm the veracity of the information in the system and of the engineer's
presentation to the larger group. The trainings were designed in such a way as to socialize the system
within the engineering ranks, while developing a collective appreciation for the system.
4.2.4 Centralizing Information and Coordinating Delegation for Information Management
As the GPMS system rolled out completely in the fall of 2010, the BBMP was confronting major
cash management problems compounded by a backlog of projects carried over from previous years. The
fragmentation across the BBMP's public financial management system and the obsolescence of the FBAS
system were contributing to a payment crisis among contractors who had come to rely on seniority to
secure lead access to the BBMP's unpredictable cash flows.
Many people were creating issues like contractors saying they were not being paid; that
seniority was being overruled. At the time, these contractors used to turn to dharnas.
Whenever there was a delay to bill payment, they would form a group, stop work and
create problems in BBMP. They go to the district in-charge Minister. They used to
operate through the mayor and then with their henchman, they used to get things done.
They were bypassing commissioners and special commissioners.55
Pressure was mounting on the Indian CST to bring the system up to full coverage across the BBMP's 198
wards. New coordination mechanisms were established to support the rollout. Every week an
implementation review meeting between the Indian CST and special commissioner (projects) was held to
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assess problems with the deployment such as offices that did not have enough computer terminals or
issues with Internet connectivity.
A second type of meeting - performance reviews - were held weekly between the special
commissioner, Indian CST, chief engineers from the zones, and executive engineers. These meetings
focused on system performance, reporting, and collective learning. Questions addressed during these
meetings included login patterns among BBMP engineers, data missing from certain zones, and how the
chief engineers were providing support to lower level staff in divisional, sub-divisional, and ward offices.
BBMP employees were allowed input into these meetings to help the Indian CST to monitor problems
among end users. Finally, the Indian CST circulated a standardized feedback form that BBMP staff could
complete to describe features they wanted or had problems using. To sustain the tight feedback loop
between end users and senior managers, comments and suggestions were tabled and the municipal
commissioner would take a decision during the performance review.
Still even as these new coordination mechanisms were improving deployment, the patterns of
adoption remained uneven across the zones. The problem was one of imposing a technical system onto a
highly informal structure of local accountability relations in management. The implementation dilemma
was that other than notifications, which are official orders issued by senior executive officers in the
corporation, there were few remaining options for incentivizing the use of the system. The special
commissioner (projects) offered a grace period to the engineers that would lower the initial risks entailed
by adoption. The process was largely informal, but the special commissioner announced to the engineers
that they would not be punished for previous mistakes or problems if they began fully complying with the
new GPMS system.
We told engineers if they had done something in the past that might get them in trouble,
we would not move forward with disciplinary action if they started using the system.
While this might let a "bad apple" remain, the thing is you can never be certain that a
bureaucrat will be reformed.56
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The role of the Indian CST was evolving from their initial responsibilities for the execution of system
design, development, and training. While the first phase of implementation focused on ascertaining the
number and composition of projects under the control of the amalgamated BBMP, the second phase
focused on the performance of various actors in the chain of delegation. The lead programmer at the
Indian CST was responsible for overseeing modifications to the backend of the system:
We focused in the second phase with a variety of reports like contractor report for
example. If contractors are executing around four to five jobs and they submit a tender
for a new one, then the BBMP officer needs to check how many projects this contractor
has delivered, whether he has completed all the projects, and how many projects are in
progress.5?
By March of 2010, the number of projects in the GPMS system had surpassed 30,000. The centralization
of project information in the BBMP had drastically shifted the policy concern of the special commissioner
(projects). Organizational attention among senior officers moved from understanding the total number of
projects in the BBMP's portfolio to how to cover the projected costs of the additional projects that were
officially registered across expanded BBMP territory in the GPMS system.
The shift in performance management and coordination to clear projects was subtly changing
management relations between concentrated and deconcentrated agents. The Indian CST and special
commissioner (projects) used the weekly meetings at the BBMP to instantiate a modified performance
evaluation system. With the municipal commissioner present and invested in the outcome of the FMIS
system, the special commissioner began to reinterpret data flowing in the GPMS system as performance
indicators to evaluate engineers and recommend staffing changes. Some of the variables used to judge
performance included who had and had not logged in to the system over the previous week and the extent
of project-level data reported from the zones. Thus, the type of performance management that was
beginning to take shape was pragmatic with respect to the situation at hand. The special commissioner for
projects could use performance reports in the system to manage tasks related to staff transfers to other
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departments, locations, or offices for those engineers that refused to use the GPMS system for project
management.
The ability to append digital photos to the project page was considered essential given the size of
the BBMP's new jurisdiction. While the special commissioner and chief engineers still relied on spot
checks to monitor project execution, the feature increased the engineer department's capability to allocate
scarce staff resources to more efficiently monitor the entire portfolio of projects under their authority. An
engineer described his new capability to exert control at a distance in the following way:
You can monitor from any place. You need not go to the site. What I mean is that
information on the project and reports can come from the system and then be used to
check against other manual reports or progress on the ground. Information is more
balanced.58
The Indian CST's Software as a Service (SaaS) delivery model provided them considerable discretion
adding new reports and features to the system. The original idea was that adding features would be
subject to demand, however ascertaining demand for project information was difficult. In soliciting the
reporting needs of different engineers, the Indian CST could not solely fall back on the system they had
introduced and its information processing capabilities. Most of the reports the Indian CST could provide
were overshadowed by the mounting pressure to come up with a funding solution to the number of
projects that were now formally registered.
This issue could not be solved directly by the Global Project Management System. The special
commissioner (projects) was now responsible for their completion, but clearing them off the BBMP's
books as liabilities required working more closely with the chief accounts officer (CAO). They began
with the incomplete project report automated in the GPMS. While the report helped identify projects that
had gone far beyond their estimated completion date, the BBMP was still subject to cash management
constraints. The senior management of the BBMP divided bill payment into three levels:
The bill payment problem is critical. We received money for day-to-day management and
the State had given 500 crores. We devised a system of three categories. Service bills like
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solid waste management and water cannot wait so they were cleared within one week.
Salary and wages also have to be cleared. Project mode bills for lake development, major
roads, bridges will get priority out of the remaining funds. The remaining 30 percent
goes to ward works or miscellaneous projects such as school room repairs.59
Within these parameters, the suite of project reports introduced by the Indian CST helped identify which
projects to accelerate for completion and which projects were in the pipeline that could be scrapped.
There is a liability on BBMP, you could not just stop it in between. It should be taken into
safe stage in some cases or just to be allowed to be completed. Those works which were
not started yet and were not necessary actually, keeping the financial health of the
BBMP, and considering the non-prioritization of those things, we scrapped them.60
At the time, the special commissioner estimated he had saved the BBMP from committing to around
3,000 crores ($680 million) rupees of funds for socially unnecessary public investment projects such as
roads, drains, and unnecessary maintenance.
4.2.5 Bolting the System Down
Having introduced new report formats to support the special commissioner and engineers in the
zones, the implementation strategy turned to bolting the GPMS down more deeply into the BBMP's
public financial management system. A stronger incentive would be necessary to encourage engineers to
enter any remaining projects in the GPMS system. The Indian CST offered to bring online a bill
processing feature in the GPMS. GPMS would then transform into a mandatory step that would force the
engineers to rely on it more fully. More importantly, the move was viewed as essential to push the full
responsibility for financial management over projects down to the chief engineers and executive
engineers working at the zonal level. If bill payment to contractors had to flow through the GPMS, and
engineers were inputting information into the system at the point of transaction, then accountability
relations could be fixed around the level of correspondence between the project information and bill
payment information in the GPMS system
At the time bills were approved manually by the executive engineer before checks were released
by the chief accounts officer after confirming cash levels in the BBMP's bank accounts. The transaction
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was officially registered through ex post entry into the Integrated Financial Management System (IFMS).
By tying bill payment to GPMS, they could achieve two objectives. First, processing payments to
contractors through GPMS would increase the downside risk for engineers and contractors of keeping
projects off the books, since the scrutiny of contractor payments could happen in real-time. Second, by
requiring bill processing and payment disbursement to contractors to run through GPMS, the city
government could gain back control over the payment flow process. The change would also force
coordination between senior officers in the projects and the finance departments. The consequences of the
change were that monopoly control over contractor payments exercised by the chief accounts officer
would be reduced. The decision was linked to vertical scrutiny of financial flows:
We issued through circular instructions and through review meetings that GPMS was
being put into use and we also said that (circular) that if bills don't come through GPMS
they will not be honored (project bills). Scrutiny could be done.
The current municipal commissioner, Siddaiah, agreed and issued a directive (i.e. circular) to engineers
that all bills should be entered in GPMS as of April 2010. Following the circular to pass bills through the
GPMS system, the assistant engineers and assistant executive engineers in division offices across the
zones began issuing payments through the GPMS system. In order to introduce the appropriate controls,
the Indian CST could automate the validation step within the CVCMARK data management framework
in the new bill payment module. Without the automated validation, engineers would be able to pass
invalid or unverified bills through the system. Bill payment entries required the exact work code
associated with the project selected. When issuing a bill to pay contractors through the GPMS system, the
engineers would have to select a work code and the remaining aspects of the project work would
automatically populate from the related project file in the system into the bill payment data entry screen.62
The 14-digit project-level work code, which originated with the FBAS system, was issued
manually by the assistant controller (finance) based on cost estimates provided by the engineers and
depending on annual budget sanctions and the availability of finance. Work codes flowed into the GPMS
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after their creation so that critical element of internal control in public financial management was outside
the GPMS system (see figure 4.4 below). The order to pass bills through GPMS therefore modified the
existing budget execution process by inserting a control between procurement and fund commitment. The
expectation was that by requiring project information to be entered by engineers in the zones and
requiring them to use the GPMS to scrutinize bill payment the BBMP would move one step closer to
bolting the system down. The special commissioner projects and the Indian CST anticipated that affixing
the two ends of project supervision to the same FMIS system and within the same level of the engineering
hierarchy could reshape accountability relations within internal management procedures across all 198
wards.
Figure 4.4 Change in Internal Control Process as a Result of GPMS Bill Payment
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Proje ct Entry Bill Scrutiny
Having expanded the functionality of GPMS from project entry to project accounting and
introducing new reporting formats, the deployment had reached an important performance plateau (S.
Peterson 2011). The next task was to increase public awareness of the system and encourage public
participation. A year a half after the introduction of the GPMS system in the west zone, public events
were held around the city to present the GPMS to the public and communicate its purpose and how
citizens might participate.6 3 The Citizens Voluntary Initiative for the City (CIVIC), a prominent NGO in
Bangalore, hosted a public presentation and training session in June 2011 in Bangalore. The municipal
6 http://praja.in/en/events/201 1/06/do-you-want-moni tor-bbmp' s-projectscome-and-learn-how. See also, 20 June
2011. Staff Reporter. "Monitor BBMP Projects on the Net Now." The Hindu.
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commissioner that approved the design and development of GPMS presided over the event. The purpose
was to train the public on the GPMS system and its features, including registering complaints, viewing
public investment projects, uploading comments and photos to the project sites, and to solicit suggestions
for improvements to the GPMS online portal.
4.2.6 Shock to the System: The Verification Problem and Hidden Implementation Stress
As the GPMS system continued to stabilize in the BBMP, the Indian CST turned to integration
issues they had left unresolved during the first year of deployment. The number of projects registered in
the BBMP was approaching 50,000 but the system remained delinked from the other financial
management information systems in the BBMP. Integrating the Global Project Management System and
Integrated Financial Management System was important because monitoring and control over bill
payment was now conducted through the GPMS system, but bill payments to contractors were ex post
registered in IFMS by the chief accounts officer. By integrating the back end of GPMS and IFMS, the
project management cycle would be fully covered. Integrating the two systems would help reduce the
single version of truth (SVOT) problem that continued to exist in the BBMP.
The Indian CST began to focus on two subsets of projects: projects without work codes and
projects that were duplicated between IFMS and GPMS. The former were important because the Indian
CST had included data entry validations in the project bill payment feature of the GPMS. If a project did
not have a work code, engineers would not be able to submit bill payment requests through GPMS. This
step in the systems development process confronts the verification problem, which is distinguishing
between "honest errors in judgment and outright corruption" (Stiglitz 2010, 24). The introduction of
controls into the system is a particularly precarious period during implementation. If the controls are too
rigid and penalize honest errors, the design might discourage the continued institutionalization of the
system. However, the purpose of the system is to economize on the efforts required to detect and prevent
outright corruption, so internal controls are necessary to produce the requisite efficiency gains (benefits)
to justify the opportunity costs of changing internal procedures.
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Table 4.4 below shows project information from a report that described the range of statuses
among projects in the GPMS, including 5,890 projects that contained duplicated project information and
1,062 projects that were entered without an assigned work code. Existing budget and accounting
regulations for the BBMP (Bangalore Mahanagara Palike (Accounts) Regulation, 2001) that were
developed when the funds based accounting structure was devised by the BATF stated that assistant
controllers finance (ACF) (located in zone offices) assigned the work code for each project only after the
chief accounts officer had approved the availability of funds and either the joint commissioner or
municipal commissioner had approved the project through the program of works. Because FBAS was
centrally located in the BBMP head office, such an arrangement required substantial investments in top-
down monitoring and oversight. When SM Krishna lost the elections in 2004, the BATF's heavy hand of
monitoring was lost. When the state government dissolved the BBMP council to amalgamate the city with
the peri-urban jurisdictions the internal coordination necessary to make the system work collapsed even
further.




Projects without Work Code 1,062
Projects without Zone 6,874
Cost Over Run Projects 2,093
Cost Savings Projects 4,240
Time Over Run Projects 2,885
Source: Indian Centre for Social Transformation
Now that the Indian CST's GPMS system was handling management review of contractor bills, it
was incumbent on the organization to understand why projects without work codes existed in the GPMS
system. The effort to get GPMS up and running had been an enormous undertaking with project
information entered by both staff from the Indian CST and BBMP engineers and other employees. With
permission from the special commissioner, the Indian CST started in the west zone and began inquiring
about specific projects that were entered into GPMS without ajob code. Following spot checks and
conversations with west zone engineers, the Indian CST was able to hypothesize that assistant controllers
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finance and executive engineers were using duplicated work codes to submit work bills for payment on
incomplete or entirely non-existent work. The special commissioner (projects) recommended a deeper
investigation.
The municipal commissioner constituted the Technical Vigilance Committee under the
Commissioner (TVCC) to investigate. The TVCC was dispatched around the city with project data from
the Indian CST to visually inspect whether work for the duplicate project codes had been carried out.
They relied on GPMS project reports to systematically examine projects in three constituent assemblies in
the west zone: Gandhinagar, Malleswaram, and Rajarajeshwari. The initial estimate of financial
irregularities in these three assembly districts amounted to Rs. 1,539 crores (USD$265 million). This
amount was reported in the Financial Express with confirmation provided by the BBMP commissioner.'
Another news article presented speculation by Sharan Patil, a Congress party MLA, that the loss to the
city could rise to 10,000 to 20,000 crore rupees if an inquiry were to be conducted across all 198 wards.
Siddaiah, the municipal commissioner that had supported the initial development and implementation of
the GPMS, made an initial recommendation to the Bangalore Metropolitan Task Force (BMTF).6 5 The
BMTF issued first investigative reports (FIR) to over 1,300 engineers. However, shortly after the BMTF
initiated their investigation, the BMTF's office along with server rooms inside the BBMP were attacked
by arsonists.' The project files were, however, stored in the GPMS system secure on remote server
backups.
The ensuing debate centered on what institution to recommend a deeper investigation. At the
time, there was no precedent for such cases in the BBMP. The special commissioner (projects) and the
" http://www.financialexpress.com/news/probe-ordered-rs- I-539-cr-bbmp-scam/88 1463/
65 The BMTF was created in 1996 as a police agency to investigate the destruction of public property and to detect
and prevent illegal construction on public land in Bangalore.
' https://timesofindia.indiati mes.com/city/bengal uru/BMT F-files-for- I 5-years-destroyed-in-November-2011-
fire/articleshow/15455057.cms.
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municipal commissioner considered their options, which ranged from the Karnataka Criminal
Investigation Department to the Karnataka Lokayukta 7 :
Therefore, we had in fact, the then commissioner and myself, we took a decision to refer
it to a higher level authorities like, not necessarily CID because CID again is under the
government and they could be under some kind of influence or whatever. We wanted this
to be probed by Lokayukta itself.68
The state government made powerful interventions into the local investigation. Less than two weeks after
the irregularities were made public, the BBMP commissioner was transferred and replaced by
Shankarlinge Gowda. In a statement made after Siddaiah was replaced, the chief minister was quoted as
claiming the irregularities only amounted to 5.22 crore instead of 1,539 crore.6 9 The new municipal
commissioner submitted to the state government's plan, which departed from the earlier decision to refer
the case to the Lokayukta:
But government took a different view and the cabinet took a decision to refer it to the
Criminal Investigation Department (CID) and these three divisions, they went through
some of the works again. The CID people, they couldn't understand much because of the
technical issues, lot of technicalities are involved, and because of the passage of time and
again some roads and some culverts would have been redone again, so they couldn't go
to the original, probably because the projects were from three or four years ago.?
The discovery by the Indian CST was, however, highly detrimental to their system. The state government
froze the use of work codes and introduced an entirely new unique project identification called the job
code. The job code was a convention borrowed from the state government public works department. All
new job codes would be issued by the chief accounts office (finance department) and created by the
Integrated Financial Management System. The decision effectively cut out the Global Project
Management System (GPMS), as engineers abandoned the system and the municipal commissioner that
had ordered the use of GPMS had been removed.
The authorizing environment in which the Indian CST had maneuvered to deploy the GPMS
system had changed substantially in just two years. The duplicate project scam in the BBMP's West Zone
67 The Karnataka Lokayukta is the highest anti-corruption judicial agency in Karnataka.
68 Interview, 29 October 2015.
69 See http://expressbuzz.com/cities/bangalore/BBMP-scam-is-Rs-5-Crore-not-Rs15K-Crore-DVS/341662.html.
70 Interview, 29 October 2015.
133
had exposed weaknesses in internal control connected to information technology governance decisions
made by the Bangalore Agenda Task Force (BATF) a decade earlier. Centralizing the accounting
information management system in the head office while delegating fund commitment (i.e. the origination
of the project work code) had generated structural asymmetries in financial information management.
Contractors and engineers, working with the assistant controller finance (ACF), were able to exploit
mismatches in delegated responsibility for monitoring and oversight between the task areas of budget
authorization, fund commitment, and project execution.
The assessment of the GPMS implementation was that the special commissioner (projects) and
the Indian CST team had pushed too soon to bolt the system down through payments. They had
confronted a set of powerful actors, but had done so in too straightforward a manner to sustain long-term
use of the GPMS system by engineers. If the BBMP could improve the effectiveness of revenue
administration by increasing control over short-term cash flows and cash balances, they could gradually
introduce an integrated project monitoring system while guaranteeing the availability of funds for
contractors. As the duplicate project scam moved into the court system, the BBMP turned its attention to
cash management. In particular, replacing the manual collection system with automated processes became
a major priority taken up by the special officer (finance) who had been recently deputed with instructions
to replicate the state governments automated treasury system for the BBMP.7"
43 Financial Management System
4.3.1 Negotiating the Boundaries of the Revenue System
The special officer (finance) first approached the Integrated Financial Management System team
to build on the existing human resource information system. IFMS's human resource information system
7 The Khajane project had been a major success for the state government, connecting all 216 treasury offices
located in district across the state to a central server. The new arrangement under Khajane corrected an old system
where disbursements of intergovernmental finance were made on a first come-first served basis, with little tracking
and monitoring over how the funds were used locally (Sandeep and Ravishankar 2011). The special officer (finance)
had been private secretary to the Karnataka finance minister for seven years and then spent a decade as the Director
of Treasuries with responsibility for implementing Khajane.
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had been issuing paychecks for years and was therefore equipped with real time gross settlements
capabilities. The request made to the IFMS team was for a comprehensive, end-to-end IT-based cash
management system beginning with automated receipts across all departments on a single platform. The
special officer's goal was to monitor and account for all payments made for services to the BBMP.
Consequently, the automated receipt system would capture and account for all revenue sources supporting
municipal services, from the ten-rupee ($0.33) fee for admission to public health clinics to the property
tax payment made by the largest urban landholding companies. The IFMS team, however, would not
agree to the level of customization desired by the special officer:
IFMS was supposed to be a comprehensive version... for the whole BBMP across
departments on a single platform. But it was not implemented in the way I had envisioned
it. They wanted my help for the specification sheet - I am only a domain man I am not an
IT person - so I can give ideas. When they are not accepting my advice for IFMS I
decided I will go on step-by-step developing module by module."
Consequently, the special officer (finance) approached the Indian CST and their OpenSaaS model of
system development. The decision to take a modular approach in response to limited coordination from
the IFMS team required strengthening the vertical linkages between senior officers, the Indian CST, and
front-line revenue agents distributed across the BBMP's 198 wards spread across 709 square kilometers
of territory.
With the issue of internal control over engineers and zonal-level project management institutions
in the hands of the Karnataka courts, ensuring the availability of cash resources for budget execution
turned the focus of the special commissioner to revenue collection and the comprehensive consolidation
of cash resources. The first step was an automated receipt module called the Financial Management
System (FMS). The objectives of the FMS were three-fold. First, the system would aim to integrate
monitoring and management of all forms of tax and fee payments made in city government offices for all
available services. At the time, receipts were handwritten and reporting was manually done based on
aggregating paper records contained on numerous payment registers. No single system could account for
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payments for all types of services. More importantly, the timely reconciliation of bank balances was not
possible, as automated sweeping of the hundreds of BBMP accounts into a central consolidated account
had not been established. Consequently, the incremental gains in revenue collection from automating
receipts and reconciling accounts daily could be used to clear pending bills to contractors and increase
support for broader reforms to cash management that had failed to come about during the previous GPMS
implementation.
Second, once the automated receipt module was deployed, the Indian CST could link it to
contractor payments by migrating the bill payment feature from GPMS into the FMS system. If this move
was successful, they would link payments to contractors and revenue inflows and therefore have a more
accurate picture of payables and receivables on a single platform. Third, with some foresight and strategic
consideration, the front end and backend design could be tinkered with to pursue other objectives, such as
improving managerial understanding of revenue administration practices in the hundreds of BBMP
offices located around the city.
This third objective was essential, almost a precondition of the other two, because senior
managers in the BBMP had no systematic understanding of the financial position of the municipality.
We didn't know how much money we were getting, who was paying. It was an internal
crisis. Some revenue officers were blatantly duplicating and changing figures at the time
so we had to figure out a way to put a stop to that or to try to understand what they were
doing using the receipts module.?3
Similar to the GPMS system, the overall aim was to reduce slack in revenue collections and cash
operations by strengthening information management accountability. To do so, the FMS system would
have to delegate formal information management responsibilities to the level of action where information
originates.
The objective was to decentralize the system to empower zonal authorities and then be
able to hold them accountable. You see previously, when receipts were issued manually,
we knew there were duplicate receipts but we did not know how bad the problem was.
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Now if any type of duplications started coming up in the system, we could see where it
was happening, and we could start to understand it.74
The BBMP commissioner issued a circular75 in February of 2012 and the Indian CST took five months to
develop the first receipt module.
The first challenge was sitting down and coordinating with the other managers of financial
management information technology systems in the BBMP. The property tax was managed through
software provided by the National Informatics Centre and FBAS was still used to report annual revenue
yields in order to construct budget proposals. The special officer (finance) and the Indian CST tried to
convince the property tax team, managed under the additional commissioner (revenue), to migrate the
property tax system onto the new FMS platform. The property tax software was not capable of handling
arrears, which at the time were cleared and accounted for manually by hand. The information technology
system that covered the property tax, which was the largest source of own revenue for the city, refused to
integrate with the new FMS receipt module. However, because the NIC software could not handle
property tax arrears, they agreed to process back payments for property tax on the FMS system.
Through these initial attempts at coordination and the negotiations spawned by them, the special
officer (finance) and Indian CST encountered a strategic opportunity with respect to designing the
elements of the first FMS module.
You see because there was a separate software prepared by NIC [National Informatics
Centre]for property tax, we instead prepared software intentionally were multiple data
in different types could be ported in to daily get information on nodal banks.?"
Although the automated receipts for the property tax would be excluded from the FMS system, the team
devised a workaround based on manual entry. Because khata?? transfer fees (i.e. the registration that
makes a property owner liable to pay property taxes) and property tax arrears would pass through the
system, they already had a portion of transactions falling under the property tax system. The Indian CST
" Interview, 15 December 2015.
15 No. EIC / PR / 4582 / 11 - 12
76 Interview, 16 July 2015.
Khata is proof of a property taxpaying account with the city government. Khata certificates are necessary to apply
for electricity and water connections, trade and building licenses, and bank loans.
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and the special officer (finance) agreed to include in the FMS an input screen for end-of-day property tax
collections, where the assistant revenue officers would report the aggregate collection for the day. Figure
4.5 shows the dedicated page under "Property Tax" in the front menu that provided input fields for end-
of-day nominal collections.
Fi.ure 4.5 Daily Property Tax Collection Screen in Financial Mana:ement System
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Though this feature would require ongoing supervisory action to ensure compliance, the
difference between the reported end-of-day property tax collections and the value of property tax arrears
and khata transfer payments would approximate the difference between the total property tax yield and
amount of receipts registered in the core property tax software. As the system expanded, the only way to
make legitimate claims on the performance of the different revenue sources for the BBMP would be to
"close out" the system by including daily and monthly bank account balances (see figure 4.6 below).
Senior managers in the BBMP anticipated a transition period for this requirement to be taken for granted
as part of the routine of revenue officers in payment offices and assistant controllers finance (ACF) in the
zonal offices. The feature would facilitate partially automated bank reconciliation reports and save senior
managers valuable time ascertaining the ongoing performance of various revenue instruments in the
BBMP and the overall financial position of the city.
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The internal control purpose of the feature was to provide a mechanism to the special officer to
check whether funds deposited into the more than 900 BBMP bank accounts (up from 300 when the
BATF installed the FBAS system) were being remitted daily into the consolidated bank account of the
BBMP. Over time the system would provide the basis for credible orders to automatically sweep the
accounts into the consolidated account. Getting to this point would require detailed knowledge of the
revenue system's mechanics at a highly disaggregated level, since making such a major structural reform
would require introducing new procedural rules and programs and reappointing staff.
Consequently, the overall design of the FMS was planned accordingly. Once the system was in
place, the information contained in FMS could then be compared against reported information in the
incumbent property tax information system to arrive at a more comprehensive picture of the revenue
system. In contrast to the GPMS system design which was relatively open at first and only later added
internal validation elements as implementation proceeded, the FMS system would be rigidly designed
around a set of automated validations from the beginning.
The Karnataka Municipal Accounting and Budgeting Rules (2006) and the National Municipal
Accounts Manual both prescribe certain requirements for receipts issued by urban governments. So the
system would need to be designed in such a way as to conform to those laws and regulations while also
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including elements that would reveal practices at the level of the revenue office. To achieve the latter,
some unique design elements and features would need to be added to the system.
I added new features based on the ability of the software system: Put budget head for
payment (4 digit R-Code); Name of department (zone office); Name of
division/subdivision; Name of official receiving money; Name of bank, bank branch, and
account number.?"
The desire to print so much information on the front end of the receipt was to increase the level of
transparency. In addition to receiving an automated receipt in exchange for payment of services, citizens
would be able to check with the appropriate bank branch to ensure that their payment was deposited in the
bank. On the back end of the system, the inclusion of so many details had another purpose. To start,
collecting the relevant information related to existing bank accounts and revenue codes required
substantial time investment. The chart of accounts has 327 revenue receipt codes. To create such
functionality in the FMS system, the master file would need to have all bank account information records
for the 936 bank accounts operated by revenue officers that make deposits into BBMP accounts.
The system would be need to be more automated and restrictive than the GPMS. The scope for
discretion would need to be extremely limited, given the dual aims of understanding the situated practices
of revenue officers while maximizing revenue inflow by capturing and accounting for even the smallest
payments, such as the Rs. 10 charge to enter public hospitals for service. To do so, the system would need
additional features:
Another thing I did that is unique is giving unique system generated number for the
receipt and made each officer a unique structured code. The code contains: Department
(zone/division/subdivision) and his number.79
By creating a unique structured code for the receipt and the revenue officer linking it to the office
location, when the officer logged into the system and selected the R-code (budget head linked to the
specific revenue) the rest of the receipt except for the amount field and the payment type would be
locked.
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When he enters his code all the things in the system will automatically populate. So we
have a single source of data for accounting and auditing and reconciliation so that
nobody can give duplicate figures and data is secure."
This section and the previous have outlined how the design of a local financial management
information system can play on the multiple uses of accounting information as a strategy to "fix the
accounting" and build state capability. The design of the FMIS is not simply to produce thin "technical-
rational" accounting information, but to produce a particular type of information to better understand
"thick accounting" relations (Andrews, Pritchett, and Woolcock 2016). While there may be universal
standards of "technical-rational" accounting information, accounting information for "social -political"
and "institutional" purposes require more situated knowledge (Ansari and Euske 1987). Here we can
observe the special officer and Indian CST's intentions to develop surveillance resources but not through
horizontal coordination with other concentrated agents. Instead their approach built up resources through
vertical coordination within the new FMS system in order to express reform interests through demands in
future bargaining situations. The special officer (finance) would only be able to do that once sufficient
information had accumulated on the system, which was only possible through skillful design of the
system.
4.3.2 Three Modes of Coordination
Since the overall objective was to centralize information in order to shift downward
accountability relations to the zonal level, the design of the FMS system necessitated starting in the head
office. R-codes, the unique identification code for each revenue head in the budget, had to be mapped.
The need to map the system for revenue codes and bank accounts provided the Indian CST with an
opportunity to devise one approach to coordination as experimentation.
We had to prepare master file which is a huge task. The source is the individual
departments of the BBMP so we are at the mercy of their will, there is no other agency
that can compel them. First we started training department people how to enter data.
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Department by department we went down to subdivision level of training. In addition, we
put I engineer in each zone whose only responsibility was to support FMS. 81
The deployment of the system provided the opportunity to devise a coordination mechanism that would
also serve the purpose of inquiring into "folk practices" out of sight to officers in the head office. While
the FMS team anticipated problems associated with manual issuance of receipts, they were only
beginning to learn the variation in revenue administration practices around different areas of the city. The
markets department, which oversaw the leasing of government properties, provides a useful example of
the coordination mechanism of planning and mutual adjustment. As the FMS team began targeting
departments for training, the markets department was a potentially important revenue base where
automation could improve collection. The BBMP rented out tens of thousands of stalls and other spaces
in various city properties. The general understanding was that revenue collection of market rents was
weak, but the reason why was not well understood.
As the system was built out, training sessions provided opportunities to understand the specific
constraints to procedural coordination that would potentially limit the usefulness of FMS in delegating
accountability down to the zonal level. For instance, in the training session for officers in the markets
department, participating officers revealed that tenants in KR Market, the largest wholesale commodities
market in the Kalasipalya area, tended to pay their rent in one large payment but refused to pay with
check if the amount is above 1,000 rupees. In contrast, the dress and clothing store tenants on MG Road
and Jayanagar paid by check. However, across both types of tenants and locations, the special
commissioner (finance) and the Indian CST learned that most shops were subleased out to at least four
different parties. While lease registration documentation could be sought in some cases, in nearly all of
them the revenue officers were not able to recognize the primary party/shop owner for collecting unit
rent. The solution to this problem, although limited, was to use handset devices that revenue officers
could take to the shop stands, attempt to register primary leasees, and collect payment on a monthly
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basis. 2 The amount collected at the end of the day would then be transferred from the handheld unit into
the main system accessed online in the respective markets department offices throughout the city, thus
generating an aggregated income stub that listed the individual payments of tenants.
Similar to the GPMS experience, the FMS system engaged in a pilot in the town planning
department in the head office before deploying the system in the zonal offices.
As we developed the module, we did one month of a bank reconciliation and found 182
crores missing. We knew we were on to something so we then put the module into place
in the zones. The system would give a list of receipts during the day and show the entire
flows of revenue from the citizen to the bank."
The training, piloting, and overall deployment provided the Indian CST with opportunities to create new
coordination mechanisms through face-to-face visits and discussions with BBMP officers both in
centralized training sites and in the payment offices and other budget units of the BBMP.
82 Indian CST. Weekly Reports 30.07.2012 to 04.08.2012.
83 Interview, 15 December 2015.
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Figure 4.7: An Indian CST Staff Member Puts up a Notice to Use FMS
Source: Indian CST
Feedback reports filed weekly during the initial deployment phase were generally positive about the
benefits and future potential of the FMS receipts module. The Assistant Controller Finance in the East
Zone reported both time savings and improved managerial accountability through better payment tracking
along with improved tax services to residents:
I would like to reiterate that the initiation of FMS at our offices since 02-July 2012 at
East Zone have been very helpful, I have received a lot of calls from BBMP officers of
this zone stating the importance of have such an application at our working place, by
using FMS it saves a lot of time, easy to get reports, above all there is accountability of
public funds. We have received good opinion from the public too as now after
implementing FMS they feel they can avoid delays.'
These manual feedback reports submitted directly from unit offices back to the Indian CST were
important coordination mechanisms during the initial implementation, creating tight feedback loops
between the experiences of end users during initial use and the technical system designers external to the
BBMP. They helped motivate the Indian CST programmers and implementation officers, while also
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providing valuable insight into the use of the system and into particular end user problems, such as further
training of staff beyond the formal positions on the organization chart:
At present only AEE [Assistant Executive Engineer], AE [Assistant Engineer], ACF
[Assistant Controller Finance], & Clerk knows how to operate computer generated
receipts. My suggestion is to better to train all staff how to operate computer because
usually AEE, AE, ACF is attending meeting and the clerk sometimes leave.8 5
There were still problems of technology failure as a result of interruptions to the supply of power or
internet service in BBMP offices. Feedback forms also contained reports suggesting that the system could
not prevent all forms of petty corruption at the point of payment. An assistant revenue officer in Begur, an
area that was added to the BBMP in the amalgamation, reported a case where a taxpayer:
He has applied for khata transfer certificate and the case worker has given computer
generated receipt with the amount he had paid. The system of FMS is good. The case
worker is asking extra amount for bribe for issue khata transfer certificate.86
The receipt module of the Financial Management System was not able to address these forms of petty
corruption.
One other type of coordination mechanism emerged from the deployment of the FMS system.
Led by Indian CST's initiative, the substantive coordination mechanism took the form of experimental
investigations that largely failed to stimulate further action on the part of the BBMP. As the Indian CST
had learned with the GPMS, it is difficult to anticipate the demands for IT services within the
administrative hierarchy. The Indian CST also had an interest in offering new IT services, since the model
was based on a software as a service (SaaS) framework. They needed to coordinate strategically with
certain actors to get small wins (Weick 1984) in order to demonstrate the pragmatic legitimacy of the
system to the BBMP's nonnative policy objective of improving revenue collection and cash management.
The first investigation was with advertising tax. The advertising department claimed there were
only 3,000 billboards ("hoardings") across the entire city. The BBMP had expressed an interest in
abolishing the advertising tax, though the state government would not allow it on grounds it was one of
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the BBMP's dedicated revenue streams. Payment and income for billboard rentals were managed by the
Advertisement Department manually and in excel. The income in their records showed 25 crores in 2012-
13, but the amount in the FMS demonstrated 65 crores. Based on their detailed analysis of advertisement
receipts, they produced a study and circulated a reform strategy for collecting on advertising billboards
that had poor records of payment.
The other investigation was in the area of property tax collections where the Indian CST
conducted a ward-level survey and of a single property to determine the potential returns from different
collection strategies. First, the Indian CST chose Shantala Nagar, Ward 111, and surveyed 734 properties.
From this sample, the BBMP issued 275 notices to pay property tax following the property visits by the
Indian CST team. As a result of their efforts, the city collected an additional 15.66 crores from a single
ward. The other experiment was an analysis of a single large commercial property in Shanti Nagar, in the
center of the city. The Indian CST combined non-payment of arrears with a physical site measurement
against the Self-Assessment Scheme declaration by the owner. The difference in the built-up area claimed
by the owner and the actual total built up area amounted to 632,811 square feet. Combined with four
years of arrears the unpaid property tax amount rose to 10.40 crores for a single property. The Indian CST
would continue to use this experiment to advocate for their legitimacy amid other IT actors in the BBMP.
By simple extrapolation, 15.66 crores from a single ward would yield 3,100 crores ($501.83 million) for
the entire city.
4.3.3 Returning to the Problem of Cash Management
As time went on and the FMS system came to be institutionalized in the IT ecology of the BBMP
and the information generated by the FMS system and available to the Indian CST began to cover a wider
range of practices. By the end of March 2013, over 11 billion rupees in tax and fee payments had been
transacted through the Financial Management System (see table 4.5). In less than a year of use over
230,000 receipts had been issued through the FMS system, which allowed the Indian CST to begin
building up a real-time analysis of the information flowing through FMS. The Special Officer (Finance)
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had also succeeded in getting drawing and disbursement officers to process bill payments through the
FMS.
Table 4.5: Financial Management System Status as of March 31, 2013
Transactions # of Records Total Amount (Rs.)
General Receipts 230,529 11.41 billion ($190.19 million)
Work Bills 5,261 7.44 billion ($124.07 million)
Tax Deductions against Work Bill 5,261 940.22 million ($15.67 million)
Source: Indian Centre for Social Transformation
Like the special officer (finance) had originally intended, the receipts module was designed in
such a way as to help understand what practices were going on in the far flung divisional, sub-divisional,
and ward offices of the BBMP. From June 2012 to August of 2014, monthly opening and closing balance
statements had been entered for 126 bank accounts. The opening and closing balances for 810 bank
accounts had not been recorded in the FMS. The Indian CST was regularly producing reports for the
BBMP like the Opening-Closing Balance Report from February 2014 in Table 4.6. These reports clearly
demonstrated the need to sweep unsupervised bank accounts and to order a full reconciliation of the
BBMP's bank accounts.
Table 4.6: Onenin2-Closing Bank Balance Report (Daaaal )oe
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Department Bank Name Bank A/C May June July Aug Sept Oct Nov Dec Jan
No:








Revenue Vijiya X no no yes no yes yes yes no yes
Offz Address
:RDAROTDSR










Health - General Vijaya X no no no yes yes yes no no no
Offz Address
:HGDHODSRH












Town Planning Canara X yes yes yes yes yes yes yes yes no
Source: Indian Centre for Social Transformation
The FMS had also registered the use of duplicate demand draft identification numbers on
different FMS receipts used to pay for multiple services. For instance, the Indian CST had flagged as part
of a larger examination the use of duplicate demand drafts to pay the same amount twice but while
making slight variations in the "Party Name" in an attempt to avoid detection. These transactions covered
tax and fee payment amounts far higher than petty corruption, for instance fee payments of 70,000 rupees.
Towards the end of 2014 the FMS system had registered over 1,500 instances of duplicate demand drafts
being accepted for tax and fee payment at BBMP offices. This growth spurred the Indian CST to
approach the municipal commissioner to order a formal reconciliation of the BBMP's bank accounts.87 in
response, the municipal commissioner formally constituted a committee comprised of all the IT-providers
for financial management to the BBMP to determine an integration strategy to connect all the disparate
systems.' The additional commissioner (finance) was appointed chairman with representatives from all
four software providers as members. The committee met several times in the fall of 2014 and discussions
were extensive. However, the additional commissioner (finance) failed to submit a final report.
4.4 Discussion
Digital financial management information systems (FMIS) are, by definition, complex
development projects. Intentional coordination efforts are necessary to alleviate both anticipated and
unanticipated problems. The previous sections chronicled the emergence of various coordination
mechanisms and structures in local government following the introduction of the GPMS and FMS
systems. These coordination structures were partially built around the task environment of project
87 No. Indian CST/BR/BBMP/2014 Dated: 21-01-2015.
88 Letter No. CFO / 95 / FABS/ 2014.
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management and revenue mobilization in a setting characterized by high levels of incomplete
information. These coordination mechanisms, however, mostly existed within the GPMS and FMS
systems. Beyond the boundaries of these modular financial management information systems, the IT-
advisor and the administrators of the other FMIS systems were reluctant to collaborate. As each system
evolved over time, transactions in one system began to gaining meaning with respect to transactions in the
other systems.
This chapter focused on delegation within the management accountability relationship in the
building state capability (BSC) framework. In this discussion section, I will draw from Galbraith's (1974)
perspective of organizational design as a problem of information processing to outline types of
coordination emerging from information technology on the expenditure and revenue side of the budget.
Galbraith (1974) views problems of coordination as a result of slack in the delegation of information
management and accountability. The amalgamation of the BBMP with the I ll jurisdictions on the
periphery generated substantial performance slack in the public financial management system. As
monitoring, oversight, and control mechanisms were degraded (intentionally and unintentionally) as the
size of the BBMP increased, the information requirements to perform basic PFM tasks increased
substantially. As evidenced by the narratives in both expenditure (e.g. duplicate work codes), and revenue
management (e.g. subleasing market stalls), the number of "transaction exceptions" had led to
hierarchical overload in both revenue and expenditure subsystems. This was the situation confronted by
the special commissioner (projects) and the Indian Centre for Social Transformation (Indian CST) when
they first embarked on the development of the Global Project Management System (GPMS) followed in
turn by the Financial Management System (FMS).
Increased coordination was also accompanied by conflict and competition, in particular
competition between the IT-provider organizations that were supplying the BBMP with financial
management systems that had overlapping accounting functionality. The following discussion focuses on
why the vertical coordination between concentrated and deconcentrated actors within the GPMS and FMS
deployments did not lead to horizontal coordination between the external contractors. High levels of slack
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can create common cause for short periods of time, but this consensus quickly confronts fragmentation.
Contests for power render the short-lived coherence of common causes untenable. What explains why
patterns of horizontal conflict and competition emerged within core areas of technical administration?
4.4.1 Asymmetric Integration
In many ways, the Indian CST operated as Simon's (1945) quintessential product engineer,
immersed in the end user environment to discover on a rolling basis what "products" were needed and
how each could relate to improvements in financial information management. However, the BBMP was
not an open market and demand for their services was expressed unevenly across the many fragmented
departments that comprise the city government. The asymmetric approach to integration adopted by the
Indian CST was partly necessary given the formative information and communication technology (ICT)
context. No immediate solution existed to resolve the prevailing technological and organizational
problems with the FBAS system and the diseconomies of scale brought about by amalgamation were
causing major problems for oversight and monitoring of project construction and delivery.
The Indian CST's social enterprise model also shaped the asymmetric approach. The Indian
CST's OpenSaaS technology framework has a very specific logic. The organization offers the technology
for free with the promise of full customization. In exchange for the promise of full and ongoing
customization, the Indian CST operates not only as a technology provider but also as a type of governance
advisory firm. As the head of the Indian CST described, when they approached the BBMP the message
they conveyed was that:
You do not have to pay much for the technology but the tradeoff is we increase the threat
of exposure for you.89
Though financial management information systems are typically classified as non-core components of the
public financial management system, the GPMS and FMS systems integration approach required the
system to trespass into core areas.
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The GPMS strengthened coordination capabilities at the top of the BBMP hierarchy, but had less
of an affect lower in the engineering department. While there is evidence the system increased levels of
efficiency (e.g. engineers reported not having to make as many construction site visits to manage
projects), the system did not increase the effectiveness of project execution. This is the case because the
effectiveness of project execution is beyond the scope of the GPMS technology. As an engineer
remarked:
"There are many problems we face when executing a project like shifting of cables,
pipes, removal of trees, and coordination with traffic police. All of these things cannot be
programmed as such. They cannot be anticipated because there is no documentation.
There is no documentation of trees or the location ofpipes and utilities. "9
On the revenue side, the FMS system helped some revenue and assistant revenue officers prioritize and
target arrears for tax collection. Because of the BBMP's highly distributed bureaucratic structure with
substantial discretion at the zonal level, the use of controlling mechanisms of coordination below the level
of the head office were almost entirely voluntary.
4.4.2 Reducing Slack and Decentralizing Information Management
What is the relationship between information technology design and information management
accountability? Figure 4.8 below describes the relationship between the locus of information management
accountability and verification costs. When the locus was in the head office, verification costs were very
high. As GPMS and FMS both pushed information management accountability down to the points of
action where information originates, the cost of verification declined. This was the intended response to
the high level of slack in the system following the amalgamation. Without the authority to change the
information requirements to perform public financial management tasks, the BBMP special commissioner
(projects) and special officer (finance) designed and deployed financial management information systems
to increase the capacity of the system to process information.
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The GPMS and FMS systems reduced slack between the information requirements to perform
system tasks (in the organizational context of the BBMP stretched out across 198 wards spread over 709
square kilometers) and the capacity of the system to process information. Yet, the reduction in transaction
and coordination costs were accompanied by a drastic increase in information flows. On both the
expenditure and revenue side of the budget, these flows turned into a sort of information overload for
which the Indian CST alone was incapable of handling in a strategic manner. Tactically, the Indian CST
devised a form of inquiry into task areas within the functional domain of project management and revenue
administration. These forms of inquiry were a response to information overload that was consistent with
the resources of the Indian CST. The organization is small and highly specialized. As an external vendor
to the BBMP offering a software service, it constantly faced the dilemma of how hard to push the BBMP
in a particular direction without upsetting relations with its most important (and largest) client.
In such a large bureaucracy with various levels of exposure to information technology,
we should expect mixed experiences. However, two of the Indian CST's and BBMP's
implementation decisions were strategic mistakes and are relevant to discuss. First, the idea that
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passing contractor bills through GPMS would bolt the system down was misguided. The timing
was premature to convert the GPMS system into an obligatory passage point by adding the bill
payment feature. The special commissioner (projects) concluded that:
Ultimately you know it boils down to one thing the bill passing authority is the executive
engineer. In BBMP, actually files need not come to my level for passing bills. They won't
come. Only for certain things... such as for release of letters of credit and those things,
but the bill passing authority is executive engineer. So what they would do after
insistence on GPMSfor passing bills is they started passing bills at their own level.9'
Moreover, introducing the bill payment feature put the GPMS system into direct confrontation with the
finance department and chief accounts officer (CAO). These are the two most powerful institutions in
public financial management operations on the expenditure side of the budget. The case for co-locating
information management accountability for contractor payment with the responsibility for entering and
maintaining public investment project information made on the basis of efficiency and oversight logic
was strong. However, relying on a logic of appropriateness given the ongoing transition and disruption
caused by the GPMS system might have provided alternative options.
Second, neither the BBMP nor the Indian CST had a plan in place to manage resistance other than
ongoing mutual adjustment. Put differently, no one involved had the foresight to propose an interim
institution to process and discharge the many "exceptions" that were mounting over time. Processing such
large volumes of transactions in short periods of time requires skilled handling of irregularities. On the
project side, these exceptions were previously lost in the delegation mismatch between issuing the work
code by the assistant controller finance located at the zonal-level and approval and oversight located in
the head office. The special commissioner (projects) temporarily "suspended" expectations of substantive
accountability during the initial deployment of the GPMS system, but did so only through informal
means.
The Indian CST handled these "exceptions" according to the resource constraints they faced as an
organization. Such methods underpinned their overall organizational strategy, isolating variables in the
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FMIS and investigating why they are expressed as "irregularities" in the system. On the revenue side, the
information overload originated with the overflow of "exceptions" in duplicate demand drafts and
differences between opening/closing bank balances and reported receipts. Both continued to grow even as
the FMS system increasingly achieved a taken-for-granted status in the BBMP. In the language of the
building state capability framework, it is not the case that computerization represented procedures that
were too distinct from the "folk practices" (Pritchett 2013) within the public financial management
system in the BBMP. Rather, the GPMS and FMS systems had no capability for accommodating the "folk
practices" outside a regime of substantive transparency and accountability over what was clearly an
extended transition period.
4.4.3 Plural Institutional Configurations and Polycentric Regulation
The third and final explanation for the decentered governance structure for public financial
management was the presence of plural institutional configurations in close proximity at the technical
core of the PFM system. The presence of two commercial firms and one non-government organization
spurred a clash between production models for three reasons. First, conflict was partly the result of a
structural feature of the "business model" for information technology services placed within a setting
characterized by high levels of incomplete information. Pragmatic legitimacy of FMIS applications are
premised on the scale of transactions that flow through them. Put differently, network effects (Katz and
Shapiro 1994) apply to public information and communication technologies (ICTs) that handle large
volumes of transactions. Their pragmatic legitimacy goes up with their share of the total universe of
transactions that could possibly processed through them. Second, following the advice of the special
officer (finance), the Indian CST intentionally designed the FMS system to encroach upon the transaction
space covered by other information systems. Third, there are certain identification numbers on both the
expenditure and revenue side of the budget that are more integral to accountability than others. On the
project side, the replacement of the work code with the job code and the failure of GPMS to issue it (and
the acquisition of responsibility by the IFMS) was detrimental to future coordination with the GPMS.
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A hierarchical mode of producing financial information management services could not be
imposed on the fragmented organizational environment. Competitive institutional configurations arose
internally to the BBMP, but not because the BBMP developed the capability for competitive tendering.
The FBAS cell was the monopoly provider of digital financial information management services in the
BBMP. The expansion of the BBMP in 2008 drastically reduced their pragmatic legitimacy but did not
affect their normative legitimacy as the core accounting platform in the BBMP. The premise of the
OpenSaaS model, full customization and front running ideas for new reports and applications in a service
oriented architecture (SOA), placed it in competition with commercial firms driven by the profit motive.
On both the expenditure and revenue systems in which the Indian CST was contracted to deploy financial
management information systems, coordination gave way to competition when the Indian CST's
technology transitioned from "counting" to "accounting" functionality and thereby reducing slack in the
organization. The broad conclusion is that financial management information systems cannot be relegated
to non-core technical areas of the PFM system. The particular mix of institutional arrangements in "non-
core" technical domains give rise to social dynamics that spill over into core areas.
This chapter found that information technology projects for public financial management do
improve coordination between senior managers and frontline agents. Because these coordination
structures operate under pervasive conditions of incomplete information, they serve not only to facilitate
IT implementation but also as an interim institution of local inquiry that increases the legibility of the
practices in the system. However, the presence of multiple financial management information systems
operating in close functional proximity and managed under incompatible institutional arrangements
generate competitive behavior among IT-providers. Rather than augmenting vertical control in rule-bound
bureaucratic structures and intergovernmental relations, financial management information systems
gradually convert local public financial management into a polycentric regulatory regime.
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Chapter 5: Mediatingi Financial Transparency: Spoiler Traps, Legitimacy Games, and the
Making of an Issue Network
5.1 Introduction
Having demonstrated in the previous chapter that reductions in organizational slack as a result of
enhancing information processing capacity can inadvertently lead to competition and conflict, this chapter
asks whether or not financial management information systems (FMIS) delivered to urban local bodies
(ULBs) in outsourcing arrangements are consistent with the public good. Do they contribute to fiscal
transparency as boosters claim in the smart cities literature (David, Justice, and McNutt 2015)? Do they
create opportunities for pernicious forms of elite capture, particularly as the private value of public
information rises? Or is there an alternative to these critiques from the left and the right, where novelty in
governance can yield public value even in complex, highly contentious local government settings
(Cordella and Bonina 2012)? Interrogating the issue of fiscal transparency and the public good through
the case of the BBMP is interesting because the city government had come to depend on three different
and overlapping financial management information systems (FMIS). Each was managed under a different
institutional arrangement, giving rise to both coordination and conflict among technology services in
"non-core"! areas of public financial management.
The data for this chapter comes from direct observations of negotiations and the actions and
reactions that were stimulated by actor interpretations of the micro-context of change during a period of
social and political mobilization around public financial management in Bangalore (Joshi 2014). The
evidence indicates that the polycentric internal governance regime that results from incompatible
institutional arrangements surrounding FMIS neither leads to information democratization, nor does it
contribute to systemic capture of local government by elites. I uncover both patterns of information
democratization and information closure.
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Information closure can be attributed to technology organizations rationally protecting their
reputational and profit interests in local software product markets.9 2 Progress made in the direction of
information democratization is mediated by the situated interests of political actors that can gain access to
relevant information and assemble it in ways that support their agenda. Decentered internal governance
opens up a polycentric entrepreneurial environment where legitimacy games are structured around subsets
of fiscal transactions and functionalities within the local public financial management system. This plays
out on both sides of information closure and information democratization. In such a setting with multiple
financial information systems providers, the interaction of political and market interests across these
institutional arrangements can serve to create a spoiler trap for institutional challengers.
5.2 Politics and PDFs: State-Local Relations and the Quest to Reassert Version Control
Only a month after the municipal commissioner had established the committee on integrating the
FMIS systems in the BBMP, the chief minister of Karnataka formed a committee to explore options for
restructuring the BBMP. Led by B.S. Patil, the Expert Committee on BBMP Restructuring had held
public consultations for nearly six months and was expected to release their final report advocating
trifurcating the BBMP.'3 In February of 2015, Chief Minister Siddaramaiah constituted the Kataria
Committee to investigate financial irregularities in the BBMP. The committee submitted an interim report
in two weeks but the report remained private. The combination of the two committees telegraphed the
Chief Minister's intentions to use the recommendations of the Kataria Committee to justify show-cause
notices to BBMP council members. This would be the initial step to dissolving the BBMP council. The
Government of Karnataka issued notices to 198 BBMP councilors in March, 2015. Chief Minister
92 All three software providers were offering their services at a price that was easily covered by the BBMP's albeit
deficit prone budget. Because of the extreme variation in information technology skill levels within the BBMP and
the local supply of information technology services relative to demand, it is a sound assumption that the external
technology providers needed the BBMP more than the BBMP needed them.
'" The committee ultimately proposed to split the BBMP into five corporations with directly elected mayors holding
five year terms, but the plan was eventually shelved.
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Siddaramaiah's explanation for the decision was that the state government no longer had the resources to
supervise the BBMP, particularly national and state government investment schemes in the city.
In addition to requiring all BBMP council members to respond within two weeks with why they
disagreed with Siddaramaiah's concerns (a formality in India's parliamentary system), the move required
legal proceedings in Karnataka High Court to postpone the regularly scheduled elections in May for up to
six months. The state government held that the restructuring would require time to effectively delimit new
wards. Opposition parties (Bharatyia Janata Party and Janata Dal -Secular) claimed that the move was
nothing more than an attempt to postpone elections at a time when the BJP was ascendant in national
elections and while it held 113 of 198 council seats in the BBMP. A ruling in the Karnataka High Court
on April 24 gave the chief minister the permission to dissolve the BBMP and move forward with the
restructuring.
With the dissolution of the BBMP council, the state government appointed an Administrator to
manage the BBMP during the interim period. The Administrator brought in new officers in key positions,
which included subsuming the information technology department under the Additional Commissioner
(Finance) position. The Administrator ordered the newly appointed Additional Commissioner (Finance
and IT) to reconstitute the integration committee out of the contractors for the three core FMIS systems in
BBMP (FBAS, IFMS, and GPMS-FMS) along with the IT Advisor and the chief accounts officer. The
new Additional Commissioner (Finance and IT) requested a series of live demonstrations from each of
the three FMIS providers which would be followed with a discussion on viable options for integrating the
systems moving forward. While the Indian CST was uncertain how the demonstration meetings and
subsequent deliberations would go, they expressed hope that the decision to integrate the systems would
finally be made. There were other reasons to be optimistic. First, the Indian CST's initial experience
implementing the FMS system demonstrated a capability to quickly identify revenue leakages which
would be necessary to ameliorate the building crisis in pending bills. Second, the Government of India
had recently released the preconditions for participating in the Smart Cities Mission, which the Indian
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CST assumed would serve as a strong incentive to the BBMP to adopt the GPMS-FMS technology.9 4
Third, other prominent national programs like Digital India, which advance information technology
adoption in state governments and urban local bodies, encourage preferential treatment to domestic firms
and organizations that develop open source software applications developed in India.95
5.2.1 Co-Producing Capacity
A little over a month before the integration committee negotiations began, the BBMP
Administrator took to Twitter on May 17 to announce that "Details of all works pending bills as on
30/4/2015 are put up on BBMP website for transparency. Please check the works and inform us." The
BBMP had published information on pending bills to contractors, but the information was uploaded on a
static portable document format (.pdf) file. The file contained information on 41,868 pending bills for
public investment projects in the 100 wards of the old BMP jurisdiction. The decision to make available
pending contractor payments was puzzling, particularly in the context of the court cases on the BBMP
elections unfolding in the Supreme Court. In a May 5 Supreme Court hearing, the bench had ordered the
State Election Commission to hold the BBMP council elections by August 6,2015. The State government
had one last appeal, which would not be heard until the first week of July.
As campaigns for council seats began with an election date still unknown, the Aam Aadmi Party
(AAP) was beginning their first systematic grassroots campaign to build local political support and
potentially contest seats in BBMP elections. A third of the funds supporting Arvind Kejriwal's
monumental victory in the February Delhi elections was sent from Karnataka and Maharashtra.' The
connections between the Indian CST and the Karnataka AAP party went back to the summer of 2014,
' The Smart Cities Mission adopted a set of parameters and scoring criteria from which competing cities would be
evaluated that amounted to 100 points for the first stage of city selection. The parameters that related directly to the
GPMS-FMS system amounted to 25 points.
" See Government of India (2015). The Indian CST regularly traveled to New Delhi for trade shows hosted by the
Ministry of Electronics and Information Technology among other central government ministries in order to
strategically position the GPMS-FMS system according to the nominal policy "formula," in the language of the
building state capability framework.
' See Aji, Sowmya. 2015. "33% of Aam Aadmi Party's Delhi Funds Come from Karnataka & Maharashtra." The
Economic Times (January 29). Kejriwal founded the Karnataka AAP in July, 2013.
159
when the Indian CST was invited to speak about the GPMS and FMS in a leadership training program for
party activists. During that presentation, the Indian CST advanced a proposal to utilize the GPMS and
FMS systems to develop an issue community of volunteers that would focus on citizen audits of projects.
The idea at the time was to develop the capacity of AAP activists to contest BBMP council seats in the
local elections that were a year away. Groups of volunteers could systematically audit the project
information contained in GPMS and begin responding to the citizen complaints stored on the grievance
portal. Such activities, if done systematically over the course of a year, could increase significantly the
sensitivity to community problems and situated knowledge of the public expenditure system of
participants. The Karnataka AAP party did not follow through on the civic capacity building program, but
many of the AAP party members and activists remained in touch with the Indian CST.
The BBMP administrator's release of pending bills was a valuable opportunity for the Karnataka
Aam Aadmi party and the Indian CST. For the Indian CST, the information filled a gap in the GPMS
system between the period when engineers stopped passing contractor bills through GPMS and when the
task was reconstituted on the FMS system. The release of the pending bills suddenly brought the
Karnataka AAP and Indian CST together again. In an initial set of meetings shortly after the BBMP
Administrator's announcement, the Indian CST and AAP activists debated the merits of various strategies
for utilizing the newly available project information. Two problems surfaced immediately. First, the
pending bills file posted to the BBMP's website would need additional work to convert the project data in
the file spread line-by-line across thousands of pages into usable information. Second, the pending bills
listed were only from the 100 wards that made up the old BMP corporation before amalgamation. The
discussions about what to do with the information included shaming the BBMP government and
politicians or utilizing the new administrator's actions as a resource for political mobilization given the
backdrop of the elections. They agreed on the latter.
Many AAP activists worked in the information technology (IT) industry in Bengaluru and so
offered to help convert the data contained in the pending bills documents into a format that could be
uploaded into the GPMS-FMS system. The Indian CST and their GPMS and FMS systems were useful to
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AAP because the data on pending payments in 100 wards released by the Administrator was limited only
to the name of the project and the amount of pending payment. Access to the GPMS system would give
the AAP activists capacity to more clearly devise a persuasive interpretive frame for the mass of data
contained in the list of pending bills, based on an array of important information that was not available
such as original estimated cost, photos of the projects, and engineer and contractor information. The
GPMS-FMS system also contained another resource that was valuable to the AAP activists - the citizen
complaint module. At the time, the complaints module had over 8,521 entries dating back to 2010. The
AAP activists requested the Indian CST to modify the front-end user interface so that they could sort
complaints at the ward-level and correlate these complaints with whatever eventual sorting and analysis
they made of the pending bills contained in the PDF files and the project information in the GPMS
system.
Some of the AAP activists had advanced skills in data mining and who had supported various
local political mobilizations around the state by mining online voter ID registries to build customized
voter registration databases. In exchange for controlled access to the GPMS-FMS system, they offered
support to the Indian CST to import the pending bills data and to update the FMS system. The AAP
activists offered to scrape the property tax payment website and transfer the information into the FMS
system. Though an unconventional and isolated approach to temporarily integrating the FMS and
property tax payment systems, this type of activity was covered by the Indian CST's public trust deed and
memorandum of understanding (MoU) with the BBMP. In addition, the FMS system already contained
both normal property tax transactions and property tax arrears." The online property tax payment portal
of the BBMP asked for either new or old property identification (PID) numbers. The AAP team coded a
screen scraping application, cycling the PID numbers that had been registered in FMS during tax
" Though covered under the Indian CST's public trust and MoU, this activity is simply an updated tactic for the
Internet age long practiced in India. As Goetz and Jenkins (2001) report in the case of the Mazdoor Kisan Shakti
Sangathan (MKSS) in Rajasthan, there is a long history of non-government organizations obtaining official
expenditure records "filched" from low-level clerks inside government.
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payments made in the revenue offices of the city.98
The data scraping engine provided for 50 threads to run parallel on the BBMP's online property
tax system, which took approximately 8 days get all the property tax payments that were missing in the
FMS system. The AAP team was able to collect 1.2 million property tax transaction records from the
BBMP site in less than 2 weeks.' Given the pending integration committee meetings, the Indian CST
believed the property tax information would enhance the pragmatic legitimacy of their system. They felt
confident the updated GPMS-FMS system would prove its worth during the live demonstrations. The
AAP activists settled on the model the Indian CST had presented to the Aam Aadmi Party of Karnataka in
2014 by initiating a political mobilization around a city-wide citizen-led social audit of public investment
projects in the BBMP.
5.3 Integration Committee as Spoiler Trap
The new additional commissioner (finance and IT), who had been the position for only a month,
had been charged with assessing the existing ecology of IT systems in the BBMP and developing a plan
to integrate them into a single system. This required an assessment of the existing systems, in order to
determine which would become the BBMP's base system and incorporate the information from the other
two. A separate option entailed adopting a new FMIS from the outside, such as the system developed by
the Municipal Reform Cell (MRC) in the state government. A new system from the private sector would
likely require initiating a tender process which could delay the necessary integration.
The BBMP's cash management problem, stumbled upon by the Indian CST when they first
helped introduce the GPMS six years prior, was still unresolved. Pending bills to contractors for
completed work had risen to around 2,500 crores (US$ 416.6 million) and most assumed the chief
98 Screen scraping is a technique used in transparency initiatives to correlate information contained in government
databases that are intended for final display to a human user, making them difficult to link to another dataset (Brito
2008).
99 These types of programs are limited by the refresh rate of the online system targeted for data mining. For instance,
if the refresh rate is two seconds, then a scraping program could acquire information for 302,400 transactions in the
course of seven days.
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minister and administrator would succumb to pressure to expedite the completion of existing projects
during the period of administrator rule in the run up to the elections. The stakes were high for making a
decision, as the additional commissioner (finance and IT) would make clear during the negotiations when
he stated that "there are financial implications not just technology considerations.""
In a letter circulated to the Indian CST, the additional commissioner (finance and IT) set the
expectations for the committee's work. Each party would be given an opportunity to outline the features
of their system in a "live" demonstration. The letter neither specified the evaluative principles nor criteria
that would be used to make the assessment of the three systems. The FBAS system had long been
recognized as obsolete, but the FBAS cell retained importance (and some control) given their
involvement in producing the annual budget statement of the BBMP. The Indian CST was slated to go
first.
5.3.1 Negotiations: Round 1""
At the start of the first meeting, the additional commissioner (finance and IT) clarified that the
purpose was to come up with a plan to integrate the three systems into one and to decide which system
should be the final system to adopt. The objective of this meeting was to provide each party an
opportunity to do a live demonstration of the features of the system to help the additional commissioner
(finance and IT) understand the BBMP's options with respect to the capabilities of each system to provide
for the information management needs of the corporation. Each party would be given 30 minutes to
present. Before proceeding to the demonstrations, the additional commissioner outlined the state of
problems in the BBMP and the level of functionality desired:
We know that enterprise resource planning (ERP) solutions exist. I wanted a detailed
statement of April and June and we could not compile total income and total
expenditures. The CFO had to go to the bank and ask. It should be that I'm sitting on my
mobile and I can see the balance sheet.
The additional commissioner continued:
10 Integration Committee Meeting. 7 July 2015.
10! All quotes under this section were collected during the integration committee meeting on 30 June 2015.
163
FBAS has two simultaneous problems. Migration and the database does not have
102
updated information. We are not sure if the data generated is right or wrong.
Because the Indian CST's GPMS-FMS systems were constructed on a cloud-computing platform that
could quickly and inexpensively collect, aggregate, analyze, and display income and expenditures, the
additional commissioner's description of the system requirements seemed in their favor.
The Indian CST began their live demonstration by logging into to the Global Project Management
System (GPMS). They first displayed basic project information contained in their system, starting with
the number of projects, their location across different scales (zones, divisions, and wards), and the status
of project construction and delivery. The chief accounts officer interrupted to argue that the GPMS-FMS
has not been "handed off" to the BBMP. The Indian CST responded by noting that:
The GPMS-FMS is a cloud computing platform, so everyone has usernames and
passwords, and the system is being currently used to issue receipts and to produce
reports for the BBMP.
The CAO countered that the process of transferring information technology to the municipal corporation
is defined by an official process that has to be followed and that it was not followed by the Indian CST.
For instance, the CAO claimed that the transfer of system ownership requires a software requirement
specification (SRS) sheet, a work order, and a schedule of rates for the specific tasks that are carried out
to deliver the system." The Indian CST noted in response that the system was developed under a
Memorandum of Understanding (MoU), signed first by a state government enterprise and then by the
commissioner of the BBMP.
The Indian CST moved on to demonstrating the project screens used by engineers to input project
details. Noting that some of the input fields were voluntary, the Indian CST demonstrated that important
102 By migration the Special Commissioner was referring to FBAS software system hosted "offline" (i.e. local area
network) not connected to the Internet.
103 This line of questioning of the procedural aspects of system design and implementation closely follows the
discussion during a previous meeting with the CAO in which the Indian CST attempted tried to press the issue of
bank reconciliation. Despite having a memo from the Municipal Commissioner ordering that a bank reconciliation
system be put in place, the CAO questioned the absence of a schedule of rates in the Indian CST's MoU with the
BBMP and a formal work order. The concern was that correct procedures would need to be followed because the
BBMP would be audited.
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information like work code,job code, p-code, initial cost estimate, associated bill payments, and progress
statements were all available. Even with the updated information from the administrators pending bills
files, the unevenness of project information related to physical process and financial management posed a
problem for the Indian CST. Both the IT advisor and the CAO confronted the Indian CST, noting the gaps
and placing the blame on the Indian CST. The IT advisor and CAO strengthened their critique by
describing the GPMS-FMS as an "outside system" and as such:
The BBMP does not have official ownership. It is not the BBMP engineer's responsibility
to upload information.
The Indian CST responded by noting the core principle of transparency in financial management
information systems - pushing information management down to the points of action where information
originates. They conceded they recently updated the project files with the pending bills data released by
the Administrator, but considered this a strength. The system was robust to bureaucratic resistance that
might arise in response to various administrative and political shocks or crises and can very quickly be
updated. They followed up by asserting that in order for e-governance applications to be legitimate the
burden is on BBMP engineers and revenue officers to update the system "in real time" following the
execution of a government transaction.
In response, the chief accounts officer exposed the problem for the Indian CST's OpenSaaS
model with a simple question:
Why haven't the people in the BBMP updated it ifyou have already transferred it?
The Indian CST could not furnish a coherent response to the CAO's line of questioning. The line of
questioning trapped the Indian CST in a dilemma. Although they had demonstrated the utility of the
GPMS features, the additional commissioner (finance and IT) was new and they did not want to be seen
as accusatory towards BBMP engineers. After finishing the demonstration of the remaining GPMS
features, the Indian CST loaded the FMS system and gave a quick overview about how system capacity
could expand on demand in order to process growing transaction volumes for taxes and fees the BBMP
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imposes on residents and commercial firms. Displaying the property tax module, the Indian CST pointed
out this feature was essential for the BBMP's most important revenue source.
The IT advisor and chief accounts officer immediately objected to the presence of the property
tax information in the FMS system. From project management to revenue administration, the first
meeting of the reconstituted integration committee had become very contentious. The IT advisor
expressed concern that property tax payment on the FMS system had not been validated by the BBMP.
The Indian CST responded by loading the citizen complaint module, showing thousands of complaints
posted online about problems and deficiencies in the BBMP's online and office-based property tax
system. These complaints described a system that was generating rolling losses for the BBMP.
The additional commissioner (finance and IT) interrupted, conceding that:
Property tax payments collected through FMS is a failure of the existing property tax
system in the BBMP.
The chief accounts officer and the IT advisor followed up with two requests, asking to see a budget
module and a year-long report of property tax collection. The budget module was loaded but empty as it
was never activated during the initial deployment of the FMS system. The Indian CST exceeded the
second request by displaying a five-year report for property taxes that included arrears. The request to see
automated property tax analysis provided the Indian CST the opportunity to show the automated bank
reconciliation report that they had relied on over the previous six months to submit the paper-based report
and request for bank reconciliation they had been submitting to state government and BBMP officials.
In doing so, the Indian CST believed it could open a line of questioning about property tax
collection and demonstrate to the additional commissioner (finance and IT) the capability of their system
to quickly and precisely identify the collection offices in the BBMP where these discrepancies might be
originating. To further their case, the Indian CST loaded the automated report that tracked the use of
duplicate demand drafts in collection offices. In response to the performance capability of the GPMS-
FMS system, the IT advisor attempted to return the discussion back to procedural norms associated with
information and communication (ICT) projects in ULBs, asking if:
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All the functions that could possibly be included in the GPMS-FMS are listed in the MoU?
At this point, the Indian CST's demonstration had proceeded for over two hours and the additional
commissioner adjourned the committee until the next meeting the following week.
5.3.2 Negotiations: Round 2"'
For the second meeting, the FBAS cell and IFMS team were asked to give live demonstrations of
their systems. The Indian CST showed up to the second meeting carrying large binders full of reports,
letters, orders, and circulars in anticipation of similar challenges to their account they experienced the
previous week. Opening the second meeting, the additional commissioner (finance and IT) requested that
the committee consider whether or not a low-cost solution exists for migrating data between the existing
systems. The FBAS team was scheduled to give the first demonstration.
Because the system was not web-enabled but hosted on a local area network inside the FBAS cell
office in the BBMP head office, the FBAS team could not give a live demonstration. Instead, the FBAS
team circulated a memo for discussion. 05 The note stated that "the objective of the exercise is to
implement a fully integrated, decentralized solution in the BBMP." The note further outlined a set of four
task areas related to legal and administrative reform and the technical parameters for a software system
that would replace the arrangement. The four task areas of the proposed project were (1) transition to
National Municipal Accounting Manual (NMAM); (2) implementation of software for core accounting;
(3) web enablement and integration of core accounting software; and (4) decentralization, training and
implementation. The note was establishing the parameters for what constituted accounting in the BBMP
and leaned in the direction of normative compliance.
The additional commissioner (finance and IT) proceeded to list the set of requirements for the
future system in the BBMP in terms of content. The system:
Must have assets, liabilities and expenditures and the balance sheet must conform with
the national municipal accounts manual (NMAM). The system should reveal inflow and
outflow based on whoever gives the approval.
* All quotes under this section were collected during the integration committee meeting on 7 July 2015.
105 July 2015. Bruhat Bengaluru Mahanagara Palike. Note on Upgrading FBAS.
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After a discussion of the existing accounting process in the BBMP, the additional commissioner noted the
importance of understanding the Integrated Financial Management System (IFMS) software and
acquiring the capability to integrate IFMS with whatever solution was adopted. The IFMS team then
began presentation of payroll and job code functions of their system. Neither of these were "live" in the
sense of showing transaction processing from the point of action where information originates through to
the reporting and auditing features. The IFMS team suggested taking:
A new approach to scalability that includes core accounting and is document-based with
menu options available.
The latter feature had been in the GPMS system since 2009. The Indian CST countered that a key
requirement of accounting - the availability of closing and opening balances of BBMP bank accounts -
was not demonstrated by the IFMS team. In contrast, the FMS system had special features designed
precisely for this purpose. The additional commissioner (finance and IT) asked how much time is needed
to get to core accounting and budgeting and the IFMS team responded with 2 months and at a cost of 5
lakhs ($8,300). The additional commissioner (finance and IT) inquired as to whether the Indian CST and
IFMS team could run a competition to see how each software system would handle official financial data
shared from the FBAS system. The IT advisor shifted the emphasis of the discussion to the need for a
comprehensive solution:
If you want to go for comprehensive accounting system we have to define what we want
and go for a study. First define functional features. The Municipal Reform Cell already
adopted standards from NMAM and we can use them. We need to detail a framework of
functions. What has been done? What needs to be done? Once we have the framework we
can ask what are the solutions we have. Then a timeframe. Then ensure compliance. We
have to decide on these things. Looking right now on IFMS solution is best. They are
already doing [contractor] payment and that is most important. IFMS has to do an
estimate we cannot just believe what they say.
The FBAS team added that:
It is clear they [Municipal Reform Cell software] can do core accounting and there is not
a core accounting module in each of the other systems.
The IT advisor continued to add factors that would need to be considered in any new financial
management information system project:
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When we are making a big transition we need a more robust system. People get
transferred. Have to hand over the technical. We need functional expertise in BBMP. If
you want a balance sheet on this day or report on the payroll account it should be able to
do it. In this context we should look at the big picture.
The Indian CST countered:
FMS has all the capabilities you are describing available it would just take minor
adjustments. Every BBMP employee has a username and password so the system is
already available.
The discussion further drifted in the direction of legal compliance. A member of the IT department noted:
For each transaction, there are accounting standards. As of today, receipts and
expenditures are not matching so they [BBMP officers] want to do manual procedures.
The additional commissioner then shifted to more short-run considerations by noting that:
A tender might be very expensive. We have 3,000 crores pending payments. If the IT
solution is sustainable over the next 3 years this is good enough. Municipal Reform Cell
if it has all the capabilities we can migrate to that level. Among available solution
providers we need a rough estimation of costs and to decide if we don't have to go with a
tender.
The Indian CST tried to draw attention back to the issue of functionality, in particular the relationship
between the design of the system and its legitimacy as an accounting system. Returning to the IT
department officers comment, the Indian CST argued:
We are thinking too narrowly. Cost of training has to be separated out for tender. IT
team needs to be changed and this requires significant training. Validation should be at
user level, tight at entry level.
The Indian CST attempted to reframe the discussion around an alternative to compliance to procedural
norms for IT projects but in relation to the requirements of the Smart Cities Mission:
We had 17 projects for JNNURM but they are not completed. For Smart City status you
have to show that the projects are completed. The IT system should be open source. Need
to have project management system in place. Need to show increase in revenues which
we have done. The GPMS-FMS is best positioned to meet the criteria for Smart City. The
FBAS and existing property tax system have small and big errors as we have already
seen. As far as system is concerned, IT system should preserve data. Public participation
is important. How do you allow citizen to participate in every aspect of governance? We
should not get rejected as a smart city.
The additional commissioner (finance and IT) concurred but deferred the decision by requesting a
presentation from the Municipal Reform Cell in the Karnataka government. The second
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negotiation meeting concluded with no immediate decision. Instead of revealing the preferences
of the new BBMP administration during the interim period between elections, the negotiations
held by the reconstituted integration committee revealed hostilities from senior officers and
indecisiveness on the part of the additional commissioner (finance and IT). The OpenSaaS model
adopted to asymmetrically integrate the GPMS and FMS systems made it difficult to counter the
procedural critiques made by the IT advisor and chief accounts officer.
5.3.3 The Spoiler Trap in Social Outsourcing for Information Technology
Between the three technology systems available to the BBMP, the Indian CST had developed the
lowest cost solution with the most demonstrated functionality to improve elite policy/services and
transaction intensive tasks associated with service delivery and imposition of obligations. Moreover, the
argument for the GPMS-FMS also stood on the support derived from the particular characteristics of the
financial management information system that would increase the strength of the city's application for
funding under the Smart Cities Mission. The external option discussed during the meetings, approaching
the Karnataka Municipal Reform Cell (MRC), was developed for small and medium-sized ULBs in the
state but was not robust to the transaction volume and overall stress of Bangalore's general-purpose
megacity administrative system. Following the integration committee meetings, the Indian CST
confronted a dilemma on how to move their work forward.
The social outsourcing model had led the Indian CST into a trap. On the one hand, the parameters
for the BBMP's new integrated financial management information system discussed during the
negotiations closely matched the GPMS-FMS system. On the other hand, choosing the Indian CST as
software provider would have triggered a bank reconciliation process inside the BBMP. The organization
had made a point of identifying that precise problem during their demonstration. There simply was no
way around this implication of selecting the GPMS-FMS technology to support the BBMP's public
financial management system moving forward. Over the previous six months the Indian CST had
continuously advocated for a bank reconciliation, a decision borne out of the evidence. Given the growing
volume of "mismatches" between the BBMP's suite of financial management applications, the bank
170
reconciliation implied a high-level investigation. The Indian CST perceived the opportunity as a potential
pathway to tighter integration because any systematic attempt to reconcile the BBMP's 900 or more bank
accounts would also force an audit of the other FMIS systems, thus calling into question larger systemic
revenue collection and financial management practices.
The alternative approach would be to pursue a more oblique path, less threatening to the
legitimacy of the BBMP. The difficulty with such an organizational strategy was that it put the legitimacy
of the Indian CST's model at risk. The organization is concerned with long-term transformation of
financial management, based on offering a combination of features including extremely low cost FMIS
systems and a commitment to ongoing customization (carrot) which come with an implicit threat of
exposure (stick). The social outsourcing arrangement supporting the partnership between the BBMP and
the Indian CST - a memorandum of understanding instead of a tender (or other contractual obligation) -
was, in part, a result of path dependency. The project began with the attempt to transfer the web-based
project management system (WBPMS) from the Karnataka State Police Housing Corporation (KSPHC)
to the BBMP. Nevertheless, over time the ambiguity and flexibility of the MoU became essential to the
Indian CST's adaptability and robustness to stress. Put differently, the Indian CST perceived the relative
openness of the MoU and the OpenSaaS model of software delivery as a form of options contract. Even if
they did not exercise the implicit threat of exposure, the option had value.
The Indian CST faced what the literature on anti-corruption agencies and public sector
accountability refers to as a spoiler trap (Kuris 2014). The spoiler trap is a dilemma confronted by anti-
corruption agencies (ACA). Aiming to neutralize the investigatory or prosecutory powers of ACAs,
institutional incumbents force ACAs into a dilemma to stall or derail the push for anti-corruption reforms
(Kupatadze 2017, 2015). The dilemma centers on the decision to either push forward with high-level
investigations risks "crippling pushback or potential dissolution" while less obtrusive actions "might
appear timid or biased" (Kuris 2014, 3). Each option is filled with downside risks. Mismanaging the
dilemma threatens to curtail the pragmatic legitimacy of the ACA. In the case of the BBMP's financial
management information systems, the two alternatives confronted by the Indian CST pose as legitimacy
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games. If the organization continues to push the bank reconciliation report, it threatens the external
legitimacy of the BBMP with credible information supplied on official systems by engineers, revenue
officers, and other staff. If the Indian CST backs down and as a result is not perceived as legitimate, its
commitments and obligations as a social enterprise are less likely to be perceived as legitimate
particularly the rapidly expanding issue network which it had helped construct and to which it belonged.
The Indian CST and allies thus had to weigh the likely costs and benefits between a high-visibility or
low-visibility strategy.
5.4: Mediating Information Democratization: Factors Shaping Local Fiscal Transparency
As the chapter described earlier, the combination of the pending payments file release with the
GPMS-FMS helped reassert a higher level of "version control" in the GPMS-FMS system following the
buildup of some gaps in financial information over the previous year. The dilemma confronting the Aain
Aadmi Party activists was how to develop an approach that could exploit the public release of the pending
contractor payment files to support a political mobilization. How could the financial information in the
GPMS and FMS systems help? This decision was complicated because the Karnataka AAP had not yet
decided if they were actually going to have AAP members contest the BBMP elections. On both the
expenditure and revenue side of the BBMP's budget, financial information was fragmented and
incomplete. The AAP activists now had access to data on public investment project performance from
tens of thousands of project entries and on the revenue performance of the city from hundreds of
thousands of transactions.
During an initial meeting with the Indian CST, an AAP activist concluded that the problem in its
simplest form was that:
We have to decide those cases we are comfortable living with and those we are not."0
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How would such a value framework be imposed on the mass of public financial management information
at their disposal? The AAP's campaign to win the Delhi elections in early 2015 had focused heavily on
themes of corruption and basic services. An AAP activist noted that their:
Immediate interest is to understand and expose corruption and use it as an electoral tool.
But sensitization is lacking because we do not know the figures.
Drawing on the complaints related to water, housing, sanitation, and roads, among other service
conditions in the citizen grievance platform, the AAP activists began developing an approach that was
first narrowly targeted at the ward level of governance. For instance, originally the overall aim was to:
Align the needs of the locality with the existing corporator [BBMP council member] who
is supposed to represent the residents.
Complaints in the online grievance module level could be used to understand which wards to target and to
better understand ward conditions in advance of canvassing neighborhoods by foot to communicate with
residents and potential BBMP council voters.
Because PFM information in the BBMP was fragmented and partial, there were initial problems
deciding how to select, analyze, interpret, and translate the information for the public:
How to figure out what to do with the data has been a challenging learning process. It is
not self-evident how to present the data to the public. The AAP party identity is centered
on anti-corruption so presentation to the public must be filtered through that lens."09
At the same time, they devised a framework to analyze the project data with the goal of conducting a
citizen-led social audit of public investment projects in the city. Having access to financial information on
so many projects and limited time and resources, the AAP activists had to economize. The solution, given
AAP's political identity, was to audit a particular type of project:
Though there are many forms of corruption that affect governance, present forms of
corruption that come at the expense of low-income residents.11
07 Interview, 18 June 2017.
108Intrvie, 24 July 2017.
109Interview, 23 July 2017.
"O Interview, 18 June 2015.
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Having analyzed the information in the GPMS system, the AAP analytics team set selection rules for
determining the public investment projects to audit. First, the project had to be what they considered
"high value" with a minimum of 20 lakhs ($33,000) pending payment. Second, the project had to be
visible "from the street" and the project description in the GPMS system had to be clear. This criterion
precluded maintenance projects. Third, the locations of the projects should be scattered across the
assembly constituency, zone, or ward because the purpose was to be seen in public doing things. Still,
preference was given:
To standing committee heads; we look at their wards for big projects and
discrepancies.'
The heads of standing committees are often the most powerful local politicians and therefore highly
visible to the public.
The other financial management information AAP had access to was connected to revenue
administration from the FMS module. In deliberations on possible strategies, the Indian CST shared
reports with the AAP team on the data discrepancies that were contained in the FMS system. These
reports focused primarily on the property tax but also their experience with advertisement taxes and the
use of duplicate demand drafts that were registered in the system. While developing a framework and
strategy for utilizing the expenditure information was not as difficult for the technically adept and
politically saavy AAP activists, developing an approach to the potential use of the revenue information
was more complicated and contentious in discussions.
The revenue information presented a difficult puzzle for the AAP party. One idea for
communicating the revenue information to the public was to present non-compliance according to high
profile elected officials, large corporations, and large landholdings. The shortfall to the BBMP could be
framed as a loss of resources that could be invested in services. The AAP activists could not agree on how
the revenue information might be understood by the public when juxtaposed against the presentation of
the project information. An AAP activist stated the confusion in the following way:
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The question is how to translate to voters. Is weak collection potentially a revenue gain
for the citizen? "12
However, many of the biggest corporations are local and run by individuals who grew up in Bangalore.
Indeed, as an AAP activist concluded:
Infosys, for instance, on property tax, will be unpopular to bring it up in the media
because it is a company that is a "son ofsoil" in Karnataka so there is a lot ofpride in
it./3
While low collection rates and weak enforcement in revenue administration was a clear indicator of poor
performance at the expense of the poor, it was not clear to the AAP activists if this interpretive frame is
shared by citizen voters.
As the social audit mobilization took shape, volunteers evaluating the project needed to be
trained. This was the first large-scale structured activity for the AAP in Bangalore. They had managed to
develop an approach within the timeframe of the elections, but it was not without problems. As one of the
leaders of the social audit described:
AAP is struggling to know who all their volunteers are. Who qualifies? This is a logistical
nightmare. We take whoever turns up to do a social audit because this is a political
mobilization. We just pick up projects from GPMS and send them to the volunteers to
check. 114
The activists started by making initial pilot visits to project sites. Two to three volunteers would make
visits to two or three projects on the same day to learn how to replicate the audit on a larger scale. These
visits were a form of learning-by-doing, because no one had experience interacting with BBMP engineers
on the project site. Specific training would need to be developed to help volunteers deal with a range of
potential situations with BBMP bureaucrats and a clear need to avoid offending engineers or causing
problems because of a failure to prepare for different types of interactions. The training focused on what
to ask of the project engineers present and how to ask it.
12 Interview, 24 July 2017.
U Interview, 18 June 2017.
114 Interview, 18 June 2017.
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During the open campaign period, the AAP activists conducted social audits for 20 projects in
total. For instance, they examined a school construction project in ward 98, Jogupalya, located in central
Bangalore. The Jogupalya school project was for the construction of an 8-room school building.
According to information reported through the GPMS, 40 lakh rupees had already been released. With the
additional information supplied by the pending bills file released by the Administrator, the BBMP was
scheduled to release of an additional 60.5 lakh. Three years into the project, the school building was only
partially completed and the AAP activists, through visual confirmation (civil engineers were connected to
the teams) estimated that the total cost should be 40-50 lakh.
Another audit in central Bangalore, a project for renovation and repair of slum housing in
Neelasandra (Ward 116), found that no improvements had been carried out in the previous year but the
BBMP had been billed 2 crore rupees with another 81 lakh pending payment. The social audit was not
without controversy. When participants went to audit a borewell project in Byatarayanapura (Ward 7), the
joint commissioner of Yelahanka Zone prevented the executive engineer from visiting the project site
with the participants. The story played out in the media and online, but overall the social audit was
conducted with no major disruptions.'1 5 The leaders of the social audit challenged the Administrator to
form a social audit committee in the BBMP, but the Administrator responded that it was not necessary.
During the open period of campaigning while AAP was carrying out the social audit they did not report to
the public any revenue-related details coming out of the BBMP. However, while they did not contribute
to public education on revenue administration, they did assist the Indian CST in augmenting the FMS
database by incorporating property tax payments from the BBMP's online property tax system.
5.5 Discussion
These vignettes are useful to consider how transparency, authority, and legitimacy are constructed
in context. They exhibit the classic characteristics of polycentric regulatory regimes (Black 2008). First,
"5 See 2015. June 26. "BBMP Admin's Transparency Agenda Sparks a Social Audit Controversy." Citizen Matters.
http://bengaluru.citizenmatters.in/bbmp-aap-bangalore-social-audit-controversy-7470.
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the activities of all actors are only partially based on national and subnational law. Second, the
jurisdictional boundaries are unclear. Third, in principle though activities fit within a formal regime of
governance, there are no existing state structures that can render them accountable to specific formalized
standards.
5.5.1 Legitimacy Games
The Indian CST had not followed a conventional software delivery model. Joint ownership
of the two FMIS modules was intentional from the beginning, but opened the Indian CST up to
criticism for not following the conventional policy formula for information and communication
technology projects in ULBs. The OpenSaaS approach was partly based on the experience of
FBAS, which lost the source code during the political transition following S.M. Krishna's term as
Chief Minister. As an open source (i.e. non-proprietary) system, the Indian CST aimed to limit
the risk of corruption in IT contracting and its implications for technology and provider lock-in.
All of these aspects of the social outsourcing model built over the course of six years were targets
in a legitimacy game.
The Indian CST pushed the need for a bank reconciliation beginning in 2014 and continuing
through the integration negotiations, which set up the conditions for the spoiler trap. Although pushing a
bank reconciliation would seem counterproductive when positioned against institutional incumbents in a
negotiation, the Indian CST's position was premised on two factors.1 6 First, of the three parties in the
negotiation, the GPMS-FMS system clearly demonstrated the most pragmatic legitimacy. Indeed, the
characteristics of an ideal system that were described by all participating parties in the negotiations
closely matched the features of the Indian CST's GPMS-FMS technology. Second, it was in the Indian
CST's interest to raise the profile of the GPMS-FMS system through a bank reconciliation, which they
"16 I set aside both the significant evidence supporting the need for a reconciliation and older recommendations for
an audit crafted by the Comptroller & Auditor General (C&AG). At the time, the C&AG's last audit of Bangalore
was in 2009. The ULB-level audits by the BBMP, unless expressly directed by a state government, is a limited
technical audit of budget variance in aggregate revenues and expenditures, major accounting procedures, and a
deeper investigation of 2-4 departments.
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believed a bank reconciliation would trigger public demand for substantive transparency as the technical
issues (i.e. the ICT systems in use in the BBMP) surrounding public financial management would
transition from a matter of simple fact to a matter of public concern (Latour 2008, 2004).
Stated differently, as a social enterprise, the market for the Indian CST's services was far larger
and more varied than the BBMP or other potential clients in the private and public sectors. At certain
times, this aspect of their institutional design confounded the formation and execution of a change
management strategy. Nevertheless, the organization perceived its interests to be broadly aligned with
residents in Bangalore who held political interest in local public financial management. Such a notion of
the market for the Indian CST's services also drove their assumptions about the new administrator
appointed to lead the BBMP following the dissolution of the council. The Indian CST believed that by
conforming to national standards for public sector information technology, in particular the parameters for
e-governance systems in the Smart Cities Mission and Digital India, the administrator would impose the
decision to integrate the Funds Based Accounting System and Integrated Financial Management System
into the GPMS-FMS via the new additional commissioner (finance and IT).
5.5.2 Situated Interests, Situated Fiscal Transparency
The increasing use of digital technologies associated with fiscal transparency raise the critical
issue of whether they create public value and what that value might be. Can public value be created
through mediation of fiscal transparency by extra-governmental organizations? The experience of the
Indian CST and Aam Aadmi Party activists portrays a politics associated strongly with new information
gatekeepers. These gatekeepers restrict, in part, the flow of financial information to the public, while also
serving as organizers that make financial information legible and understandable. This is a transactional
politics, not dissimilar to the classic form of deal making that mutually benefits two parties. The
emphasis, however, is on transactions in the sense of financial information.
That the analysis of financial transactions was connected to the Aam Aadmi Party challenges
conventional notions of expert forms of analysis and representation. The Aam Aadmi Party in Bangalore
had a clear agenda for gaining local political power in local office by advocating for reductions in
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corruption and increasing basic services to low income urban residents. While assembling the analysis to
support the social audit required some form of expertise, the decision rules that went into the selection of
particular projects to send volunteers to audit were generally pro-poor. The focus was not on the
distributional outcomes of any particular category of public investment projects such as roads and
flyovers. The emphasis was on project execution that comes at the expense of the poor.
Still, the justification by the Aam Aami Party activists for not mobilizing around revenue
collection and performance is absent from both research on fiscal transparency and the growing literature
on taxation and the public political agenda in the global South (Brautigam, Fjeldstad, and Moore 2008;
Moore 2004b). The analysis developed by the AAP activists for selecting the projects for the social audit
is consistent with the perspective that citizen activism around fiscal issues in the global South focuses on
reducing corruption and unnecessary waste of public money mainly by groups "speaking for - or in the
name of - citizens defined as potential citizen-beneficiaries of public expenditure" (Moore 2004b, 28).
Nevertheless, the AAP activist's justification for not publicizing or otherwise using the revenue
information was not based on a concern over the social costs of exposing revenue mismanagement to
wealthy taxpayers who will be empowered to "keep 'their' money out of the hands of people whom they
are quick to 'stigmatize' as 'undeserving" (Moore 2004b, 26). Rather, one part of the dilemma is based on
the perception of a future loss of an implicit income subsidy."' The other part of the dilemma, to which
the justification was directed, manifests in terms of a political loss function based on the social identity of
taxpaying entities.
The Aam Aadmi Party's focus on discrete transaction information in government financial
management information systems is a unique type of political activity. For instance, the emphasis is
"7 In his study of the origins of the property tax revolt in California, Martin (2008) argues that a similar
interpretation - under-collection as a form of income subsidy - was broadly shared by home owners facing the
property tax but who, at the time, benefited from lower tax bills as a result of fractional assessment practices. The
revolt that ensued was not against taxation per se, but against the loss of an implicit tax privilege that operated as a
large-scale social program. While that income subsidy came from widespread fractional assessment practices and
not low collection rates like in Bengaluru, the political dilemma of establishing interpretative frames to translate a
matter of fact (i.e. under-collection) into a matter of concern on a public political agenda is equivalent in the two
cases.
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clearly distinguishable from that of the social movements that led to the Right to Information Act in India.
The focus is on transactional activity, which is different than on whether or not citizens have received
ration cards or final benefits of government welfare schemes (Goetz and Jenkins 2001). This subtle
difference points to the potential for rising conflict as private technology firms, or quasi-private software
developers organized as social enterprises, increase their involvement in financial management in
municipal governments in India. The Aam Aadmi Party's ability to articulate a pro-poor vision out of the
mass of information supplied to them by the Indian CST, and the Indian CST's ability to connect and
work with the Aam Aadmi activists even while facing pressure from internal negotiations in the BBMP,
culminated in the social audit of BBMP projects in the midst of local elections.
Could something similar happen with software firms seeking private gain through profits? When
private actors develop proprietary tools driven by an investment in speculative norms and ideologies,
quite the opposite of information democratization and financial transparency is the result. In quasi -market
spaces, firms carve out separate spaces. Technology firms sell proprietary systems to local governments
that do not understand, on a collective level, what they mean. As the discussion of the "spoiler trap"
showed, the Indian CST had the upper hand on the most relevant rational choice criteria: least cost option,
highest social impact, and meeting technical and other standards of national urban policy. Yet, the spoiler
trap partially set by the Indian CST's insistence on reconciliation of the BBMP's bank accounts
threatened their position as a hub of transaction processing and information aggregation in the financial
management system of the BBMP.
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Ch. 6 Trespassing Boundaries between State and Society
6.1 Introduction
The last chapter revealed how situated fiscal transparency is constructed within issue networks
spanning the supply and demand sides of reform. The chapter examined how such issue networks for
transparency work in practice, mediated by information technology and path dependency in highly
contentious local contexts characterized by high levels of incomplete information. This chapter takes the
analysis a step further, examining the progressive expansion of the transparency network to more
powerful state actors located at a higher level of the political system. What were the implications for
political accountability as a result of the decentered governance of the production of public financial
management between institutional incumbents and challengers? The previous chapter concluded with the
formation of a transparency issue network aided in part by reciprocal relations between the Indian CST
and the AAP activists. The low visibility strategy by the Indian CST to avoid the spoiler trap was aided
by pushing for the hard demand for bank reconciliation. This chapter focuses on how accountability
mechanisms operate in such a competitive environment for technology services within local public
financial management.
Through changes in Indian CST's strategy as a result of contingent responses to political
dynamics, we can observe how the role of municipal accounting shifts away from a neutral technique for
managerial control, given cover by the ostensibly rational premises for FMIS implementation that were
described during the integration committee meetings in the past chapter. Rather, IT-mediated public
financial management shifts to the more radical terrain of counting "not the visible, but the invisible"
(Meyer 1986, 351). In doing so, a stronger political basis is formed for fiscal knowledge and for
trespassing institutional boundaries that would otherwise reinforce fragmentation of public financial
management functions and reinforce information closure in the fiscal domain. This chapter unpacks how
the ambiguity of IT-driven public financial management opens up a space for mediation and novelty and,
in doing so, a new institutional terrain for political accountability.
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6.2 Stranger than Fiction? Social Outsourcing and the Necessity of Asserting Administrative Fact
The distinctions in the building state capability approach between thin and thick information and
accountability add up to a particularly stark contention about the possibility of accountability in settings
where individuals' "accounts" and organizational "accounting" diverge. As a form of survival strategy,
organizations can "fix" the accounting and in doing so make "administrative facts" of accounting out of
total fiction. This is the classic assertion that public sector bureaucrats are incentivized to manipulate
financial management information to ensure compliance. When such social norms have taken hold in a
particular bureaucracy (private or public sector), there is little possibility for the work of crafting numbers
and financial reports out of mass transactions to fix substantive accountability. Yet, as Quattrone (2015)
and other critical accounting scholars point out, accounting works not just as a coercive tool of control but
can serve enabling purposes. While the building state capability framework asserts that fixing the
accounting will likely not fix accountability (Andrews, Pritchett, and Woolcock 2016), where does that
leave new social enterprises that are intent on building efficient, effective, transparent, and accountable
public financial management systems over time? What can be done?
As this chapter will show, there are a range of purposes to which the selective construction of
administrative fact can be put to use in a setting full of fiction. While fixing the accounting may only
temporarily fix the principle-agent accountability problems in local public financial management, the
question, as Quattrone asked, remains: "how is one able to provide an explanation and an authoritative
account if the account cannot produce a positive knowledge of reality and cannot find authority in its
ability to generate transparency?" (Quattrone 2015, 13). When the accounting project of an FMIS internal
to government has failed, a social reconstitution of accounting requires social relationships and alternative
modes of transparency. Put differently, when the different financial management information systems
(FMIS) within a municipal government lose legitimacy due to multiple historical and contemporaneous
factors, municipal accounting must still continue in some form. This imperative is achieved by continuing
to build relationships with diverse internal and external stakeholders through alternative networks.
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6.2.1 Reading the Political Moment
The failure to convince the new Special Commissioner (Finance and IT) during the reconstituted
integration committee deliberations provoked a reassessment of the Indian CST's strategy and the
prospects for their technological solution in the BBMP. Having worked with five different municipal
commissioners and four chief ministers, the organization was accustomed to changes in the senior
leadership of the municipal corporation. Based on the governance history of the BBMP, the Indian CST's
OpenSaaS model was purposively designed to withstand frequent changes in senior leadership. The social
enterprise was accustomed to changing the behavioral assumptions it attributed to state government
officials and various senior officers in the BBMP to guide their organizational strategy, though they were
not immune to internal disagreements about whether a low or high visibility strategy was more
appropriate. During the interim period between dissolving the BBMP and the council elections, the Indian
CST did not always exert a consistent position with respect to their counterparts in the BBMP. As a
senior manager in the Indian CST reflected during a strategy discussion:
We have to show them the way and lead them by the nose. But we want them to take
ownership so we want them to get the glory to say that they did it. If we say that we did it,
we will have one momentary adulation and satisfaction and recognition but it will not get
institutionalized. Because jealousies will come in, vested interests will get aroused, and
we will get targeted for destruction. I would like to do it by being in the shadows where
others think we should lead the way." 8
The personnel in the BBMP had changed significantly. The political context had changed. Almost
everything had changed, except the technology organizations supporting the municipal corporation. Both
the special commissioner (projects) and the special officer (finance) who initiated the GPMS and FMS
projects had rotated out of their positions by the end of 2014, so the organization did not have the internal
foothold with senior management it had relied on for the previous six years. Following the show-cause
notice issued by Chief Minister Siddaramaiah in March 2015, the Indian CST assumed that the
administrator would be inclined to collect as much revenue as possible given two strong local incentives:
to clear the backlog of payments to contractors and to spend available resources in the lead up to local
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118 Interview, 2 December 2015.
elections were the trifurcation process to fail. As a subcontractor to the BBMP for public financial
management, the common refrain about the "cash strapped" BBMP was a baseline incentive to continue
to experiment and push for further reforms:
"There is no revenue" this response from the BBMP actually reinforces people's efforts
to go after revenue. 1 9
The Indian CST requested repeat meetings with the administrator in order to explain their
approach to financial management information systems and the value of the OpenSaaS model. While the
initial meetings focused on the history of the GPMS and FMS systems in the BBMP, they continued to
emphasize the issue of floating funds (i.e. funds not remitted to the nodal bank account) in the BBMP that
had been a constant theme of their engagement with the city. The work of the AAP activists augmenting
the property tax records contained in the Financial Management System (FMS) allowed the Indian CST to
update the bank reconciliation report it had formerly submitted to the BBMP commissioner. Though the
Indian CST's report could only present a partial perspective of the overall financial performance of the
BBMP, the organization could define a set of irregularities they thought would merit triggering a bank
reconciliation on the part of the administrator.
When the Financial Management System (FMS) receipt module was introduced, the circulars (i.e.
directives) issued during deployment demanded that opening and closing bank balances were to be
uploaded daily. 20 It was these early design decisions that shaped how the type of accounting service the
external IT-provider was able to offer the corporation. In their updated 2015 reconciliation report, the
Indian CST included the compliance rate for reporting opening and closing bank account statements,
transaction details that confirmed the use of duplicate demand drafts at payment offices, and the
119 Interview, 24 November 2015.
120 According to the circulars, payments must be deposited into a bank account by the end of the day and the bank
must reconcile and report the deposit both internally and externally to government accountants. The deposits in the
governments accounts are recorded against the obligation of the resident and this record must be maintained in order
to avoid tax disputes. The bank must report back to the BBMP, which chooses to use or not use this information in
their budgeting, capital planning, and cash management activities. The information originating with the taxpayer and
revenue officer's transaction then must travel up the chain of delegation to mid-level managers in the zones (i.e.
deputy commissioners) and from there to managers in the BBMP's head office.
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difference between receipt totals in FMS and reported collection by the BBMP published in the
corporation's budget documents from 2011-12 to 2014-15. The report focused on 15 revenue codes (each
corresponding to a different tax or fee levied by the BBMP) in which the actual collection reported by the
BBMP was lower than the total registered by the FMS. The difference amounted to 7,997.66 crores
($1.24 billion).'2
In one of their final meetings with the administrator before the council elections, the Indian CST
presented the updated reconciliation report and argued their case that the BBMP could rely on the GPMS-
FMS system not only to mobilize revenue but also to help qualify the city for the following round of the
Smart Cities Mission competition. The assumption that the administrator could be persuaded to go after
"floating funds" held in the hundreds of BBMP bank accounts and, in doing so, would be receptive to the
Indian CST's demonstration of pragmatic worth proved partially correct. The administrator reported back
to the Indian CST that following a review of the reconciliation report, he had collected more than 500
crores ($83.3 million) of floating funds, tax and fee revenue that officers had failed to remit to the
consolidated ("nodal") account of the BBMP. While another small win demonstrating the pragmatic
legitimacy of the Indian CST's technology model, the amount was only a small portion of the funds
estimated to remain outside the BBMP's central account.
The BBMP council elections were finally held at the end of August 2015 and the Bharatiya Janata
Party won 100 of 198 seats, serving to rebuke Chief Minister Siddaramaiah and the broader Congress
Party's stewardship of the BBMP. A month later revenue officers received a circular ordering them to
cease using the Indian CST's Financial Management System (FMS) and to begin processing receipts in
121 Report Regarding Reconciliation of All BBMP Bank Accounts. 29 May 2015. It is important to point out that the
Indian CST did not have a precise understanding of the status of the BBMP's bank accounts. The estimate was made
in the context of FMS transactions cross-referenced with BBMP budget information. Nevertheless, as I described in
chapter five the FMS system was intentionally designed to make these kind of estimates, which are largely
operational numbers. In accounting research, operational numbers are understood as "the numerical surface form of
an underlying reality which is qualitative in character" (Gillies 2004, 190).
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BBMP payment offices through the Integrated Financial Management System (IFMS). 22 The Indian
CST's FMS experienced a precipitous decline in use following the order at the end of September, though
many revenue officers continued to use the system over the next two months. In addition to abandoning
the FMS, the BBMP ordered the consolidation and closure of existing bank accounts down to 25, though
it would only report that it had successfully done so months later. The Indian CST's memorandum of
understanding (MoU) was still in effect (expiring in February 2016) and the organization was beginning
conversations with the Engineer-in-Chief, who wanted to reintroduce the Global Project Management
System (GPMS) to support project management for the "major works" category of projects in the BBMP.
6.3 Advancing the Transparency Issue Network into the Arena of Political Accountability
In consultation with an array of local actors, the Indian CST once gain had to carefully adapt their
strategy. Following discussions with accounting specialists in the Indian CST, it was thought that the
decision to consolidate the number of BBMP bank accounts should have triggered a bank reconciliation
and wider financial audit, according to the Karnataka Municipalities Accounting and Budgeting Rules
(2006). While the Indian CST acknowledged the potential reputational consequences as a result of project
"failure," the integration committee deliberations clearly demonstrated the ongoing operational risks
associated with the financial management information systems that remained in the BBMP. The
transaction intensiveness of Bangalore's financial system creates acute risk of system failure, with
cascading effects beginning with loss of information and foregone revenue. The value of shared
ownership in the Indian CST's OpenSaaS model was the redundancy it provided to the existing financial
information infrastructure in the BBMP. Mid-level bureaucrats had already confirmed discrepancies
between their records and those of the head office, which the Indian CST could validate given the
renewed version control achieved by updating the property tax and pending bill payments.
112 The circular was reported to have been issued by the IT-advisor, though no instructions were issued to the Indian
CST. The Special Commissioner (Finance and IT) was later quoted in a news article claiming that the BBMP was
developing a web-based information system.
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Leaders at the Indian CST considered three main options for action, though approaching the head
office was not viable given the order to cease using the FMS to issue receipts.
Three options are available right now besides bringing it to the notice of the head office
or the hierarchy. Take it to public domain. Take it to the legislature or the people who
are entitled to ask questions in the legislature who won the election. Or take it to the
judiciary for fixing accountability.
During the summer months, the Indian CST had updated the GPMS-FMS systems based on the
deliberations during the integration committee meetings. One of these updates included displaying
property tax information, both payment history and arrears, beyond simply the ward scale all the way
down to the street level. The idea was that while local politicians may not be interested in aggregate
figures, they might be persuaded to initiate property tax collection drives on the basis of disaggregated
collection and arrear information. The Indian CST first approached the new mayor and the deputy
commissioner (revenue), both of whom were new to their posts, with a separate property tax report that
showed the top ten uncollected property tax payments by highest tax liability. The organization continued
to approach various political and administrative leaders, including the director of accounting at the
Karnataka Municipal Reforms Cell.
They also began a strategy of further expanding the issue network in order to outflank the
dominant actors inside the BBMP. Drawing on their resources, the Indian CST began an organizing
approach which Clegg (2010, 10) has described as combining "skilled analysis, deployments, and
coordination grounded in local knowledge with which to outflank dominant actors with superior
resources." Various pathways of organizing support were pursued, some more stealth than others. The
goal was to maintain two fronts: (1) continue attempting to persuade BBMP officers of the value of the
GPMS-FMS systems while (2) contributing to a public interest litigation (PIL) case against the BBMP.
The latter would need much wider support from various organizations and politicians in Bangalore and
have to be carefully considered since it was not immediately apparent what qualified as a legitimate
evidentiary basis for such a case.
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12 Interview, 15 October 2015.
6.3.1 Right to Information (RTI) Requests
Building on the connections that grew out of the political mobilization around the AAP's social
audit during the summer months, the now durable network of organizations and activists began
coordinating a series of right-to-information (RTI) applications intended to increase collective
understanding of the current status of the PFM system in the BBMP and support the formulation of the
public interest litigation. The RTI requests would not only target a broad range of "thin" revenue and
expenditure information in the BBMP, but also "thick information" by triangulating details about service
agreements among the FMIS providers to the BBMP and the set of "waivers" or "exemptions" to
provisions in two key legal frameworks guiding PFM in the BBMP. Table 6.1 below lists the information
that was requested. Individuals from various organizations, including the Namma Bengaluru Foundation,
Whitefield Rising, Forward Foundation, along with many of the activists who had participated in the
AAP-led social audit, volunteered to submit the RTI applications. 4
Table 6.1 Information Requested in RTI Applications
Information Relevant Actors
Intergovernmental transfers and external funds Government of India, Karnataka Government,
World Bank, Asian Development Bank, Japan
International Cooperation Agency (JICA)
Agency details, service agreements, service levels, FBAS, GPMS-FMS, IFMS, GIS
compensation for all FMIS in the BBMP
Number of wards covered, steps taken to include FBAS
additional wards for FBAS
Purpose of BBMP waivers from National Municipal State Finance Department
Account Manual and Karnataka Municipal
Accounting and Budget Rules (2006)
Council approval to open 25 new bank accounts in Municipal council, Special Commissioner
Canara Bank (closure of 900+ accounts) (Finance); Accounts Department
The other objective of the RTI requests was to cross-reference any information provided by the
BBMP with information contained in the GPMS-FMS systems. The Indian CST was not concerned about
124 Studies using randomized control trial methods have demonstrated that RTI requests in India are effective for
gaining access to public goods among poor or disadvantaged groups in New Delhi (Peisakhin and Pinto 2010).
Government institutions have 30 days to respond to a RTI request and the only recourse to refusal is on the basis of
national security interests. In practice, there are often delays and public information officers can claim any number
of reasons for why paperwork processing was delayed. Some of the RTI requests were ignored by the BBMP, with
activists taking recourse to "back channel methods" to get the information.
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differences as their information management system was designed to be open to the public and to support
"real-time" auditing of the BBMP. Thus, a strategic aim was to get swept up in the bank reconciliation
and broader BBMP audits in order to gain normative legitimacy to complement the pragmatic legitimacy
they had built up around the functionality of the system. In aggregating as much information as possible
in as short a period as possible, the network was also following a core principle of fiscal administration -
"that there is a difference between an 'auditor' knowing... and having sufficient evidence to sustain a
court finding to that extent" (Slemrod and Yitzhaki 2002, 1448). Within a two-month period, the issue
network had submitted 34 RTI applications to the public information office at the BBMP and had
received responses for more than half of them.
6.3.2 Micro-Inquiries
In order to strengthen the draft of the public interest litigation and lower the "adjudication costs"
(Andrews, Pritchett, and Woolcock 2016; Pritchett 2013) of the public interest litigation court case, and to
continue building their portfolio of diagnostic PFM services to the BBMP, the Indian CST began a series
of micro-investigations on the available information in the Financial Management System (FMS).1 2 5 The
first fee base they focused on was rent payments the city received for leasing out space in public
buildings. They identified a building on MG Road, the main thoroughfare in the heart of the city. They
picked a utility building with 100 tenants, assuming that the monthly yield from such a large public
property could potentially be a windfall gain and that with so many units they should expect some errors
related to the transaction. For each unit, there are three monthly bills - water, electricity, and rent - and
the water and electricity utilities used unique payment ID numbers. Rental fees for the BBMP were not
collected on the basis of a unique ID, so each time the city government received payment the assistant
revenue officer was required to type in the payee's business name. In a single year, they found that one
shopkeeper had given fifteen different descriptions for their business name for their unit in the city's MG
"' Under the Memorandum of Understanding (MoU) held between the BBMP and the Indian CST, these analyses
always got written up into short memos or reports and circulated among the commissioner and other senior officers
(Revenue and Finance in particular) in the BBMP.
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Road property. This made it very difficult to automate the analysis of payment data and limited the
traceability of payments unless a dedicated analysis was made.
In their quick investigation, the Indian CST found that the annual yield for that BBMP property
had incrementally declined over the previous three years. During the investigation of the rental payments,
the Indian CST analyst also discovered that in addition to non-compliance, there were a few data entry
errors in some of the more recent receipt payments. For instance, one of the monthly payments was
supposed to be for 10,000 rupees. The description portion on the receipt clearly noted "monthly receipt."
However, the assistant revenue officer had entered 1 lakh 10,000 (i.e. 1 10,000). As this amount was
wrong (no rental unit leased for 110,000 rupees a month), any income statement made on the basis of this
information would not accurately reflect the BBMP's financial position. To the Indian CST's knowledge,
no one had tried to correct the entry. The finding was alarming to the organization, though not surprising
given they had been steadily isolated from internal management as they pushed for the bank
reconciliation late in 2014.
The evidence from these quick inquiries fed into both advocacy efforts with BBMP officers and
the development of the public interest litigation. The organization also began contacting joint
commissioners (i.e. zonal commissioners) to offer the FMS product as a data analytics service. Over the
past three years, the Indian CST had automated a number of reporting formats and with new updates to
the code, end users could easily visualize the location of property tax arrears on a GIS map. From the
initial design and deployment, the objective of FMS was always to decentralize control over revenue
management to joint commissioners (i.e. executive officer of zone) and then to hold them accountable for
their performance. Through informal coordination mechanisms, the Indian CST contacted the joint
commissioner of Mahedavapura. The joint commissioner had been recently promoted by the chief
minister and therefore presented a strong opportunity to promote the new model of FMS as a financial
analytics service that could potentially get a direct connection to the chief minister.
In order to demonstrate the new FMS features, the Indian CST asked the joint commissioner to
confirm whether ten instances of property tax arrears registered in the FMS system were similarly
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registered in the joint commissioner's system. Of the ten properties, the joint commissioner had collected
property tax on seven but they were not reflected in the property tax GIS system. Ultimately, though the
joint commissioner experimented with the new version of the FMS system, he declined to adopt the
system fully claiming that it would require permission from the head office. Yet,just as the integration
committee meetings had provided useful information to the Indian CST, the discussions during these
meetings also proved useful to both the joint commissioner and the Indian CST. It allowed the joint
commissioner to identify property tax arrears that were missing in the main GIS property tax system and
the Indian CST to better understand the suite of technologies the Joint Commissioner relied on for
financial management. While the joint commissioner had previously relied on FMS to issue receipts and
track daily collection yields, the joint commissioner used a range of software systems to monitor
performance in his zone including the GIS property tax system, FMS (until it was repealed), MS Excel,
and the set of manual cash books and payment registers.
6.4 Litigating Accounting in the Public Interest
The Indian CST also connected with Namma Bengaluru Foundation, founded by Rajeev
Chandrasekhar. 2 6 The Namma Bengaluru Foundation recognized the Indian CST with their annual award
in 2013 for the organization's work on e-governance and public financial management with the BBMP.
Namma Bengaluru Foundation along with Forward Foundation agreed to help coordinate the public
interest litigation, including selecting the lawyer to submit the case to the Karnataka High Court. The
public interest litigation was considered the last option. With coordination led by the Namma Bengaluru
Foundation, MP Chandrasekhar would lead the engagement on the public interest litigation.
The financial management problems of the BBMP were well known publicly, but as the AAP
party activists described when designing the social audit, it is difficult to educate the public and politicize
the issue if you do not know the "numbers." As one of the leads managers from the Namma Bengaluru
126 Rajeev Chandrasekhar (BJP) was in his second six-year term as a Member of the Rajya Sabha, the upper house of
Indian parliament. He sat on the Consultative Committee on Finance and was Co-Chairman of District Development
Coordination and Monitoring, Bangalore Urban District.
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Foundation described, numbers are in many ways simply an answer without a question. Nevertheless,
they are essential in order to ground a situated inquiry into a highly contentious, highly opaque area of
urban governance. Reflecting on the Indian CST's position in the emerging transparency and
accountability issue network, the lead officer concluded:
You see they have a MoU with the government. And from that MoU they have information
on the projects and how much revenue was collected and by looking at that information I
find out answers. And then only can I learn what are the questions I should be asking.2 7
The issue network took a ratcheting approach beginning with a simple threat of action. The initial plan
focused on writing to officially notify the Comptroller and Auditor General of the status of the BBMP's
financial management systems and issuing a white paper or similar report. In a series of meetings in late
2015, it was concluded that such an approach would neither publicize nor politicize the issue to the degree
needed.1 28 Instead, Rajeev Chandrasekhar issued a public letter (see figure 6.1 below) to the chief minister
citing "evidence provided by concerned citizens and NGOs" related to the number of bank accounts in
operation and the failure to remit revenue collected to the central account of the corporation. The letter
requested the Chief Minister to order an audit by the Comptroller and Auditor General (CAG) and
threatened to take legal recourse if no action was taken by Siddaramaiah.
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127 Interview, 24 November 2015.
128 Interview, 3 November 2015.
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Sub: Request Ordering a CAG Audit into 88MP Accounts
I write this letter in continuation to my letters written to you previously on 16* December
2013 and 2' April 2015 about the problems facing our city Bengaluru and in particular
the rompant malgoveroonce that is causing these problems.
Most of the problems facing the city today - bod roads, inadequate gorbage
management capacities etc are being blamed on lock of financial resources. In
December 2013, I had highlighted the issue of loopholes in revenue collection and
leakages and I am writing again to draw your attention to the rampant and deliberole
mismanagement of the SBMP Finances resulting in thousands of croes of rupees of its
revenues including tox collected from citizens being siphoned off and not being used for
the development of our city.
It has been brought to my notice by several concerned citizens and NGOs that hundreds
of crates of tax receipts and revenues collected by BBMP have not been credited into the
main bank accounts but deposited in miscellaneous accounts by some officials in BBMP. 11
is learnt that over 900 bank accounts are being operated by the 86MP officials. Such a
large number of bank accounts for one institution located within the some city calls for
inquiry as to how these accounts are opened and operated in various public sector and
private sector Banks I understand that subsequently these accounts are being
consolidolted into 25 occounts, but the issue of the performance in the post of these over
900 accounts remains unanswered or unquestioned.
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MP Chandrasekhar also wrote to all 28 MLAs from Bangalore (BJP, Congress, JD-S, and
independents) to attend a public consultation on the status of the BBMP's financial management
practices. Six MLAs1 29 attended along with representatives from civil society organizations which were
given time to discuss their concerns with water supply, sanitation, and other urban services. The primary
objective of the meeting was to explain the financial issues surrounding the BBMP management and to
develop a citizen charter that included financial management and a strategy for social mobilization."'
129 Attendees included members of the Rajya Sabha and Lok Sabha, seven from the BJP, one from Congress Party,
and one Independent. MP Chandrasekhar is a member of the BJP party, which likely explains why more BJP MPs
attended.
10 These discussions would later become the Namma Bengaluru Foundation - Citizen Partnership movement which
draws from many of the Indian CST's principles of transparent and accountable goverance of public financial
management. See http://cp.namma-bengaluru.org/NBF-CP-SaveBengaluru-Charter.pdf.
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6.4.1 Making the Case and a Response: Complexity of the Policy Formula
The Chief Minister initially responded that the Government of Karnataka needed time and would
look into the matter. When Siddaramaiah failed to initiate the C&AG audit, the Namma Bengaluru
Foundation and MP Chandrasekhar introduced public interest litigation against five parties (i.e.
"respondents"): the Government of India (Ministry of Finance, Urban Development Department, and
Comptroller and Auditor General), the State Government of Karnataka, and the BBMP. The public
interest litigation case was filed on December 19, 2015 in Karnataka High Court."' In order to make the
case on the merits of the public interest litigation, the transparency and accountability issue network that
was building in Bangalore used the public interest litigation to "scale up" accountability claims to the
highest levels of the Government of India in an effort to influence higher level decision-making (Fox
2007). Under the prevailing policy formula for public financial management in ULBs in Karnataka, all
five parties have a significant role in the governance of PFM in the BBMP.
What is intriguing, however, is that the emphasis on the procedural roles of actors located
vertically in the intergovernmental fiscal system heavily shapes how the relationship between public
financial management and urban governance is framed in the petition. The writ petition does conclude
that:
Thus, maintenance of accounts and its audit is a constitutional function that goes at the
heart of local governance.
This is the only reference to local governance in the writ petition. Instead, local auditing is framed as an
intergovernmental issue. The public interest litigation is filed on the basis that all five respondents
(Government of India, State of Karnataka, and BBMP) failed to conduct an audit of the BBMP through
the Government of Karnataka. The purpose of the public interest litigation is to ensure that the BBMP is
audited, that the process is initiated by the Karnataka government, and that the audit is carried out by the
Comptroller and Auditor General (CAG). After describing the expenditure responsibilities and local
"I Karnataka High Court. 2015. Writ Petition 58006.
112 Karnataka High Court. 2015. Writ Petition 56006, p. 17.
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revenue assignment (mainly the property tax) to the BBMP, the weight of justification for the audit is
based on the BBMP's dependence on intergovernmental transfers from the Center and state government.
The evidence of the need for an audit includes previous CAG reports on ULB audits and news articles
over the previous four years that indicate financial irregularities or improprieties in the BBMP.
Grounds for the case in support of the BBMP audit are advanced on the basis of "the failure of
Respondent 2 [Government of Karnatakal to manage the accounts of Respondent 4 IBBMPI in a manner
envisaged under the Constitution as well as the Karnataka Municipal Corporations Act, 1976 amounts to
dereliction of their constitutional duties and a systematic breakdown of the rule of law" (p. 21). These
grounds come before the provisions on local accountability of ULBs in the 74th Constitutional
Amendment Act (Part IX-A). The public interest litigation goes on to outline the responsibilities of all the
respondents with respect to national and state-level laws and regulations. The writ petition concludes by
requesting the court to step in and issue an "appropriate writ, order, or direction in the nature of
mandamus" to induce the Government of Karnataka to order a CAG audit of the BBMP.
Following the first hearing during which the writ petition was filed, the public interest litigation
case adjourned. In the second hearing on February 26, 2016 the BBMP filed their response to the public
interest litigation. At the hearing, the Union Government lawyers asked for more time to file objections to
the public interest litigation. The CAG filed their response during the third hearing on March 10, 2016.
The BBMP responded that it has been continuously audited as per section 150 and Part II of the Financial
Rules in Schedule 11 to the KMC Act 1976 (KMC), has a chief Auditor, and has conducted audits as per
the provisions of the KMC Act 1956. More importantly, the BBMP replied that it no longer had 900 bank
accounts open under its legal jurisdiction, but had closed and consolidated their account structure down to
25 accounts.' The response of the CAG was that the BBMP did not follow key rules in the Karnataka
Municipal Corporation Act 1976 for the submission of their audit reports. Therefore, the accounts as
submitted were not "authentic." As they were not authentic reports, the CAG could not audit them.
1 Sreenidhi Law Chambers. Statement of the Objections of the Respondent No. 4, BBMP. 2015. (p. 7).
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6.5 Discussion
6.5.1 The Paradox of Operational Information
The ambiguity of the financial information circulating in Bangalore did not discourage collective
organizing. Rather, for the Indian CST, the operational information incentivized regular face-to-face
interaction and, over time, drew actors together in punctuated moments where controversy and other
dilemmas rose to the surface of local politics. Though the Indian CST and other actors were aware that
financial information available to them was operational in nature, they still managed to make it useful in
the context of their interests given the incentives they faced. While the prevalence of high or low-quality
information does not directly trigger the functioning of transparency and accountability relations in local
governance, the way different actors assembled information for their own purposes suggests skilled actors
can find creative ways to use what is available to them to circulate partial perspectives on fiscal
performance even in difficult circumstances.
While the financial management information systems initiatives under investigation did
temporarily modify levels of capability and managerial relations and improve internal accountability, the
expected benefits were not achieved. The complexity and political aspects of generating fiscal
transparency were considerable. However, the FMIS initiatives did help with the convergence of a
number of actors that, over time, have constructed a durable issue network spanning the supply and
demand sides of reform. Such convergence raises questions about the use of financial information for
accountability. Did relevant actors connect the vast information accumulated on the GPMS-FMS systems
to political exposure of high profile politicians responsible for stewardship over the BBMP's resources?
This did not happen in the case of the public interest litigation. The Indian CST and other actors focused
on "outliers" or "aberrant cases" as a device to seek political accountability. However, no specific
politicians beyond the executive branch of state government were directly addressed in the public interest
litigation.
Thus, neither exposure of well-known politicians in "exceptional cases" nor idiosyncratic, more
mundane exposure of the everyday management of financial resources made it into the public view.
196
While the Indian CST's politics internal to the BBMP constituted a politics of (partially automated)
measurement, the approach was not extended into pervasive and powerful demonstrations in the public
interest litigation. Indeed, the public interest litigation relied more on news media reports over the
preceding decade as evidence than it did on the visualizations of the Indian CST's reports to the BBMP
officers over the same time period. While the public interest litigation played out following my departure
from field research, the avoidance of concrete transaction information that could have easily been tied to
politicians and officers perhaps reveals the fault line of private and public "transactions" in public
financial management and how these distinctions are currently problematic in the current state of urban
politics in India. The GPMS-FMS, like all digital financial management information systems, are
powerful devices for recording traces of transactions and aggregating them into new forms and formats in
order to elicit accounts and accountability (Ruppert and Savage 2011).
6.5.2 Ex-Post Accountability
Knowledge of public funds not swept into the consolidated account of the BBMP motivated the
Indian CST to continue pushing for a reconciliation of the BBMP's accounts. This knowledge was
translated into a public interest litigation by MP Chandrasekhar. Following Fox's (Fox 2015) distinction
between tactical and strategic approaches to social accountability, the strategy adopted by the Indian CST
would seem to fall into the latter. The organization connected to a rising political party in Bangalore,
while also linking to politicians in state government. That is to say, they jumped between institutional
scales when the opportunity was presented, or when previous pathways of change were foreclosed.
The study has classified the assemblage of these actors as an issue network that focuses narrowly
on transparency and accountability of local financial management. The issue network is not self-
organizing, but rather is mutually constituted by the socio-technical arrangements that pull the various
actors together. These actors do not constitute an online "mob," but rather are pulled together through
mutual interests in both information technology and how it gets embedded in local governments (Ruppert
and Savage 2011). However, in the case of Bangalore, information technology in the form of financial
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management information systems technologies has led to a particular type of accountability through ex
post litigation.
For the period under examination, the technology development, the situated transparency, and the
broader organizing efforts did not lead to new legal strategies that would negotiate new support for reform
and changed policies on the "terms" of the issue network. Citizens were not drawn into financial
management at earlier stages of the process, but rather helped contribute to litigating the BBMP's
financial management efforts in the forum of the Indian court system. This was not a case of deepening
democracy(Appadurai 2001), at least for the period under investigation. For urban politics in the fiscal
domain of municipal government in Bangalore, the traditional conservative pathways of accountability
triumphed. These are old modes of litigation. Despite more information acquired and legitimized through
processes of social inquiry, the reliable tactic for citizen organizations is still the common institution of
the judiciary. That enough financial information can be assembled to sue through public interest litigation
for an audit is a positive development. It reifies the role of courts because there is so much uncertainty
and entrenched interest. In fact, the courts are the only truly independent actor.
Nevertheless, ex post accountability is not enough to stimulate changes to public financial
management institutions, at least for the time being. The idea that technology services should have
prevented actors from taking the litigation route is a common argument advanced in their favor. Yet, it
took three years from the time the Indian CST began recommending a sweep of the BBMP's accounts and
bank reconciliation initiative for the matter of concern to be raised in the court system in the form of a
public interest litigation. Thus, in order for information democratization of citizens and digital
governance, following need to be addressed in policy: (1) entrenched interest (2) path dependency in
politics and (3) marketization of tools and actors.
Regarding the latter, that the supply of skilled labor can ensure that municipal governments
acquire information technology for financial management at relatively low prices in international
comparison would seem to be a net benefit for the country. This structural factor in Indian software
markets, however, also suggests that municipal governments have an outlet available when the evidence
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indicates they should bear down hard to modify accountability relations. The executive can always order
the adoption of a new system that will fix the ills and mistakes of the previous system, and the cycle (at
least in Bangalore) of encroachment on the formative information communication technology context met




The dissertation has examined the role of technology in local financial management reform in
Bangalore by looking specifically at patterns of inter-organizational coordination and accountability
following the adoption of new financial management information systems in municipal government. The
case of Bangalore is emblematic of larger trends across cities in India, such as growing centripetal
dynamics drawing a wider range of new private and nongovernmental actors into core areas of technical
administration in urban local bodies. Specifically, the study aimed to understand the organizational effects
(i.e. coordination and accountability) of information technology applied to project management, revenue
collection, and cash management in the Bangalore municipal government and the overall relationship of
information technology to capability for policy implementation.
The Indian Centre for Social Transformation (Indian CST) demonstrated an unusual commitment
to supporting public financial management information system design and development in Bangalore,
sustaining engagement at multiple levels for more than six years. 4 From 2009 to 2015 the Indian CST
made strategic updates to the backend of the software and conducted both supply-led and demand-driven
training sessions with BBMP managers, engineers, revenue officers, civil society organizations, and
political party activists. They developed monitoring and reporting practices under conditions of pervasive
uncertainty and organized issue networks spanning the state-society divide. Though not without
imperfections and weaknesses, particularly with respect to the visual design of the user interface, the
modular Global Project Management System and Financial Management System were delivered at an
extremely low cost on an open source, cloud computing platform.
134 It should be noted that while the municipal finance reform is often theorized and conceptualized as a domain of
technical decision-making, actors attempting to implement changes in practice in many urban contexts of the global
South confront an array of direct and indirect threats to their work. For instance, during implementation of the
Indian CST's Global Project Management System, one of the server rooms that hosted the system on the premises of
the BBMP was attacked by an arsonist. Since the Global Project Management System was hosted on a cloud
computing platform, the financial information was not destroyed.
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There was uneven compliance within the engineering hierarchy, even as executive orders (i.e.
notifications) were issued by executive officers at the highest levels of municipal government. While the
revenue hierarchy largely complied with the Financial Management System, the automated receipts did
not end petty corruption. For instance, some distributed bureaucrats in health services in public hospitals
and clinics, still managed to shift demand for bribes from the point of initial entry fee collection to the
window disbursing the treatment card that doctors use to document care. At a more general level, absent
integration with the other PFM information systems, the GPMS-FMS did not achieve the overall goal of
management control across the 198 wards of the BBMP.
Cloud computing is relatively new in municipal governments in India, though the technology is
integral to many of the Government of India's national development plans. The expansion of cloud
computing technology is an important element of the National eGovernance Plan, led by the MeghRaj
component under the Ministry of Electronics & Information Technology (MeitY). In the case of the
BBMP it was the combination of cloud computing with the Indian CST's Software as a Service (SaaS)
model that sustained joint ownership over the financial management information system modules and
drove down information verification costs in the BBMP. There was a correlation between the cost of
information verification and the strongest resistance to the software systems in the BBMP. On the
expenditure side of the budget, verification costs were drastically reduced when the municipal
commissioner ordered that contractor bills be cleared through the GPMS system. On the revenue side of
the budget, adjudication costs had drastically declined by the time the integration committee was
reconstituted by the new additional commissioner (finance and IT).
I have framed the analysis and discussion of financial management information systems (FMIS)
in Bangalore around process (coordination), outcomes (accountability), and values (the role of the state
and non-state actors). I found that coordination occurs through both formal and informal mechanisms and
that successful coordination between concentrated and deconcentrated actors constitutes a form of local
inquiry (Smoke 2015) and discovery through experimentation. An asymmetric approach to integrating
digital and paper-based components of the PFM system was a strategic decision made by senior officers
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in government with the external technology provider, the Indian Centre for Social Transformation. The
asymmetric integration strategy implied the creation of flexible coordination mechanisms between senior
managers and frontline engineers and revenue officers.
The information and knowledge generated through this vertical coordination across concentrated
and deconcentrated agents, however did not lead to horizontal coordination among external information
technology providers. The mismatch between these vertical and horizontal coordination mechanisms
effectively increased the levels of decentered governance in local public financial management. Given the
failure of horizontal coordination among technology providers developing or maintaining FMIS systems
in functional domains of close proximity, the PFM system in Bangalore has increasingly taken the form
of a polycentric regulatory regime marked by complexity, fragmentation, and interdependence between
state and non-state actors in which all serve as regulators and regulated (Black 2008). In such a setting,
the dividing lines between official and unofficial, formal and informal, planned and unplanned are
increasingly blurred.
While the conventional literature rightly points out the political dilemmas and administrative
complexity of different revenue instruments assigned to local governments, it often overlooks the
organizing, mobilizing, and contesting that occurs below the surface of formal political leaders in local
government. Neither does the classic public choice framing of local discretion to comply with policy or
shirk responsibility capture the reality of planning and executing information technology projects for local
public financial management. I have found evidence that even as local governments remain dependent on
intergovernmental transfers, networks of actors carve out substantial autonomy in their effort to make
legible, and assert control over, a multiplicity of parallel practices and procedures for local financial
management. Actions within these networks gain temporary influence over the internal flow of funds and
which urban actors get to participate in foundational processes in local financial reform, but it is
increasingly difficult to sustain control over the process through information technology governance
alone.
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To the extent financial management information systems projects add complexity to the policy
process, the highest transition costs are likely to be concentrated in the early years of reform during which
contractor and internal managerial arrangements are dominated by non-routinized practices. Transparency
sought through outsourcing arrangements can inadvertently add impenetrable layers of bureaucratic
organization to the local context. Where specialization in sub-systems promises efficiency and
effectiveness, it also temporarily increases problem complexity within the system. During the early stages
of change, administrative actors are required to take on extraordinary policy learning efforts.
Specialization magnifies the demands of information for transparency and accountability, while
simultaneously increasing the number of veto points in the chain of "clearing" solutions, and introduces
new coordination problems.
The information set available to the BBMP also changed over time, as the system they installed in
the BBMP provided the foundation for developing experimental engagement in various subsystems on the
expenditure and revenue side of the budget. Information democratization was setting in because, on a
collective level, institutional actors did not fully appreciate what was transpiring. As a result, what
information that was released and circulated in the public domain, did so because it was "hidden in plain
sight." However, as the verification costs of financial information approached the threshold for
adjudication, stress built up in the system and inter-organizational coordination morphed into enterprise
litigation in a context of quasi-market competition. Once institutional actors realized the implications of
what was transpiring, governance relations actually got worse.
7.2 The Politics of Introducing Information Technology into Local Financial Management
The social and political dynamics that I have chronicled in this dissertation are about how local
governments in India increasingly rely on information technology to cope with the dual challenges of
governing cities and implementing local financial management reforms. At the most basic level, the
narratives are about the creativity, ingenuity, and fallibility of senior officers, middle managers, and
external advisors that are forced by necessity to coordinate and make decisions in the midst of both
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incomplete information and shifting policy formulas linked to the senior officers that hold managerial
positions. The study has demonstrated that mid-level managers exercise substantial autonomy through
financial management information system (FMIS) projects.
Like many other cities in India, the BBMP is heavily dependent on intergovernmental transfers
and loans from public and private banks and struggles to manage conditions of rapid urban growth. As of
2015 the fiscal position of the BBMP reflected deep structural problems that remained almost a decade
after the amalgamation (BBMP Restructuring Committee 2015). The BBMP was collecting around 1,800
crores ($300.0 million) in revenue annually from its own tax and fee base, with a property tax collection
rate below 50 percent. The city had pending bills due to contractors estimated at 2,300 crores (U$383.3
million) and maintained a loan balance of around 2,200 crores ($366.6 million). Over 3,000 crores worth
of incomplete projects were carried over from 2014. The two FMIS systems that were the subject of this
study, the Global Project Management System and Financial Management System (GPMS-FMS), did not
solve these structural problems.
As chapters six and seven showed, the adoption of financial management information systems
can take attempts to reform the governance of local financial management on a non-linear and tortured
path. The limited literature on FMIS has noted the consequences that stem from version control problems
when systems remain "stovepiped" along individual components of the local PFM system (Dener,
Watkins, and Dorotinsky 2011; Wescott and Schiavo-Campo 1999). These consequences are often framed
in terms of bureaucratic efficiency and effectiveness and limits to fiscal transparency. The study reveals a
set of other social and political factors that come into perspective, such as spoiler traps and legitimacy
games that transcend the internal divisions of the PFM bureaucracy and their relationship to FMIS
projects.
In such settings, social mobilization becomes the art of assembling partial perspectives and
communicating them within and beyond the state. Ideal types of fiscal transparency, most recently
's The last revision of land guidance values was in 2007.
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captured by the debate on "open budget data," are not possible. The presence of technology providers in
the PFM system both constrain and open up new possibilities. All actors seek to enhance their legitimacy
by asserting the value of specific categories of transactions of the PFM system, which contributes to a
series of legitimacy games. Technology providers, whose legitimacy rests on the success of their products
in ULBs, pitch their competition on debates over the pragmatic and normative legitimacy of the
transactions contained on their platforms. Even political parties play the legitimacy game, publicly
elevating certain transactions they are comfortable with while avoiding ones they are not.
In this final chapter I will discuss the theoretical and practical implications of the governance
processes as described in the previous four chapters. Specifically, I will focus on the role of state and non-
state actors and the ways in which information technology providers either support or retrench
transparency and effectiveness in the concurrent accountability relationships at work in the public sector
as outlined by the building state capability approach: management, politics, and compact. Chapters five
through seven have all presented examples of success and failure in coordination, implementation, and
governance in Bangalore. In the following sections, I will critically reflect on these experiences by asking
the following questions: (1) what is the role of IT-mediated accounting in public financial management
accountability?; and (2) how, and to what extent, do financial management information systems
contribute to implementation capability in municipal government?
To answer these questions and conclude the dissertation, I first synthesize the findings of the
previous chapters and present the merits of IT-mediated financial management, which is deeply
embedded in broader policy transitions within the political economy of decentralization in India. The
study relied on analytical components from the building state capability (BSC) framework, specifically
the principal-agent problems of fixing accountability relations in the public sector. The BSC framework,
however, does not readily acknowledge the material attributes of capability in the organizational context.
The material attributes of capability in local government were the emphasis of much of this study,
particularly how information technology can drive down the cost of adjudicating administrative fact. The
study also emphasized how different actors across the supply and demand sides of reform contribute to
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reducing adjudication costs by lowering the cost of verification of financial information. Notwithstanding
the willingness of common institutions of financial management to convene and make a ruling when
claims of irregularities are asserted by political actors, the study identified three components of
verification costs. The three components are a (1) technical component, a (2) design component, and a (3)
collective action component.
7.3 Capability Traps and the Dilemma of Accounting as Local Inquiry
Are financial management information systems capability traps? Capability traps are defined as
"a dynamic in which governments constantly adopt 'reforms' as signals to ensure ongoing flows of
external financing and legitimacy yet never actually improve" (Andrews, Pritchett, and Woolcock 2013,
235). The conditions which usher in capability traps are: "interventions (1) aim to reproduce particular
external solutions considered 'best practice" in dominant agendas; (2) through predetermined linear
processes; (3) that inform tight monitoring of inputs and compliance to 'the plan,' and (4) are driven from
the top down, assuming that implementation largely happens by edict" (Andrews, Pritchett, and
Woolcock 2013, 235). The dissertation revealed in chapter 3 that ministries and agencies of the national
government are increasingly incentivizing the design and adoption of financial management information
systems in urban local bodies. Nevertheless, the case of the BBMP demonstrates that it is exceedingly
difficult to prescribe predetermined linear processes, generate tight monitoring of inputs and compliance,
and assert implementation of financial management information systems through edict.
The process of financial management information system design and implementation followed an
experimental trajectory that was open-ended, with neither formal compliance nor performance
management as primary aims. The initial implementation of the FMIS systems conformed to the "basics
first" tradition of public financial management reform (Andrews 2006; Schick 1998) because key
technological and institutional features of the operational context restricted each system to improving
financial transaction processing and the redistribution of information. Within the BBMP, the two systems
functioned as highly sophisticated bookkeeping devices. Each attempt to extend the functionality of the
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system and institutionalize them within the BBMP as accountability devices faced stiff resistance. For
local actors that are operating in complex institutional environments characterized by an unclear
institutional mandate, aggregating (thin) operational information is necessary to demand a sufficient
(thick) "account" of bureaucratic behavior in the BBMP.
Outside the BBMP the process of financial management information systems design contributed
to the emergence of novelty in the ecosystem for external organizations. The Indian CST's SaaS model
also afforded the organization the autonomy and flexibility to circulate financial information to improve,
albeit temporarily, transparency within the issue network spanning supply and demand sides of reform
over time. Higher levels of "mediated" transparency and the collective action required to achieve it in a
context of incomplete and asymmetric information also contributed to the public interest litigation case
(PIL) in the Karnataka High Court. The autonomy and flexibility sought by the Indian CST model -
open-ended customization with open source software delivered through a Software as a Service
(OpenSaaS) arrangement - had serious limitations.
7.4 The Limits of Local Inquiry and Implementation Capability
As the Indian CST case demonstrates, technology actors that are external to the
intergovernmental system can and do go back and forth across the state-society divide. They are inside at
core technical areas for years at a time, but can easily be kicked out. These cycles give rise to catalytic,
sometimes watershed moments. These moments are ideologically and normatively driven. Incumbents
realize what they have done, but then they create and assert boundaries. Actors like the Indian CST must
then litigate to get back inside the state and the cycle begins anew. However, even as the Indian CST
sought to get "caught up" in the public interest litigation - via financial audit of the BBMP's accounts -
the state government simply did not comply with the challenge.
Financial management information systems (FMIS), as a mechanism of digital democracy, both
strengthens and erodes local autonomy. There are multiple pathways that have been described in chapters
4-6 but I will strengthen the argument. Following the public interest litigation, political interest in public
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financial management remained high. Having been pushed out of the BBMP, the Indian CST went
searching for a new venue to continue to pursue their agenda. From a strategic standpoint, the State
Finance Commission (SFC) was appropriate. They developed a partnership and were granted a contract to
aggregate, process, and analyze the property tax receipts for all urban local bodies in the state of
Karnataka, including the BBMP.
Table 7.1 describes the characteristics observed in the Indian CST that make them successful
political actors, even as they draw on their resources as technology providers. First, even though digital
financial management information systems require acute attention to technical specifications, the
organizational configurations through which they are delivered to municipal governments require
institutional flexibility due to a dynamic political landscape. Technology actors need to be prepared to
span institutional scales, such as between municipal departments and state government legislative actors.
Flexibility and adaptability to different institutional scales are reinforced by developing a financial
management information system tool that is robust to stress.
Necessary expertise extends beyond the technical domain to include social and political
knowledge and ability to read the local context. Pushing too hard too soon for organizational activities
that will expose the relationships behind powerful actors without having sufficient processes in place to
handle them is likely to throw up considerable roadblocks to further implementation. Finally, even as
certain powerful actors resist deepening the use of IT-systems, local technology providers must be
prepared to move to opportunities beyond the supply areas of reform.
Table 7.1 Characteristics of Local Information Technology Organizations as Political Actors
Characteristic Example
Institutional flexibility Work with actors to build devices that can span institutional
boundaries, such as linking citizen complaint modules to revenue
collections at the zone, division, and ward level.
Span institutional scales When appropriate build connections to political actors that are
beyond the immediate project implementation setting, so that local
innovations and analyses do not stay local.
Develop a tool robust to Using the design of revenue collection modules to collect
stress information on practices beyond those captured in direct financial
transactions with government
Come with good Have knowledge of political, administrative, and fiscal processes
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expertise that are situated in the local context, not just knowledge connected
to the legal policy framework and financial regulations
Jump to whatever Be prepared to seek out different opportunities to continue
opportunity is perceived aggregating financial information, acknowledging that
next opportunities for political accountability come in punctuated,
catalytic moments.
From a governance and policy standpoint, what is puzzling is that urban local bodies seem to
exert their autonomy in irrational ways. However, from a political standpoint, the political loss function
from more effective internal control was substantial at least in the case of the BBMP. First, cities
strategically assert their powers of autonomy by initiating complex information technology projects.
Second,just as they can invite organizations at will into core areas of the PFM system, they can close
organizations off at will. Third, even as technology organizations demonstrate small wins and generate
revenues for city government far beyond their monetary costs, their technology is perceived as a threat to
certain interests inside the state. What are the implications for a non-government technology supplier like
the Indian CST? As a result of the partnership with the state finance commission, the Indian CST is in a
good position to come back into the Bangalore municipal government when these political opportunities
open again.
For organizations that are agile enough, this is a positive development. Numerous studies in
social movement literature indicate that democratization depends on opportunities that are often randomly
distributed over time. From a planning perspective, the picture is more complicated. First, even as the
material costs of sophisticated financial management information systems can be driven down to
extremely low levels relative to proprietary systems, there are substantial political costs. Information is
not free, not least the type of information that impinges on political interests and the path dependent
development trajectory of IT firms in quasi-market settings. The dissertation reveals that the cheaper the
process is to air an agent's dirty laundry (to borrow a common colloquialism), the more lethal the process
becomes.
Notwithstanding the normative debates between transparency researchers and new public
management, the business/organizational delivery platform adopted by the Indian CST ensured that
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mistakes were revealed faster and made public by sweeping bank accounts beyond supervision through
bank reconciliations and other audits. The administrative behavior of the municipal corporation and the
BBMP council indicates that officials and politicians perceive it in their interest to present information in
a disorganized format (or not present the information at all). When the Administrator released the
information on the pending bills, he did not do so in an easily accessible format. Absent the work of the
Aam Aadmi Party activists integrating the information with the Indian CST's Global Project Management
System (GPMS), the scope of use would have been limited.
The Karnataka Municipal Corporation Act (1976) does not require the BBMP to publish internal
audits, only that the BBMP carries them out. The Comptroller and Auditor General (CAG) periodically
carries out limited audits and publishes the results online. To date, the BBMP has not released the
information supplied to it by the Indian CST regarding financial irregularities. The interim institutions
(Adler, Sage, and Woolcock 2009) that had been constructed on the Global Project Management System
and Financial Management System made them far less effective at shifting the cost of processing and
passing financial information onto public interest groups. To the extent that information processing
activities can be organized in a minimal amount of time, the verification costs (Pritchett 2013, 2009) of
public financial management information are reduced.
7.5 Implications for Theory and Practice
The technological architecture of local public financial management systems has not featured
prominently as either a dependent or independent variable in the research on municipal finance reform in
developing countries. Yet, over the past two decades there has been considerable growth in large-scale
computerization initiatives in the fiscal domain of local governments and the trend, at least in India, will
not abate.
7.5.1 Fiscal Information, Power, and the IT Artifact in Local Public Financial Management
While financial management information systems (FMIS) aspire to normative goals like financial
control, reengineering business processes, fiscal transparency and accountability, the nature and role of
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information technology controls, training, connectivity, integration, and evaluation cannot simply be
relegated to the esoteric technical considerations. More importantly, the technical is not simply political.
The technical is made political by certain actions, under certain conditions, and following certain
justifications.
Recent studies of transparency and accountability initiatives (TAIs) have expressed concern over
perspectives that frame TAIs as "tools" that can be divorced from long-term engagement by social actors
with the state through institutions of collective representation like political parties. It is argued that the
formulation of social accountability in terms of a "widget" depoliticizes the way in intensely political
process by which the poor access services (Joshi and Houtzager 2012). While an overly narrow technical
framing of solutions to service delivery problems is problematic with respect to concerns over equity and
justice in urban service delivery, one of the main conclusions of this study is that the widget makes the
watchdog.
As a developer involved in the design of the GPMS and FMS systems remarked:
Because information is power... ifyou can have same information without talking to me
then I lose this power.1 36
The modernization of local public financial management confronts a dilemma when situated against the
features of contemporary urbanization in India. On the one hand, expansion of the city's functional
geography and associated increases in the complexity of urban management require an increase in "arm's
length" management decisions. Though we have understood for some time the effects of diseconomies of
scale in public administration, information technology is a compelling alternative for gaining financial
management control in large metropolitan cities. Yet, while chapter 5 showed that FMIS adoption allows
engineers and other bureaucrats to manage at a distance, it also changes the nature of face-to-face
interactions.
These tradeoffs suggest that, along with contextual conditions, the design of financial
management information systems matters for the trajectory of financial management. Digital
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136 Interview, 4 June 2015.
technologies enable the rapid expulsion of information from protected niches, operational information,
and transaction information, among other types. In the context of Bangalore and many other cities in
India, the quality of that information in and of itself is not very high. The low quality of information
empowers organizations to litigate - the more information one gets the more right to information requests
one can submit which is good for instrumental accountability. Yet, from a normative standpoint, cycles of
litigation feed on themselves, they do not feed the transition to deep democracy. The assumption of deep
democracy is false.
7.5.2 Local Control: Public Financial Management-Led Decentralization and the Emergence of
Polycentric Regulatory Regimes
While information technology is certainly outside the core competences of public finance, the
study has demonstrated the consequences of IT for many of the outcomes of concern to the literature on
municipal finance reform in developing countries. In their review of urban governance and finance, Rao
and Bird (2010) argue that while accountability may be key to improved performance, improvements to
financial information is the key to accountability. The management of financial information, as much as
policy design, is foundational to the transformation of municipal finance in India.
The study elaborated how information and information technology feeds into design dissonance
in national urban policy. Through the empirical analysis contained in chapters three through six the study
shows how this design dissonance creates opportunities for elite capture. The logic of prevailing
instruments of national urban policy reform is based on principles of coercive federalism, but without the
backing of strong disciplinary power organized in vertically integrated political parties. While the design
and management of the Jawaharlal Nehru National Urban Renewal Mission (JNNURM) accelerated the
centripetal forces drawing technology firms into the core areas of technical administration for public
financial management, the 100 Smart Cities Scheme solidifies the trend by the normative legitimization
of special purpose vehicles (SPVs). Adopting a top-down perspective, these developments might be
construed as mishaps in policy design on the way to plugging the output gap in cities and urban areas. A
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bottom-up perspective reveals far more complex dynamics of implementation and implementation
capability in urban local bodies.
The study also chronicled the rise of expert systems and expert governance work by examining
long-term trends in the design of intergovernmental transfers to support national urban policy and finance
services in urban local bodies. There is a clear gap or mismatch between transfer design and institutions
of cooperative and competitive federalism that have informed national policy over the previous two
decades. This disjuncture has fueled the rise of contracting out arrangements that extend to traditional
functions of governance capacity, even as a growing body of planning research in India suggests external
support organizations are ill-prepared for the tasks which national urban policy has assigned them
(Baindur and Kamath 2009; Kundu 2014). Moving forward, national policy must acknowledge the plural,
polycentric regulatory environment at the local level that is being created for financial management in
urban local bodies. Such recognition is the first step in determining how to shape "incentives" and
"interests" in local financial management information systems projects.
First digital technology is not about incentives, it is about the nature of ownership. Within
ownership, sustainable development and use of digital technologies is about clearly expressing the
implications. Without ownership over digital technology, resistance inevitably arrives on the stage.
Resistance is bad for expenditure management, bad for revenue mobilization, bad, in the final instance,
for budgets. The autonomy and flexibility of the Indian CST's social outsourcing model - open-ended
customization with open source software delivered through a software as a service arrangement
(OpenSaaS) - has limitations.
The reliance on a strategy of integration through encroachment of the local financial system
opened up the Indian CST to antagonistic incumbents that successfully neutralized the Indian CST's
credibility by setting a "spoiler trap" (Kuris 2014). The spoiler trap was set through a through a credible
critique of the Indian CST's approach based on procedural norms. Even though the Indian CST could
demonstrate pragmatic legitimacy of their systems to the BBMP, they had far less normative legitimacy
given that the Indian CST did not follow a conventional model for contracting out. Moreover, the
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Memorandum of Understanding (MoU) signed by the Indian CST and the BBMP did not have terms
related to the suspension of services of the Indian CST.
The dissertation also describes the strategic dilemma of the "spoiler trap" for external support
organizations working in public financial management. As an external service provider with limited
diversification across two subsystems of financial management in municipal government, the Indian CST
could not easily push back against the treatment with the threat of public sanction. Walking away from
such a high-profile client was a reputational risk for a comparatively small player, particularly one that
adopts a Software as a Service (SaaS) model. What are the implications of these findings for national
policy?
First, incentivizing the adoption of financial management information systems in municipal
governments without improving the institutional mechanisms for the fair and effective management of
mistakes that are revealed in the process is a recipe for eventual loss of confidence in the external support
organization and overall legitimacy of the aims towards effective management. Consequently, we can say
that, in practice, there is no such thing in India as incentivizing the uptake of digital information
technology in the fiscal domain. External incentives make no difference (as the spoiler trap discussion
shows). It is internal incentives that determine the form, extent, and duration of what digital technologies
get taken up or not. What these observations amount to is that the national government needs to offer
tools with no condition of uptake along with a truth and reconciliation panel that allows cities to air dirty
laundry, recognize path dependencies, and think through their level of comfort with the current status of
the public and private domains in urban governance. Until these issues are addressed, the Central Finance
Commission will likely continue to express dismay at the inability to collect systemized revenue
information for all urban local bodies.
7.5.3 Embedded Values of Implementation
This case under examination was not one of shifting the locus of corruption to the local
government-contractor nexus. Rather, the dilemma resulted from the technical specialization of the Indian
Centre for Social Transformation - what the building state capability (BSC) approach refers to as the
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"technical core" - and the competition that existed between the BBMP and the multiple FMIS providers
to the city. The technical core of the Indian CST is captured by their Software as a Service (SaaS) model
(and their techniques for organizing data and translating it into actionable information), which created
incentives to continue to improve operational information to increase the auditability of the city's
accounting.
By analyzing the Indian CST's approach to information technology development in complex
institutional settings, the study also contributes to implementation of reform with the concept of the
embedded values of implementation. The Indian CST, along with the senior managers in the BBMP that
expended resources and pushed hard for the systems, adopted values of rational financial management
linked to information democratization and accountable relations within urban management. The Indian
CST accepted the premise that by using information technology society can push for more rational
financial management and urban governance that is responsive to the signals provided in information
produced in financial management information systems. Nevertheless, the Indian CST was willing to go
beyond conventional boundaries of the municipal government bureaucracy to achieve their end goal of
greater transparency and public participation in local financial governance.
As a social enterprise serving a particular client - the Bangalore municipal government - the
Indian CST could only maneuver in such a manner to build external connections to increase public
awareness and participation by organizing when no one was watching. This leads to a paradoxical
position for information technology in relation to democratic control over local financial management. On
the one hand, the use of financial management information systems requires accountability for the senior
executives that sanction the development and use of the systems in government. On the other hand,
forging stronger connections with political and civil organizations in society in some ways requires these
same senior executives to not pay attention at critical moments so that technology organizations can
informally capture financial information, package it in politically salient ways, transmit it to social actors
outside the state, and mobilize issue networks to hold the state accountable. When this process entails
moving up the institutional scale to state and national government, as it did with the public interest
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litigation in Bangalore, the complexity and stakes of such actions for technology providers increases as
well.
Consequently, the case of Bangalore does point to a certain distancing of certain parts of the local
fiscal domain from citizens as a direct consequence of the splintering of fiscal transactions across multiple
parallel information technology systems. Data from the case also suggests this splintering can be
overcome at the margins through distinct forms of social mobilization in which the "skilled analysis,
deployments, and coordination grounded in local knowledge" enable institutional entrepreneurs to
outflank institutional incumbents (Clegg 2010, 10). How did the Indian CST, a significantly smaller
organization than private sector consulting firms such as Tata Consulting Services or the high political
profile Bangalore Agenda Task Force, sustain engagement over more than six years? Contrary to
dominant propositions that posit the need for sustained high-level political will and commitment for
reform, the empirical material presented in the previous chapters reveals a strategy of exploiting tensions
"between the attempt to control from above and the striving for autonomy from below...between formal
and informal regulations" (Friedberg 1996, 114). Such developments may not transform accountability
relations within urban politics, but they do open up spaces for contestation that were previously closed to
social and political actors in society.
7.6 Conclusion
The more practitioner-oriented literature on public financial management reform has tended to
frame the institutional work chronicled in this dissertation as a happening in a closed structure comprised
of generic, universally-accepted budget codes that can, in turn, support either a "basics first" or
performance-oriented management system (Andrews 2006; Schick 1998). This has led to an
overemphasis on the technical attributes of financial management reform, which comes at the expense of
knowledge on the social and political attributes of reform in municipal governments. This dissertation
makes an original contribution by unpacking these social and political attributes in a major municipal
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government in India - Bangalore - and tracing the consequences for social mobilization around financial
management reform.
Political agency and participation in the fiscal domain of local government has tended to be
perceived in the structure and functioning (or non-functioning) of government budgets (Andrews 2010;
Rakner et al. 2004) or in the particular design and administration of tax instruments (Slack and Bird
2013). Despite acknowledging problems of uncertainty (e.g. incomplete information and control),
indeterminacy (administrative and political volatility), and ambiguity (weak institutional enforcement)
across the range of factors that influence financial performance in local government, most research treats
the foundational process of constructing situated classification regimes in the fiscal domain of local
government as a residual category of analysis. To date, most research on information technology for
government fiscal operations has considered aspects of information observation and verification narrowly
in terms of technical reform decisions, while the broader social process of verification has not been given
due consideration as a terrain of dispute and political agency. Moreover, often framed with a bias towards
"best practice" and built on outdated assumptions regarding the source of information technology
development capabilities in rich countries, research has mostly neglected the potential cohering in techno-
institutional configurations based on situated knowledge, deep commitment to reform, and close
proximity between information technology intermediaries and local bureaucrats.
Research into financial management reform in city governments in the global South, a necessary
though not sufficient state function for improved transparency and accountability in governance, must
channel more resources into studies of situated organizing through the use of information technology.
Indeed, as the study described in chapter three, IT-driven financial reform is increasingly tied up with
decentralization implementation in India. The findings of this dissertation are thus essential to a proper
understanding of the relationship between core and non-core areas of local financial management reform
and broader implications for municipal finance reform in India. Such investments are more than justified
by the amount of resources now dedicated to computerizing the back office operations and linking those
information flows to wider venues of public access, whether online or in person. Far more important are
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the potential gains and losses at stake for the long-run achievements of local democratization that can, in
turn, improve information management and realize the benefits long desired by apex national finance
institutions and civic entrepreneurs working in the trenches of basic urban government systems in India.
Future research on information technology and public financial management can focus on the
extent to which cities balance their self-interest and baseline duties with these disruptive technologies.
Such studies could examine how actors draw out demand for financial information management
transparency and accountability while also being reflexive about history and context. Do municipal
governments ever voluntarily adopt and institutionalize these disruptive technologies without spawning
cyclical litigation? Does such a cycle fence people off through claiming proprietary information over
certain financial transactions, thus preventing any possibility for integration of financial management
information systems within an urban political economy? This type of organizing activity and institutional
work may be "at the margins" of municipal finance reform in developing countries, but it holds
significant implications for citizen's day-to-day interactions with municipal finance systems and therefore
the potential for new technology actors and organizations to contribute to incremental change that
progressively leads to transformation of important systems for the sustainable and inclusive development
of cities in the long run.
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Appendix One: List of Interviews and Meeting Observations
Indian Centre for Social Transformation
1. Director, Indian CST (16 March 2015)
2. Lead Analyst, Indian CST (6 May 2015)
3. Founder, Indian CST (7 May 2015)
4. Founder, Indian CST (18 May 2015)
5. Director, Indian CST (20 May 2015)
6. Lead Analyst, Indian CST (26 May 2017)
7. Project Leader (Lead Programmer) (30 May 2015)
8. Independent Consultant, Comptroller and Auditor General (4 June 2015)
9. Independent Consultant, Comptroller and Auditor General (4 June 2015)
10. Lead Analyst (5 June 2015)
11. On-Site Coordinator (17 June 2015)
12. Project Leader (Lead Programmer) (15 July 2015)
13. Project Manager, Indian CST (31 July 2015)
14. General Manager - Operations, Namma Bengaluru Foundation (3 November)
15. Lead Analyst, Indian CST (5 December 2015)
16. Founder, Indian CST (5 December 2015)
17. General Manager - Operations, Namma Bengaluru Foundation (6 December)
Bruhat Bengaluru Mahangara Palike (BBMP)
18. Chief Accounts Officer (29 May 2015)
19. Former Special Commissioner, Projects (3 July 2015)
20. Principal Consultant FBAS Cell, MaGC (15 July 2015)
21. Former Special Officer (Finance) (16 July 2015)
22. Former Special Commissioner, Projects (17 July 2015)
23. Assistant Controller Finance (West Zone) (20 July 2015)
24. Former Special Commissioner, Projects (30 July 2015)
25. Joint Commissioner (Mahadevapura Zone) (16 October 2015)
26. Former Special Commissioner, Projects (29 October 2015)
27. Technical Assistant to Engineer-in-Chief (23 November 2015)
28. Former Chief Accounts Officer, BBMP (8 December 2015)
29. Former Special Commissioner, Projects (8 December 2015)
30. Executive Engineer, Roads (11 December 2015)
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31. Engineer-in-Chief, BBMP (11 December 2015)
32. Former Special Officer (Finance) (15 December 2015)
Government of India
33. Deputy Director General, National Informatics Centre (3 June 2015)
34. Deputy Secretary, Ministry of Urban Development (3 June 2015)
35. Joint Secretary (E-Governance), Ministry of Electronics and Information Technology (4 June
2015)
36. Independent Consultant, Comptroller and Auditor General (4 June 2015)
37. Independent Consultant, Comptroller and Auditor General (4 June 2015)
Government of Karnataka
38. Additional Chief Secretary, Urban Development Department (10 June 2015)
39. Director of Accounting, Municipal Reforms Cell (4 November 2015)
Aam Aadmi Party Activists
40. AAP Activist 1 (20 May 2015)
41. AAP Activist 2 (28 May 2015)
42. AAP Activist 3 (18 June 2015)
43. AAP Activist 2 (18 June 2015)
44. AAP Activist 4 (23 July 2015)
45. AAP Activist 5 (24 July 2015)
46. AAP Activist 6 (28 July 2015)
Experts and Scholars
47. Dr. Sandeep Thakur, National Institute of Urban Affairs (5 June 2015)
48. Balaji Parthasarahy, IIT-Bangalore (15 June 2015)
49. V. Ravichandar, Expert Committee to Restructure Bangalore (29 July 2015)
50. Srikanth Viswanathan, Janaagraha (1 October 2015)
List of Meetings Observed
1. Indian CST and Personal Assistant to Executive Engineer, CV Raman Nagar (14 May 2015)
2. Indian CST and Chief Accounts Officer, BBMP Head Office (29 May 2015)
3. Indian CST and Additional Chief Secretary Urban Development Department (Karnataka), Vikasa
Soudha (9 June 2015)
4. Indian CST and Special Commissioner (Finance and IT), Indian CST (17 June 2015)
5. Integration Committee Meeting, BBMP (22 June 2015)
6. Integration Committee Meeting, BBMP (8 July 2015)
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7. Indian CST and Engineer-in-Chief, Chief Engineer, and Executive Engineers, Indian CST (18
November 2015)
8. Municipal Commissioner Review Meeting, BBMP (20 November 2015)
9. Technical Assistant for Chief Engineer and Indian CST, Indian CST (21 November 2017)
10. Executive Engineers (Lakes) and Indian CST, Indian CST (23 November 2015)
11. Municipal Commissioner Review Meeting, BBMP (1 December 2015)
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Appendix 2: Semi-Structured Interview Instrument
Part I: Establish relationship to GPMS-FMS
Part II: Relationship between GPMS-FMS and work routines
Part II: Assess current status and ongoing use patterns
Part I:
1. What is your position in the office and what are your responsibilities?
2. How long have you been in this position?
3. Have you held a different position in the past? Did that position have public financial
management responsibilities?
4. How long have you used GPMS-FMS?
5. How did you first learn how to use GPMS-FMS?
6. Does GPMS-FMS help you to fulfill your responsibilities specific to your position? If so, how?
7. What time of day do you normally access GPMS-FMS to do work?
8. Are you rewarded for your work in GPMS-FMS? By whom and in what way?
9. Were politicians in this area involved in the process of adding information to GPMS-FMS or
maintaining the system?
10. Is technical capacity a constraint in this ward office? Is there sufficient technical expertise to
fulfill responsibilities?
11. What is the process for entering information into the GPMS-FMS? Can you walk me through the
steps?
12. What are the particular characteristics of this ward office that helped you or constrained you?
Part II
1. How does the GPMS-FMS influence your daily work routine? Has this changed from previous
years?
2. How did you react to new responsibilities (opportunities) when the GPMS-FMS was introduced
into the Bangalore city government?
3. Were there other reactions to the introduction of the GPMS-FMS? How would you describe
them?
4. How important is the GPMS-FMS to your job?
5. Do your responsibilities for using the GPMS-FMS affect the work of other departments? How?
How do other departments affect your work on the GPMS-FMS?
6. The GPMS-FMS is an open system meaning data entry can be viewed publicly. Does this affect
the way you do your job? How?
7. How does the Indian Centre for Social Transformation influence your work?
Part III
I. Other than entering basic information, how else have you used GPMS-FMS in the past? Has that
changed over time?
2. Can you explain the process of using GPMS-FMS to engage with citizens or your superiors?
3. Why have you continued to enter project information into the system?/Why did you stop entering
project information into the system?
4. Has the GPMS-FMS changed the way your department engages in public financial management?
If yes, how and why? If no, why?
5. Has the GPMS-FMS changed the way your department interacts with citizens?
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6. Have you ever felt pressure to not enter information into the system? Why?
7. What would you need to make updating the information in GPMS-FMS more appealing or
effective? Can you rank: recognition, salary, more resources, and/or more training, anything else?
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